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This dissertation examines the problem of historical determinism in the political 
thought of Alexis de Tocqueville. In Volume 2 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
criticizes historians in democratic centuries for undermining man’s belief in his ability to 
control his own fate by reducing both individuals and nations alike to the playthings of 
either an “inflexible providence” or “blind fatality.” And yet, as a cursory reading of both 
the Introduction to Democracy in America and the Introduction to The Ancien Regime 
and the Revolution reveals, Tocqueville himself appears to engage in the same practice. 
Whereas in the former he argues that men are but “blind instruments in the hands of 
God,” in the latter he argues that men are being “driven by an unknown force.” As many 
scholars therefore note, there appears to be a contradiction at the heart of Tocqueville’s 
thought: on the one hand, he is overtly critical of historical determinism; on the other 
hand, he appears to embrace some form of it. The question that this dissertation therefore 
addresses is: how should we understand this contradiction given Tocqueville’s oft-stated 
claim that his overriding concern, as both a statesman and a writer, is for the preservation 
of “liberty and human dignity” in a democratic age? Does Tocqueville differ from the 
democratic historians he criticizes? Or does he too succumb to what he calls the “mania 
of the century” and advance a theory of history that, whether he realizes it or not, reduces 
both individuals and nations alike to cogs in a historical machine? 
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Chapter 1: Tocqueville’s “Profoundly Ambiguous” Theory of History 
 
You have not reproached me as I anticipated for seeming to fall in to the mania of the 
century. But I reproach myself for it because I do not want to fall into it. You absolve me, 
and I accuse myself. I wake up every morning obeying a general and eternal law that I 
did not know existed the day before. Unfortunately, there are some of those laws.1 
 
 
- Tocqueville to his editor, Democracy in America 
 
 
In the Introduction to Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observes that 
while a “great democratic revolution is taking place among us,” it has essentially evoked 
two responses. While some people, he writes, view this revolution as “new and, taking it 
for an accident, still hope to be able to stop it,” others, he writes, think it is “irresistible, 
because it seems to them the most continuous, oldest and most permanent fact known in 
history.”2 Put more simply, while some people view this revolution as contingent or a 
product of chance, others view it as fated or a product of necessity. 
 A few pages later, however, Tocqueville reveals his own position. Everywhere 
one looks, he declares, “events” seem to profit democracy and “all men,” whether they 
intend to or not, help in “contributing” to its success. Regardless of their political 
leanings, all men have done their part. For according to Tocqueville, “Pushed pell-mell 
along the same path…all worked in common, some despite themselves, others without 
their knowledge, blind instruments in the hands of God.”3 In Tocqueville’s view, then, 
the gradual development of the equality of conditions, of democracy, is no accident. On 
                                               
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Eduardo Nolla, trans. James T. Schleifer (Liberty Fund 
Inc., 2009), 1285. See note “k.” 
2 Tocqueville, 6. 
3 Tocqueville, 10 (emphasis mine). 
 2 
the contrary, it is has the principal characteristics of what he famously calls a 
“providential fact.” Not only, he tells us, is it “universal” and “lasting” but also “escapes 
every day from human power.”4 Whether they are aware of it or not, “all men” and thus 
“all events” serve its development.5   
Still, as he argues at the very end of Democracy in America, that the revolution is 
no accident, that it is a “providential fact,” does not mean that history is somehow 
determined or a product of necessity. According to Tocqueville, he is well aware of the 
fact that several of his contemporaries believe that “here below people are never masters 
of themselves” and that they obey some “insurmountable and unintelligent force that 
arises from previous events, from race, from soil, or from climate.”6 But as he proceeds 
to declare, “those are false and cowardly doctrines that can produce only weak men and 
pusillanimous nations. Providence did not create mankind entirely independent or 
altogether enslaved.”7  
Man, it would therefore seem, is not as powerless as Tocqueville at first appears 
to suggest. For as it turns out, democracy is not entirely beyond the reach of “human 
power,” after all. While nations today cannot “make conditions” unequal, they can, 
Tocqueville nevertheless assures us, decide “whether equality leads them to servitude or 
liberty, to enlightenment or barbarism, to prosperity or misery.”8 They may be stuck with 
equality, but that does mean that they are somehow fated to lose their liberty. They are 
not predetermined to be “brought back,” as Rousseau puts it in The Second Discourse, “to 
                                               
4 Tocqueville, 10–11. 
5 Tocqueville, 12. 
6 Tocqueville, 1284. 
7 Tocqueville, 1285 (emphasis mine). 
8 Tocqueville, 1285. 
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a new state of nature:” a time and place where “the notions of good and the principles of 
justice vanish once again.”9  
Similarly, in the Introduction to the The Ancien Regime and the Revolution, 
Tocqueville tells us that even “in the midst of the darkness of the future we can already 
discover three very clear truths,” the first of which that “all the men of our days are 
driven by an unknown force…”10 According to Tocqueville, sometimes this force 
“pushes them gently,” other times violently. Either way, however, it is pushing them 
towards the total “destruction of aristocracy.” As Tocqueville therefore presents it, this 
force appears to be as insurmountable as the “insurmountable and unintelligent” ones that 
he briefly refers to at the very end of Democracy in America.11 To be sure, he never 
reveals what this force is. It is not clear if it “arises from previous events, from race, from 
soil, or from climate.” What Tocqueville does tell us about this force, however, is that 
despite being unknown it cannot be “vanquished” and so cannot be resisted. This force, 
whether men like it or not, is the historical equivalent of a Leviathan: “king of all of the 
children of pride,” the aristocratic few who otherwise refuse to accept their fate. 
Even so, just as Tocqueville insists in Democracy in America that while human 
beings are “blind instruments in the hands of God,” “Providence did not create mankind 
entirely independent or altogether enslaved,” he insists in The Ancien Regime that while 
all men are being driven by an “unknown force,” this force should not be mistaken as 
                                               
9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Second Discourse in The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau: The Two Discourses and the Social Contract, ed. and trans. John T. Scott (University of 
Chicago Press, 2012), 115. 
10 Alexis de Tocqueville, L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, edited by J.-P. Mayer (Gallimard, 1967), 50. 
Translation is my own. 
11 Tocqueville, 50. 
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evidence of the fact that “here below people are never masters of themselves.” While 
human beings cannot defeat this force, they can, nonetheless, hope to “regulate and slow” 
it.12 For although democracy—a social-state in which people are “no longer tied to one 
another by bonds of caste, class, guild, or family”—is especially prone to despotism, it is 
democracy and not despotism per se that is inevitable.13  
Thus, just as Tocqueville concludes Democracy in America by assuring his 
readers that while equality is here to stay, there are nevertheless important choices left to 
make, so he concludes The Ancien Regime by assuring his readers that while the “modern 
spirit” is permanent and irreversible, this spirit is manageable nonetheless. As the 
example of the province of Languedoc illustrates, human beings have more control over 
this force than one might otherwise assume. Although the modern spirit may have 
destroyed everything “everywhere else,” explains Tocqueville, its doing so was not 
inevitable. In Languedoc, “rulers” rose to the occasion. They made it so “the modern 
spirit could peacefully penetrate [its assembly] and change everything while destroying 
nothing.”14 As Tocqueville therefore tells us, if not for the selfishness of statesmen “it 
could have been the same everywhere else,” too. If only rulers had “wanted to do 
anything but become and remain masters,” they too could have adapted institutions to the 
needs of modern civilization, and thus prevented the modern spirit from destroying 
everything in its path, as well.15  
                                               
12 Tocqueville, 50. 
13 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Ancien Regime and the Revolution, ed. Jon Elster, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5. Henceforth, all in-text quotations from The Ancien Regime are from 
this translation. 
14 Tocqueville, 195. 
15 Tocqueville, 195. 
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In sum, from his very first major work to his very last, Tocqueville appears to 
subscribe to a theory of history that at once denies and affirms human freedom; that at 
once affirms and denies some form of historical determinism. For while he seems, on the 
one hand, to accept the Hegelian-Kojèvian premise that history is inevitably moving 
(whether one likes it or not) in a certain direction—that history is determined by certain 
“general or eternal” laws—he in no uncertain terms rejects, on the other hand, the 
Marxist-Kojèvian conclusion about where history is inevitably headed. Put another way, 
while democracy is inevitable the “end of history” is not; while democracy is necessarily 
the way, a world in which there is no politics, where the human race has become a re-
animalized herd of cattle that does nothing by “graze,” is not necessarily the place.16 
Although the past is closed, the future somehow remains open-ended. Hence as the 
German thinker, Karl Löwith, argues, while Tocqueville (along with Spengler and 
Toynbee) seems to believe in a “historical destiny,” his belief is by no means “the result 
of a single minded acceptance of natural fate; it is profoundly ambiguous because of [his] 
counter belief in man’s responsibility for history through decisions and will—a will 
which is always directed to a future of indeterminate possibilities.”17  
THE DEBATE OVER TOCQUEVILLE’S “PROFOUNDLY AMBIGUOUS” THEORY OF 
HISTORY 
 
That Tocqueville scholars have spent a great deal of time and energy trying to 
make sense of Tocqueville’s theory of history should therefore come as no surprise. 
                                               
16 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Cornell University Press, 1980); Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Nietzsche: Untimely Meditations (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 60. 
17 Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (University 
of Chicago Press, 1957), 11 (emphasis mine). 
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Indeed, as Marvin Zetterbaum observes, given the profound ambiguity surrounding 
Tocqueville’s apparently half-hearted endorsement of historical determinism, the “search 
for something equivalent to a philosophy of history in his writings has been carried on as 
avidly, and in as many directions, as the search for his true intent.”18   
What are these directions? According to Zetterbaum, they begin with 
Tocqueville’s close friend, John Stuart Mill, who in his review of Volume 1 of 
Democracy in America, identifies Tocqueville as a disciple of the modern idea of 
progress. In keeping with the “foremost continental thinkers,” observes Mill, Tocqueville 
begins from a conclusion that only but a few his English contemporaries, “in their most 
far-reaching speculations,” have “yet arrived”: that “the progress of democracy neither 
can nor ought to be stopped;” “that a progress which has continued with uninterrupted 
steadiness for so many centuries” can no longer “be staved…”19 Accordingly, in Mill’s 
view Tocqueville merely restates an argument “familiar to every continental writer with 
any pretensions to philosophy:” that history, like nature, “does nothing in vain;” that it is 
ultimately rational; that it follows certain ineluctable laws; that it is not simply an “altar 
on which the happiness of nations, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals are 
slaughtered.”20 In other words, in Mill’s view, Tocqueville merely reaffirms what many 
                                               
18 Marvin Zetterbaum, Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy (Stanford University Press, 1967), 4. 
19 John Stuart Mill, “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America,” in The Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, Volume XVIII - Essays on Politics and Society Part I, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by Alexander 
Brady (University of Toronto Press, 1977), 50-51 (emphasis mine). 
20 Immanuel Kant, “Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” in Kant’s Political Writings, 
translated by H.B. Nisbet and edited by H.S. Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 43-44; Immanuel 
Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch in Kant’s Political Writings, translated by H.B. Nisbet and 
edited by H.S. Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 108; G.W.F Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, 1980), 69. 
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other French historians and intellectuals with whom Mill was familiar, already argue: that 
history is progressive.21 
But does he? Not according to Jack Lively and Catherine Zuckert. As they argue, 
to identify Tocqueville as a disciple of the modern of idea of progress is to overlook 
certain fundamental differences between his theory of history, on the one hand, and those 
put forward by French historians like Condorcet, Saint-Simon, and Comte and their 
descendants, on the other. According to Lively, although the opening words of 
Tocqueville’s “first major work seem to attach him firmly to a dominant theme in 
nineteenth century thought,” he is less attached to that theme than meets the eye.22 True, 
his words are suggestive of the idea that there is “some absolute and comprehensive 
causal or metaphysical or teleological pattern within the historical process.”23 Important 
to keep in mind, however, is that Tocqueville never explicitly advances a “schematic 
history based on a scientific law or metaphysical pattern which would explain and justify 
the inevitable course of the future into democracy by pointing out the evident course of 
the past.”24 Put another way, he simply does not present his readers with a clearly 
articulated historical system of the kind that Auguste Comte, for instance, advances. This 
therefore begs the question: if his theory of history does not rely on some absolute or 
comprehensive causal, metaphysical, or teleological pattern, then to what does it owe its 
                                               
21 See John Stuart Mill, “Essays on French History and Historians,” in The Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, Volume XX, ed. John M. Robson. University of Toronto Press, 1985. In these Essays, Mill surveys the 
interpretive of method of French historians including Voltaire, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, François Mignet, 
François Guizot, Augustin Thierry, and August Comte. 
22 Jack Lively, The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville (Oxford University Press, 1962), 
33. 
23 Lively, 33. 
24 Lively, 33. 
 8 
apparent rationality? The answer, according to Lively, is that “it was not History or 
Progress which rendered the emergence of some form of social democracy necessary, but 
certain concrete psychological, social and economic conditions of contemporary 
society.”25 It was a combination of causes that by conspiring together made democracy 
necessary. Similarly and as Zuckert argues, while Tocqueville, like Hegel, “sees modern 
politics as the product of an historical development which limits the alternatives by 
bringing to light a new truth,” unlike Hegel, Tocqueville “sees that there is still 
uncertainty with regard to the outcome.”26 For Hegel, the outcome of this historical 
development is the modern administrative or bureaucratic state. For Tocqueville, 
however, such an outcome is at most only a future possibility: a kind of despotism that 
democracy has to “fear.”27  For him, there is no “end” to history because as Zuckert 
writes, unlike Hegel he did not see “the course of history as the unfolding of one 
fundamental principle.” Rather, he thought that “several relatively independent 
developments or factors have conjoined to make human beings more and more equal to 
another.”28  
Even so, other interpretations of Tocqueville’s theory of history stress the 
apparently fundamental role that Tocqueville assigns to “providence.” As Albert 
Solomon, R.P. Marcel and, most recently, Eduardo Nolla, argue, Tocqueville’s theory of 
history is not simply derivative of those put forward by the foremost continental thinkers 
                                               
25 Lively, 33. 
26 Catherine Zuckert, “Political Sociology Versus Speculative Philosophy,” in Interpreting Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America, ed. Ken Masugi (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991), 122. 
27 Zuckert, 123. As Zuckert puts it, “where Hegel regards the bureaucracy as the embodiment of rationality, 
Tocqueville worries that centralization will eventually stifle all liberty along with all initiative.” 
28 Zuckert, “Political Sociology Versus Speculative Philosophy,” 122. 
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because unlike those put forward by Condorcet, Saint-Simon, or Comte, Tocqueville’s 
theory of history remains deferential to the theological doctrine of providence. It 
“combines some of the most arbitrary conclusions of the eighteenth-century rationalists 
and the historical school with the fundamental conceptions of religious writers”—writers, 
for instance, such as Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet.29 With this, Nolla seems to agree. In his 
view, Tocqueville’s theory of history puts him closer to Bossuet than to Guizot because, 
like the former, Tocqueville “believes that all the facts of history obey a divine plan, the 
meaning of which escapes us, but one that men can predict and whose general tendencies 
they can discover.”30 Consequently, rather than begin where “every continental writer 
with any pretensions to philosophy” (as Mill puts it) begins, these scholars argue that 
Tocqueville begins where Saint Augustine begins: from the premise that the world is 
ultimately governed, not by some law of progress but by providence. Indeed, as Solomon 
explains, although Tocqueville understands human existence as being “by nature 
historical and social,” this “historical and social actuality of man is the will and the 
wisdom of a Divine Providence. The rise and the growth of the democratic movement 
points to the will of the Almighty in its irreversible process…The wisdom of Providence 
illuminates the direction in which mankind moves.”31  
Like Mill’s “continental” interpretation, however, Solomon’s, Marcel’s, and 
Nolla’s “wisdom of Divine Providence” interpretation is also questionable. For upon 
                                               
29 Marcel, Essai Politique sur Alexis de Tocqueville (Alcan, 1940), 86. As Marcel goes on to elaborate, 
“Tocqueville's striking and singular feeling…is his profound faith in the intervention of a sovereign Master 
in human destinies; it has a curious and anachronistic appearance and recalls imperiously Bossuet” (87). 
30 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, cxviii. 
31 Albert Solomon, “Tocqueville’s Philosophy of Freedom: A Trend Toward Concrete Sociology,” Review 
of Politics, Vol. 1, No.4 (1939), 410. 
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reflection, there is nothing all that theological about Tocqueville’s invocation of 
providence. As Edward Gargan writes, “Tocqueville, it is true, freely used the idea that 
such universal results had a providential cast. Historical phenomena inviting prognosis 
were, as was the democratic movement, universal and durable.” But as Gargan also 
points out, “When Tocqueville sought the sacred support of Providence to give force to 
his observations, the test that he employed was a profane one: the presence in any 
historical process of that which is constant and cumulative in impact, the extensive 
evidence that a process in history was unfolding toward an ascertainable present and 
dimly known future.”32 Consequently, for Tocqueville history is not so much governed 
by God’s mysterious or unintelligible will as it is by an entirely discernable process. For 
Augustine and Bossuet, providence is a mystery; its plan cannot be subjected to an 
empirical test. But for Tocqueville, this is simply not the case. For him, providence is 
knowable by means of human reason alone. Upon reflection, therefore, Tocqueville strips 
providence of its orthodox meaning and thus deprives it of its “consequentialism, which 
is its marrow.”33 
 Finally, Hayden White, offering a somewhat different interpretation of 
Tocqueville’s theory of history, argues that far from viewing history as either progressive 
(like Condorcet, Saint Simon, or Comte) or providential (like Bossuet and Augustine), 
                                               
32 Edward Gargan, “Tocqueville and the Problem of Historical Prognosis,” American Historical Review, 
Vol. 68, No. 2 (January, 1963), 334. 
33 Harvey Mitchell, Individual Choice and the Structures of History: Alexis de Tocqueville as Historian 
Reappraised (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 295. For more on Tocqueville’s use of the phrase 
“providential fact” see Seymour Drescher, Dilemmas of Democracy: Tocqueville and Modernization, 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), 27-29. According to Drescher, like Beaumont, who “also clearly 
used ‘providential fact’ in a secular developmental context,” Tocqueville uses the phrase to draw attention 
to “historical trends, and not to scriptural authority or general hypotheses about human nature.”  
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Tocqueville regards history as fundamentally tragic. As White explains, “If Tocqueville 
had been an Idealist (or Organicist) thinker, he would have been impelled to see in [the 
transition from aristocracy to democracy] a positive growth in human consciousness in 
general, a growth which would have been perceivable in the increased sophistication of 
thought and expression in his own age over that of all previous times—in the manner of 
Hegel or for that matter Ranke.”34 Yet, whatever Tocqueville sees in this transition it can 
hardly be defined in terms of a “positive growth.” As White goes on to elaborate,  
The growth which Tocqueville discerned in the [historical] process is not to be found in 
the progress of consciousness in general so much as in the power of the forces which 
alone benefit from the decline of aristocracy and the rise of democracy: the power of the 
centralized state on the one hand and the power of the masses on the other. And, in his 
view, these two forces aggregate and combine in such a way as to offer a critical threat, 
not only to civilization and culture as he conceived them, but also to humanity itself.35  
 
In White’s view, therefore, Tocqueville presents the inevitability of democracy not as a 
positive development but an alarming and ultimately tragic one. It is not so much 
evidence of the fact that history is progressive as it is that history is regressive, for it is 
not so much evidence of the fact that civilization, culture, and humanity are safe as it is 
that they are in grave danger. Hence as White later writes, “The whole process has the 
inevitability of a Tragic Drama.”36 It does not so much evoke hope as it does terror—just 
as it apparently did in Tocqueville himself.37  
                                               
34 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 195. 
35 White, 195. 
36 White, 195. 
37 As he tells us in the Introduction to Democracy in America, “The entire book that you are about to read, 
has been written under the impression of a sort of religious terror produced in the soul of the author by the 
sight of this irresistible revolution that has marched for so many centuries over all obstacles, and that we 




Now, as different as each of these interpretations of Tocqueville’s theory of 
history may seem, they are more alike than they are dissimilar because, as it turns out, all 
of them suffer from the same fundamental shortcoming. Insofar as they are all focused on 
locating “something equivalent to a philosophy of history” in Tocqueville’s thought, all 
of them, whether it be White’s or Mill’s, fail to take into account Tocqueville’s paudience 
as a writer: statesmen. Lest one forget, “Tocqueville writes with full consciousness of the 
requirements of political practice; his first consideration is always the effect his thought 
will have on society. It is as a statesman writing for statesmen,” Zetterbaum observes, 
“that Tocqueville is to be understood.”38 And statesmen, Tocqueville is readily aware, 
exhibit fundamentally different habits of the mind than do philosophers.  
In a speech given to the annual public meeting of the Academy of Moral and 
Political Sciences in1852, Tocqueville says that “there are two parts of politics that must 
not be confused, one fixed and the other in motion.”39 The fixed part, he explains, is 
“political science.” It is a part that is “founded on the nature of man, on his interests, on 
his faculties, on his needs as revealed by philosophy and history, [and] on his instincts, 
which change their objects according to the times without changing their nature, and 
which are as immortal as his race.”40 By contrast, that part of politics which is in motion 
is “the art of government.” It is a part of politics that involves struggling “against the 
                                               
38 Zetterbaum, Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy, 21. 
39 Alexis de Tocqueville, “Speech Given to the Annual Public Meeting of the Academy of Moral and 
Political Sciences on April 3, 1852,” translated by L. Joseph Herbert Jr. in Alexis de Tocqueville and the 
Art of Democratic Statesmanship, edited by Brian Danoff and L. Joseph Hebert Jr. (Lexington Books, 
2011), 18. 
40 Tocqueville, 18. 
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difficulties of each day, adapting to the variety of incidents, providing for the passing 
needs of the moment, and calling to its aid the ephemeral passions of contemporaries.”41 
Consequently, there is a tension if not opposition between these two parts of politics in 
that the former suggests “habits of the mind” which are “hardly favorable” to the latter. 
As Tocqueville explains, whereas the fixed part “enslaves” people “to the logic of ideas” 
and, in so doing, gives them a “taste for the fine, the delicate, the ingenious, the original,” 
the unfixed part enslaves people to “coarse commonplaces”—commonplaces that as he 
proceeds to admit, are actually what “lead the world.”42   
To write for statesmen, therefore, requires writing in a way that somehow bridges 
this divide. It requires writing in a way that sometimes ignores the logic of ideas and that 
articulates “coarse commonplaces” or “approximations” in their stead. In fact, it may 
even require writing in a way that advances certain false but salutary principles.43 In 
Volume 2, Part 3 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville offers his reflections on how 
Americans typically view the sciences. In the midst of doing so, however, he also enters 
into a more general discussion about “the habits of mind appropriate to action,” and how 
these habits relate to “thought.” As he explains, 
…now, the habits of mind appropriate to action are not always appropriate to thought. 
The man who acts is often reduced to being content with approximation, because he 
would never reach the end of his plan if he wanted to perfect each detail. He must rely 
constantly on ideas that he has not had the leisure to study in depth, for he is helped much 
more by the expediency of the idea that he is using than by its rigorous correctness; and 
everything considered, there is less risk for him in making use of a few false principles, 
than in taking up his time establishing the truth of all his principles. The world is not 
controlled by long, learned proofs. The rapid view of a particular fact, the daily study of 
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the changing passions of the crowd, the chance of the moment and the skill to grab hold 
of it, decide all matters there.44 
 
Here, Tocqueville echoes a sentiment first expressed by Machiavelli who, at the 
beginning of Chapter 15 in The Prince, criticizes the ancients for writing about politics 
not with a view to what is useful or effectual, but with a view to what is imaginary and 
thus useless.45 Like Machiavelli, Tocqueville points out that statesmen are not so much 
concerned with the truth of ideas as they are with the expediency of ideas because, given 
the nature of what they do, they have no choice but to be. Accordingly, for Tocqueville as 
for Machiavelli there is a real question as to whether statesmen should even try to act on 
“long learned proofs.” In a perfect world, they presumably would. But perfect worlds, as 
Machiavelli points out, do not exist. Statesmen do not live in them. Advising them to act 
on such proofs would therefore amount to engaging in a risky venture at best and a 
downright irresponsible one at worst. Unlike philosophers, they do not have the leisure 
required for “study.” They have to contend, on a daily basis, with fortune (what 
Tocqueville here calls “the chance of the moment”). In effect, it is much safer for both 
them and those they govern if, rather than adequately philosophize they at the very least 
adequately govern. True, this may require making use of less than true—which is also to 
say, somewhat false—principles. But as Tocqueville here suggests, this is a small price to 
pay given what is at stake.  
Consequently, the fact that The Ancien Regime, for instance, is not as historically 
accurate or “true” as Tocqueville explicitly claims is hardly surprising. As François Furet 
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observes, Tocqueville’s description of the Ancien Regime “involves a number of 
problems that deserve to be reviewed”—the first of which is that of its “historical 
accuracy.”46 According to Furet,  
…despite [Tocqueville’s] close attention to certain obstacles to the exercise of power 
under Ancien Regime—resulting from the extraordinary diversity in customs and 
procedures, and in the legal status of persons and communities—Tocqueville tended on 
the whole to overestimate the extent of administrative centralization in the Ancien 
Reigme…This fundamental belief, which ultimately contradicts other statements about 
the limits within which royal power had to operate, makes for some strange silences or 
unwarranted simplifications in Tocqueville’s treatment of the real historical forces of 
centralization.47 
 
Here, Furet reveals that despite being “remarkably knowledgeable about administrative 
archival sources for the eighteenth century” and, moreover, having the “intelligence to 
look at them at both ends of the hierarchical ladder,” Tocqueville erred in his analysis of 
certain aspects of the Ancien Regime.48 According to Furet, Tocqueville tended to 
“overestimate” the extent to which it was administratively centralized and because of 
this, contradicted himself. Yet, if Tocqueville is writing primarily for statesmen then 
what Furet calls “strange silences or unwarranted simplifications” may not be as strange 
or as unwarranted as they appear. On the contrary, they might be entirely warranted 
“approximations” given Tocqueville’s stated desire, as he tells us in the Introduction, “to 
paint a picture” that is not only “accurate” but also “educational.”49 Indeed, if 
Tocqueville’s aim is to show his readers how, despite hoping “to establish institutions 
that were not only democratic but also free,” the French Revolutionaries managed instead 
only to substitute and perfect one form of administrative tyranny for another—that is to 
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say, managed only to restore and strengthen precisely what they initially sought to 
destroy—why not overestimate the extent of administrative centralization in the Ancien 
Regime?50 Why not exaggerate the ironic kinship between what they destroyed, on the 
one hand, and what they ended up replacing it with, on the other?  
The question, we might therefore conclude, is not so much whether Tocqueville 
has a coherent theory of history and if so, what that theory is, but rather, why Tocqueville 
thought it important, from the perspective of a statesman writing primarily for statesmen, 
to insert himself into an otherwise abstract theoretical debate about the trajectory of 
human history in the first place? For what reason or reasons, and hence, to effect what 
political outcome or outcomes, did Tocqueville advance what, although never fully 
elaborated, has the appearance of a theory of history that at once affirms and denies 
human freedom?  
“NEUTRALITY AND THE USE OF HISTORY:” ZETTERBAUM ON TOCQUEVILLE’S THEORY 
OF HISTORY 
 
To be sure, this question is somewhat of an old one and already has a tentative 
answer. As intimated above, Zetterbaum is an outlier in the debate over Tocqueville’s 
theory of history in that he actually takes into account the fact that Tocqueville writes for 
statesmen. Indeed, unlike the scholars above, he readily acknowledges that Tocqueville is 
concerned with “the art of government.” Consequently, Zetterbaum provides an 
altogether different explanation for why Tocqueville has such a “profoundly ambiguous” 
theory of history.  
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According to him, despite his aristocratic upbringing and heritage, Tocqueville 
was at the end of the day a partisan of democracy, which he thought was at once more 
natural and just than aristocracy.51 As Zetterbaum also points out, however, Tocqueville 
nevertheless recognized that to take a side in the contest between aristocracy and 
democracy would be to risk exacerbating as opposed to resolving the “main political 
conflict of his time.”52 As a result, rather than explicitly promote democracy, rather than 
extol democracy’s virtues, Tocqueville chose instead to simply portray it as inevitable: as 
a “providential fact” beyond the reach of “human power.” This way, argues Zetterbaum, 
Tocqueville could give himself the appearance of being “neutral” while at the same time 
focusing “men’s attention on what [he] really cared about”—namely, “the task of 
perfecting” democracy, of “reconciling the demands justice with those of human 
excellence.”53 The inevitability thesis—Tocqueville’s historicism—Zetterbaum therefore 
concludes, is but a rhetorical smoke screen: it is “the shield behind which” Tocqueville 
can maintain his neutrality, “a neutrality that is not only compatible with the cause of 
democracy, but actively promotes it.”54  
As interesting as I find this explanation, however, it is for several reasons also 
problematic, beginning with the fact that it simply does not comport with the subsequent 
notion that democracy is really a “problem,” as Zetterbaum goes on to claim. According 
to Zetterbaum, despite its relative justice, democracy is a “problem” because it is 
antithetical to human excellence. “Traditionally, justice had been considered equivalent 
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to human excellence, or at least the expression of it.”55 However, as Tocqueville presents 
it, not only is the relative justice of democracy not equivalent to human excellence, it is 
undermining of human excellence. Left unchecked, democracy’s natural tendency—
namely, to equalize and level everything in its path—threatens to extinguish human 
excellence. In turn, this will condemn otherwise free peoples to servitude because the 
survival of liberty ultimately depends on the survival of human excellence. Important to 
recognize, however, is that this articulation of democracy as a “problem” makes sense 
only if it is actually inevitable or “beyond” man’s power, just as Tocqueville tells us. For 
otherwise, democracy would not really be as problematic as Zetterbaum claims. It would, 
in theory, remain something that is entirely reversible and thus subject to as opposed to 
undermining of human excellence. It would be much easier “perfect” than Zetterbaum 
argues. 
Second, even if the inevitability thesis is, at the end of the day, nothing more than 
a salutary myth—a “convenient means” to convince otherwise stubborn aristocrats that 
democracy, whether they like it not, is here to stay—Zetterbaum overlooks the fact that 
such a myth would be at least as undermining as supportive of the task of reconciling the 
demands of justice with those of excellence, and hence as undermining as it is supportive 
of Tocqueville’s project in Democracy in America and The Ancien Regime. Later on in 
the Introduction to Democracy in America, Tocqueville famously declares that a “new 
political science” is needed for a “world entirely new.”56 But just as it is important to 
recognize that democracy is a problem only to the extent that it is actually here to stay 
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(ie. inevitable), so it is important to recognize that this declaration for a “new political 
science” makes little sense given what immediately precedes it. In the pages leading up to 
this declaration, Tocqueville goes out of his way to argue that democracy, as novel as it 
might appear, did not just come into being overnight. Rather, it took 700 years.57 But as 
Tocqueville also makes clear, this 700-year transition from aristocracy to democracy had 
nothing to do with the free will of human beings, much less with their practicing some 
“architectonic art.”58 As noted above, the transition from aristocracy to democracy was 
the product of some unknown force, not simply chance. It had to do with men being used 
as either “blind instruments in the hands of God” or the unwitting agents of an unknown 
force beyond their control, not simply with them, deciding their own political fate. 
Consequently, to all of a sudden declare that a “new political science” is needed for a 
“world entirely new” is tantamount to all of a sudden granting otherwise blind human 
beings the gift of sight. Never mind the question of whether a new political science is 
“needed.” This is suddenly to declare, without so much as a providing an explanation, 
that political science is now possible. It is a declaration that simply does not follow from 
what precedes it and is therefore as open to the accusation of being as rhetorical as the 
inevitability thesis itself. Is political science possible in world where history is apparently 
governed by an “unknown force”? If Tocqueville’s raising this question can be 
interpreted as a “convenient means” to resolve the “main political conflict of his time,” 
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then it can at the very least also be interpreted as casting more doubt on the existence of 
free will than seems prudent. 
In fact, if one considers what Tocqueville himself writes about historians in 
“democratic centuries,” his raising this question seems altogether imprudent. In Volume 
2 of Democracy in America Tocqueville devotes an entire chapter to comparing and 
contrasting the methodological tendencies of historians in aristocratic and democratic 
centuries. Yet as it soon becomes apparent, the main difference between them is that 
whereas the former make “all events depend on the particular will and the mood certain 
men,” the latter “attribute to the individual almost no influence on destiny of the species, 
or to citizens on the fate of the people.”59 In effect, whereas aristocratic historians 
prioritize the influence of individuals in determining the course of history (and thus 
implicitly grant a kind of unfettered freedom from necessity to human beings) democratic 
historians prioritize the influence of general causes in determining even the smallest of 
“particular facts” (and thus implicitly deny that human freedom understood as something 
separate from necessity exists).60 Put another way, whereas aristocratic historians commit 
the methodological error of exaggerating the no doubt important role that human beings 
play in determining their own political fate, democratic historians commit the 
methodological error of denying that role. The end result, according to Tocqueville, is 
that whereas aristocratic historians, “particularly those of antiquity,” teach that “in order 
to become master of his fate and govern his fellows, man has only to know how to 
control himself,” democratic historians teach men “little except how to obey;” for they 
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ultimately teach a “doctrine of fatality” that, should it ever spread from them “to their 
readers,  would “soon paralyze the movement of new societies and would reduce 
Christians to Turks.”61  
When Tocqueville’s reservations about democratic historians are taken into 
account, therefore, his own flirtation with historical determinism comes into view as 
being much more problematic than it might, at first, seem. As Tocqueville goes on to 
point out, when compared to aristocratic peoples, democratic peoples are already “too 
inclined to doubt free will.”62 Why, then, would he risk exacerbating as opposed to 
mitigating this inclination? He may very well have been a partisan of democracy, but 
surely he could have found a better way to appear “neutral” than to embrace historicism 
and, in effect, risk casting more doubt on rather than bolster one’s faith in the existence of 
free will.63 To embrace such a theory is also to implicitly call into question the viability 
of his entire project. It is to risk being accused of precisely what he accuses others of 
doing: subjecting entire peoples to some “insurmountable force that arises from previous 
events, from race, from soil, or from climate.” 
Finally and, most importantly, Zetterbaum’s interpretation of Tocqueville’s theory 
of history arguably does the mirror opposite of the interpretations above—that is, 
overlooks Tocqueville’s no less genuine concern for that other part of politics, the part he 
calls “science.” As mentioned earlier, in his speech at the annual public meeting of the 
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Academy of Moral and Political Science in 1852 Tocqueville freely admits that the 
scientific part of politics has a way of enslaving people “to the logic of ideas…when it is 
coarse commonplaces that lead the world.” Still, as he goes to explain, to acknowledge 
the impractical nature of the former is not to say that it has nothing to do with latter. To 
argue as much, Tocqueville tells his audience, would be tantamount to arguing that 
political science is impossible—that science or philosophy has no connection with 
politics. Yet according to Tocqueville, this is simply not the case. “Political men,” he 
writes, tend to think that there is “something rather puerile…in imagining that there is a 
particular art that teaches one to govern.”64 And for good reason: as Tocqueville readily 
concedes, practice is often removed from theory. To “excel at one is no reason at all to 
succeed in the other;” one need only consider the example of Tocqueville himself.65 
Nevertheless, as Tocqueville also argues, those who disparage theory for being 
impractical or useless are simply wrong. Nay, they are barbaric. For as he eventually tells 
his audience, “barbarians are the only people who recognize nothing but practice in 
politics.”66  Yes, “political science and the art of governing are two very distinct 
things.”67 But this does not mean that “political science does not exist or is in vain.”68 On 
the contrary and as the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli illustrate, there is an 
important connection between theory and practice such that the latter is never fully 
removed from the former and vice versa.69 
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 According to Zetterbaum, however, the “political men” to whom Tocqueville is 
in this speech referring are essentially correct because given Zetterbaum’s interpretation 
of Tocqueville’s theory of history, Tocqueville himself is one of them. In Zetterbaum’s 
view, Tocqueville does not so much care about theory as he does about practice because 
he does not actually care, from a purely theoretical perspective, about the question of 
historical change and thus the philosophical problem of historical determinism. Rather, 
he cares only about whether the idea of historical determinism, regardless if it is true, can 
be used to “focus men’s attention.” In other words, from Zetternbaum’s perspective, 
Tocqueville cares only about the consequences of ideas and not about their truth or 
untruth. He cares about the truth only insofar as it is either effectual or ineffectual, not for 
its own sake. 
But is this actually the case? Does Tocqueville only care about the utility of ideas 
and not about their theoretical status (ie. whether they are true or untrue)? As many other 
scholars observe, it is not that simple. As Mitchell points out, although Tocqueville is 
known for having described philosophy to his friends as the “essence of all gibberish” 
and an “agony that man chooses and agrees to…inflict on himself,” the fact remains: like 
Machiavelli, Tocqueville “inflicted it on himself.”70 Moreover and as Harvey Mansfield 
observes, while in all three of his major works Tocqueville attacks, in one way or 
another, philosophers and philosophy, it is important to keep in mind that these attacks 
are directed towards a certain kind of philosopher and thus a certain kind of philosophy. 
“In each of his three books,” writes Mansfield, “he selects for criticism, not of any or all 
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philosophers, but the foundational philosophers of liberalism, who clarify, simplify, and 
(less explicitly) democratize—and who, in all this, innovate.”71 Philosophers like Plato, 
Aristotle, and Machiavelli—the very philosophers that Tocqueville considers exemplars 
of political science—get a pass. Lastly and as John Elster argues, while most people read 
Tocqueville as a political theorist and thus as being primarily if not exclusively 
concerned with practice, there is a strong case to be made that whatever his importance as 
a political thinker he was in no uncertain terms an important social scientist, as well. 
According to Elster, while “Tocqueville’s unsystematic, not to say incoherent, analyses 
detract from the value of Democracy in America as a guide to either democracy or 
America,” Democracy in America is a book that is nevertheless “filled to the brim—
indeed, sometimes overflowing—with small and medium-sized causal mechanisms and 
highly sophisticated methodological insights…”72 To be sure, Elster is wrong to conclude 
that “Tocqueville’s unsystematic, not to say incoherent, analyses detract from the value 
of Democracy in America.” On the contrary and as I shall argue, its value lies in precisely 
this. For now, however, it is important simply to note that Elster is right to point to a 
genuine and separate concern, on Tocqueville’s part, for identifying “causal mechanisms” 
regardless of their practical implications.    
As much as it is important to keep in mind that Tocqueville was a statesman 
writing primarily for statesmen, then, it is also important to acknowledge that he was not 
simply or only a statesman writing for statesmen. Indeed, he all but admits as much when 
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in an editorial note at the very end of Democracy in America, he speaks directly to the 
“profound ambiguity” of his theory of history. If we recall, in closing Democracy in 
America Tocqueville tells us that those of his contemporaries who think that “peoples are 
never masters of themselves”—that they are obedient to some “insurmountable and 
unintelligent force”—teach “false and cowardly doctrines…”73 Interestingly enough, 
however, in a corresponding editorial note to this passage Tocqueville, immediately after 
claiming that his “system” is by contrast “perfectly compatible with human liberty,” 
nevertheless raises the question of whether or not he too might be guilty of teaching such 
a “doctrine,” nonetheless. As his note reads:  
You have not reproached me as I anticipated for seeming to fall in to the mania of the 
century. But I reproach myself for it because I do not want to fall into it. You absolve me, 
and I accuse myself. I wake up every morning obeying a general and eternal law that I 
did not know the day before. Unfortunately, there are some of those laws.74 
 
The “mania of the century” to which Tocqueville is referring is none other than what 
Léon Brunschvicg calls the “darling vice” of the “nineteenth.”75 It is the philosophy of 
history; the attempt to make coherent or rational (and often, find meaning or purpose in) 
what otherwise appears to be a meaningless alter on which the happiness of nations, the 
wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals are slaughtered.” In other words, it is the 
attempt to make human history a function exclusively of necessity as opposed to chance 
and hence argue that humanity is governed by a superior force, whether it be “climate,” 
“race,” “soil,” “civilization,” “Providence,” the “cunning of reason,” or “economic 
relations.” Apparently, Tocqueville expected to be reproached for “seeming” to have 
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fallen into this mania. On the one hand, therefore, this note seems to suggest that despite 
appearances he did not. On the other hand, however, Tocqueville also regrettably 
concedes that there is a very good reason why this mania exists in the first place. As it 
turns out, “general and eternal” laws—laws that human beings have no choice but to 
obey—exist. This may be unfortunate, he laments. But as unfortunate as it may be, it is 
not something that Tocqueville was apparently willing to ignore, much less lie about. 
Thus, while he would rather not be perceived as having fallen into the mania of the 
century, he cannot avoid it, either. Like his contemporaries and thus like those of the 
democratic historians he criticizes, he too acknowledges the existence such laws, 
“unfortunate” as they are. 
For all of these reasons, then, Zetterbaum’s interpretation of Tocqueville’s theory 
of history (an interpretation which, upon reflection, denies that he even has one) also 
comes into view as being problematic—which is ultimately to say that the question 
remains: how should we understand what Löwith aptly describes as Tocqueville’s 
“profoundly ambiguous” theory of history? 
 
STRUCTURE AND ARGUMENT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
In 1837, Tocqueville penned a letter to Henry Reeve, his English translator, in 
which he wrote that while “some absolutely want to make me a party man…I am not; I 
am given to passions and I have only opinions, or rather I have only one passion, the love 
of liberty and human dignity.”76 Thirteen years later, he penned a letter to his close friend 
                                               
76 Tocqueville to Reeve, 22 March, 1837, OC VI, pt. 1. 
 27 
Louis de Kergorlay in which wrote he has “no tradition” and belongs to “no party” 
because he has “no cause other than that of freedom and human dignity.”77 Finally, in his 
Recollections he writes that the only reason he decided to re-enter politics following the 
Revolution of 1848 was his profound concern for “liberty and human dignity.”78 Yet, as 
Mitchell points out, Tocqueville wanted to be remembered neither as a statesman nor as a 
political scientist, but “principally as a historian.”79 The question of how his theory of 
history either supports or, at the very least, does not further endanger what he apparently 
cared for most is therefore an important one that deserves more attention.80 How, exactly, 
does Tocqueville differ from those of his contemporaries, those unnamed democratic 
historians, who do teach “false and cowardly” doctrines? Is his theory of history as 
“compatible” with the preservation of “liberty and human dignity” as he claims?  
These questions animate the chapters that follow. In Chapter 2, I discuss the 
various methodological tendencies that, as briefly mentioned above, Tocqueville 
associates with historians in democratic versus aristocratic centuries. More specifically, I 
provide a plausible—which is neither to say comprehensive nor definitive—account of 
the origins and evolution of these tendencies in an effort to shed light on what, exactly, 
Tocqueville, means by “history in democratic times.” Ultimately, my argument in this 
chapter is that by “history in democratic times” Tocqueville means “universal” or 
                                               
77 Tocqueville to Kergolay, December 15, 1850, OC XIII pt. 1. 
78 Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections, ed. by Olivier Zunz and trans. by Arthur Goldhammer 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2016), 77.   
79 Mitchell, Individual Choice and the Structures of History, 4. 
80 James T. Schleifer, The Making of Democracy in America (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund), 352. As 
Schleifer observes, “A strong case” can be made that “Tocqueville’s most essential concern was the moral 
condition of mankind. He valued, above all, the freedom and dignity of the individual.” 
 
 28 
“world” history: a type of history that Löwith calls “Christian by derivation” but “anti-
Christian by consequence.” It is a kind of history that although theological and 
redemptive in origin, in its secularized form takes on the appearance of being 
philosophical and progressive. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to the question of why the democratic mind finds this type of 
history so alluring. Expanding on the logic underlying Tocqueville’s analysis of the 
democratic attraction to pantheism, I argue that the democratic attraction to “history in 
democratic times” stems from the widespread adoption of a philosophical method that 
Tocqueville at first associates with the Americans: “to seek on one’s own and in oneself 
alone the reason for things;” to “rely solely on the unaided effort of [one’s] own 
individual reason.” More specifically, I argue that given democratic man’s psychological 
make-up and corresponding “restlessness,” he is liable to treat democratic history as a 
kind of ersatz religion that attaches meaning to his existence in time (history), just as 
pantheism attaches meaning to his existence in space (nature). 
 In Chapter 4, I discuss what Tocqueville diagnoses as the danger of democratic 
history—a danger which stems from its tendency to either explicitly or implicitly 
undermine man’s belief in his capacity to control his own fate. Drawing on the political 
thought of Eric Voegelin, I begin by showing how the “gnostic attitude” characteristic of 
modern intellectuals more or less captures the psychology of democratic historians for 
whom, as Tocqueville puts it, “showing how facts happened is not enough,” as well. For 
just as gnostic intellectuals, according to Voegelin, strive not just to interpret but rather 
demonstrate their cognitive mastery over social and political reality, so democratic 
historians, according to Tocqueville, have a tendency to design absolute systems which 
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claim to be theoretically infallible. From there, I turn to Tocqueville’s correspondence 
with his friend and colleague Arthur de Gobineau in an effort to show how precisely by 
designing absolute historical systems, democratic historians end up teaching their readers 
a “doctrine of fatality” that reduces both individuals and nations alike to cogs in a 
historical machine. Essentially, my argument in this chapter is that by teaching their 
readers to view human beings (including themselves), not as self-legislating ends-in-
themselves but as the accelerants or decelerants of an historical process beyond their 
control, democratic historians inadvertently promote two forms of political behavior 
inimical to the preservation of liberty and human dignity in a democratic age: what Isaiah 
Berlin calls “irrational passivity,” on the one hand, and “irrational fanatical activity,” on 
the other. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I take up the question of whether and to what extent 
Tocqueville might not also be accused of teaching his readers a doctrine of fatality that, 
whether he realizes it or not, reduces both individuals and nations alike to cogs in a 
historical machine. As we saw above, at the very end of Democracy in America 
Tocqueville raises the question of whether he himself might be guilty, like so many of his 
contemporaries, of implicitly teaching a philosophy of history that makes human beings 
obedient to some “insurmountable and unintelligent force that arises from previous 
events, from race, from soil, or from climate.” But as I argue in this chapter, given 
Tocqueville’s understanding of the relationship between what he calls the “cultivation of 
theory,” on the one hand, and the “cultivation of practice,” on the other, his theory of 
history remains much less systematic, much more political, and thus much more 
hospitable to (if not perfectly compatible with) the preservation of liberty and human 
 30 
dignity than those of his contemporaries. Indeed, as I argue in this chapter, because 
Tocqueville is a historian for whom history is neither a “tale told by an idiot” (the 
function entirely of chance) nor a tale told by a prophet (the function entirely of 
necessity), his theory of history remains, like Montesquieu’s before him, a profoundly 
ambiguous one that, as such, remains much safer for democracy than those of the 
democratic historians he criticizes. These other theories of history, Tocqueville tells us, 
are both “false and cowardly.” Insofar as his own theory remains “profoundly 












Chapter 2: On the Origins and Rise of Democratic History: Voltaire’s 
Attack on Ancient and Christian World History 
 
 
If, back in the solitude of your dwelling, you happen to compare the man whom you have 
just heard with the great Christian orators of past centuries, you will discover, not 
without terror, what the strange power that moves the world is able to do; and you will 
understand that democracy, after remaking in passing all the ephemeral institutions of 
men, finally reaches the things most immobile by their nature, and that, not able to 
change the substance of Christianity, which is eternal, it at least modifies the language 
and the form.81 
 
 
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America  
 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in Volume 2 of Democracy in America Tocqueville 
devotes an entire chapter to comparing and contrasting the methodological tendencies of 
historians in democratic versus aristocratic centuries. Interestingly enough, however, 
scholars who write about his theory of history pay surprisingly little attention to its actual 
content, much less to any of the historiography or historical context informing that 
content.82 In fact, of the few scholars who are attentive to what Tocqueville writes in this 
chapter, none address the question of where these tendencies originate or how, exactly, 
they came to be.83 
                                               
81 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 860. 
82 See, for instance, Cheryl B. Welch, De Tocqueville (Oxford University Press, 2001), 149-157; Joshua 
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 At first, this may not seem like much of an oversight. After all, Tocqueville 
himself refrains from naming any of the historians he has in mind, and thus refrains from 
drawing our attention to any of the historiography and historical context informing what 
he writes in this chapter. However, as I hope to demonstrate in what follows, it is only by 
taking stock of this historiography and context that we can begin to understand what, 
exactly, Tocqueville means by “history in democratic times” and beyond that, how or in 
what fundamental way Tocqueville’s own theory of history differs from those “false and 
cowardly” ones he refers to at the very end of Democracy in America.  
Accordingly, my aim in this chapter is to bring this historiography and context to 
the fore. More specifically, it is to put forward a plausible—which is neither to say 
comprehensive nor definitive—account of the origins and rise of the various 
methodological tendencies that Tocqueville associates with historians in democratic 
centuries.84 Beginning with my own analysis of Tocqueville’s chapter on democratic 
historians, I then explain why precisely because of their various methodological 
tendencies, these historians are not only liable to build historical systems but in so doing 
eliminate the phenomenon of chance or “accident” from human affairs. From there, I turn 
to the question of which historians in particular Tocqueville has in mind and after 
identifying them, argue that given both their tendencies and the historical context in 
which they were writing, they are perhaps best characterized as the descendants of a 
                                               
84 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to account for every twist and turn in the history of historical 
writing that may or may not have contributed to the emergence of what Tocqueville identifies, generally 
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be to write a history of historical writing, not a dissertation on Tocqueville and the problem of historical 
determinism. If the argument advanced in this chapter therefore seems less than incontestable, that is 
because it is not meant to be incontestable. It is meant only to serve as a plausible starting point for 
understanding Tocqueville’s own theory of history. 
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historiographical tradition that begins well before the advent of democracy and that in 
fact traces all the way back to Saint Augustine. Finally, I discuss the singularly important 
role that the irreligious Voltaire plays in liberating this historiographical tradition from its 
theological roots and, in effect, initiating a revolution in historical writing that culminates 
in the replacement of Christian world or universal history with what Tocqueville 
understands as “history in democratic times.” Ultimately, I argue that democratic history 
is what Löwith calls “Christian by derivation” but “anti-Christian by consequence:” a 
type of history that like Christian world history tends to be universal in scope and 
meaningful (teleological) in its orientation but that, unlike Christian world history, is 
philosophical and progressive as opposed to theological and redemptive in its overall 
character. 
“SOME TENDENCIES PARTICULAR TO HISTORIANS IN DEMOCRATIC CENTURIES:” 
TOCQUEVILLE ON THE METHODOLOGICAL TENDENCIES OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORIANS 
 
 “Historians who write in aristocratic centuries,” begins Tocqueville in Chapter 
20, Part 1, Volume 2 of Democracy in America, tend to do the following: make all events 
depend on the “particular will” and “mood” of “certain men;” “readily link the most 
important revolutions to the slightest accidents;” “wisely make the smallest causes stand 
out;” and overlook or fail to see “the greatest ones.”85 Alternatively, historians in 
democratic centuries tend to do the opposite. Rather than make all events depend on the 
particular will and mood of certain men, “most of them,” writes Tocqueville, “attribute to 
the individual almost no influence on the destiny of the species, or to citizens on the fate 
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of the people.” Moreover, rather than readily link the most important revolutions to the 
slightest accidents, they “attribute general causes to the smallest, most particular facts.” 
Finally, rather than “wisely” make the smallest causes stand out, historians in democratic 
centuries overlook their very existence. More often than not, all they see are “the greatest 
ones.”86  
 According to Tocqueville, these contrasting tendencies “can be explained;” one 
need only refer back to the usual suspect, the equality of conditions, and take note of its 
impact on how historians perceive and interpret what takes place on the “world stage.”87 
In aristocratic centuries, this equality is non-existent. Thus, when aristocratic historians 
cast their eyes upon the world stage, they see a great disparity among individuals in terms 
of status, wealth, and power. Some of these individuals come into view as being 
immensely powerful. The vast majority of others, however, remain obscure in their 
powerlessness. At a glance, therefore, a few great individuals tend to stand out amongst 
“the many” and in doing so become a natural focus point and unit of analysis for the 
historian. Because their commanding presence overshadows that of any other causal 
variable, they and often they alone are cast as the movers and shakers of history. By 
contrast, in democratic centuries the equality of conditions is pervasive. As a result, when 
democratic historians cast their eyes upon the “world stage” they see little if any disparity 
among individuals in terms of status, wealth, and power. It therefore becomes extremely 
difficult for these historians to point to any one individual “who exercises a very great or, 
                                               
86 Tocqueville, 853. 
87 At one point, this chapter was titled “Influence of Equality of Conditions on the Manner of Envisaging 
and Writing History.” 
 35 
above all, a very enduring power” over the many, and so “the many”—which in the 
context of modern democracy, ultimately means humanity or the species as a whole—
comes to replace “the few” as a natural focus point and unit of analysis for the historian.88  
Not surprisingly, therefore, whereas aristocratic historians focus on the 
determining role that certain great individuals play in shaping history, democratic 
historians focus on the determining role that “general causes” play in shaping history. As 
regards aristocratic historians, “the importance of the things that they see a few men do 
gives them an exaggerated idea,” writes Tocqueville, “of the influence that one man is 
able to exercise, and naturally disposes them to believe that you must always go back to 
the particular action of an individual to explain the movements of the crowd.”89 Hence in 
composing their histories aristocratic historians naturally look for that which aristocratic 
peoples in general look for in the theater: “great lords” and “kings.”90  They “notice first 
of all a very small number of principal actors who lead the whole play” and “who keep 
themselves at the front of the stage.”91 After noticing this very small number of principal 
actors, however, their search for causes suddenly stops. Rather than look for that which in 
addition to principal actors shapes history—that which is operating “behind the scenes,” 
so to speak—aristocratic historians opt instead to focus on uncovering what Tocqueville 
calls “the secret motives” that make these great individuals “act and speak.”92 They turn 
to the psychology of statesmen, not the political, economic, and sociological conditions 
in which statesmen have little or no choice but to operate. As regards democratic 
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historians, however, they again do the opposite. The unimportance of the things that they 
see men do gives them an exaggerated idea of the lack of influence that one man is able 
to exercise, which in turn naturally disposes them to believe that you must always look 
for a “general cause” to explain the movements of the crowd. Unlike their aristocratic 
counterparts, then, democratic historians notice first of all a very large number of 
insignificant actors, none of which “lead the whole play” and none of which keep 
themselves “at the front of the stage.” Their search for causes is therefore a much more 
prolonged and tiring one. They are liable to become lost amid a “labyrinth” of that which 
democratic peoples in general look for in the theater: a “confused mixture” of 
“conditions,” “sentiments,” and “ideas.”93 Hence, “not able to succeed in seeing clearly 
and in bringing sufficiently to light individual influences,” they tend to write instead 
about the determining role of that which affects everyone, equally. They tend to write 
about general causes such as “the nature of races, the physical constitution of a country, 
the spirit of civilization.”94 Unable to trace the influence of principal actors whatsoever, 
democratic historians tend focus almost entirely if not exclusively on that which is behind 
the scenes.  
So it follows that unlike their aristocratic forerunners, democratic historians are 
liable to design or “create” what Tocqueville calls “historical systems.” According to 
Tocqueville, because historians in aristocratic centuries are “diverted at every moment 
towards individuals, the sequence of events escapes them.” In fact, they do not even 
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believe in a “such a sequence.”95 Given their methodological focus, the “thread of 
history” remains elusive, and so they come to doubt if not deny its very existence. Their 
inordinate focus on and often exaggerated belief in the influence of individuals disposes 
them to think of history as a function primarily of accident or chance. By contrast, 
democratic historians essentially take for granted that such a “thread” exists. “Not only 
are historians who live in democratic centuries drawn to giving a great cause to each fact, 
but also they are led to linking facts and making a system emerge,” writes Tocqueville.96 
For by seeing “far fewer actors and many more actions,” they “can easily” do what 
aristocratic historians, by virtue of seeing only the opposite, cannot: “establish a 
relationship and a methodical order among them.”97 Consequently, “ancient literature, 
which has left us such beautiful histories, offers not a single great historical system, while 
the most miserable modern literatures are swarming with them,” writes Tocqueville.98 
Given their bird’s eye view of the world stage, democratic historians are liable to connect 
everything they see together into a coherent whole—to write philosophical as opposed to 
political history—and hence systematize or make rational what otherwise appears 
confused and absurd. 
So it also follows, therefore, that unlike their aristocratic predecessors, democratic 
historians are liable to believe that what happens in the world is ultimately the function of 
some kind of nebulous “superior force;” that the “thread of history” is but the product of 
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some kind of unseen first mover which determines the actions of both individuals and 
nations alike. As Tocqueville writes:  
When the trace of the action of individuals or nations becomes lost, it often happens that 
you see the world move without uncovering the motor. Since it becomes very difficult to 
see and to analyze the reasons that, acting separately on the will of each citizen, end by 
producing the movement of the people, you are tempted to believe that the movement is 
not voluntary and that societies, without knowing it, obey a superior force that dominates 
them.99  
 
In Chapter 11 of Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes explains why “curiosity” or the “love of 
knowledge of causes” prompts human beings to not only look for causes behind effects 
but causes behind causes until, of necessity, they arrive at “this thought at last: that there 
is some cause whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which is it men call 
God.”100 Here, Tocqueville makes a similar observation—albeit as it relates to 
democratic historians and hence to causality in time (history) as opposed to space 
(nature). Although they can see the “world move,” he explains, democratic historians 
have trouble seeing what, in particular, moves the world. Consequently, they not only are 
liable to do what curious human beings in general are liable to do, but also, liable to 
become what human beings in general are liable to become: believers in a “superior 
force,” a “power” or “agent invisible” to borrow Hobbes’s language, which alone is 
responsible for setting things in motion. Democratic historians are liable, in short, to 
furnish their historical systems with some kind of “motor”—a metaphysical or physical 
guarantee (a ‘necessity’)—on which the theoretical integrity their systems ultimately 
depend.  
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Finally, so it follows that whereas historians in aristocratic centuries tend to 
attribute much to accident (chance) and little if anything to necessity, historians in 
democratic centuries tend to attribute nothing to accident and everything to necessity. In a 
lengthy footnote, Tocqueville tells us that “there are two ideas in this chapter which must 
not be confused,” both of which have to do with the question of what, exactly, qualifies 
as an “accident.”101 On the one hand, he explains, an accident is the influence that a 
powerful individual, “like Napoleon,” can exert over the “destiny of a people.”102 That 
such an individual’s influence is never, strictly speaking, necessary ie. fated, means that 
at a fundamental level it remains undetermined ie. a function of chance as opposed to 
necessity. On the other hand, however, an accident can also be something that, according 
Tocqueville, is “due” completely to “chance,” such as a “plague” or “the loss of a battle;” 
for just as the spread of a plague is, at the end of day, beyond the control of any one 
doctor so the loss of a battle is beyond the control of any one field commander. 
Regardless of their respective competencies or capabilities, neither is so competent 
(virtuous, as Machiavelli would say) as to be capable of eradicating, in its entirety, 
disease on the one hand or cowardice on the other.103 While “you can” thus “refuse to 
believe in the influence of individuals,” writes Tocqueville, you can retain a belief in the 
influence of “accidents”—even though, as he ultimately concludes, that “when you go 
back to the origin of accidents, you almost always arrive at individual action.”104 
Accordingly, whereas aristocratic historians tend to write exclusively about the nature of 
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“accidents”—in that they are primarily if not exclusively concerned with analyzing 
individual action—democratic historians tend to write primarily exclusively about the 
contrary, about “necessity.” As Tocqueville tells us, whether it be in the form of a 
powerful individual or the loss of a battle, they refuse to believe in accidents. For 
democratic historians, “the nature of some battle” has no bearing on whether a nation 
survives. When a nation perishes, it is because there is “a sequence of old causes that 
destined it invincibly” to do so.105  
In sum, the problem for democratic historians is that unlike aristocratic historians, 
they often find themselves at a loss when it comes to knowing where to begin. Like all 
historians, their aim is to provide some coherent account of political or social change. To 
do so, however, they must navigate a labyrinth of confused conditions, sentiments, and 
ideas that aristocratic historians either need not or simply fail to navigate, thereby making 
it extremely difficult for them provide such an account. It therefore becomes “tempting,” 
as Tocqueville puts it, for them to “believe” that this labyrinth is less labyrinthian than it 
initially appears—that behind the chaos actually lies some kind of cosmos—and that 
social and political change is ultimately the function of some unobservable, dominating, 
“superior force.” Simply put, it becomes tempting for democratic historians to (whether 
out of frustration or hubris or both) eliminate the phenomenon of accident from human 
affairs altogether by attributing everything that happens in the world to either a “blind 
fatality” or “inflexible providence”—a rigid chain of causality that according to 
Tocqueville, “envelops the entire human species and binds it.”106  
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TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRATIC HISTORIANS: FRANÇOIS MIGNET AND THE 
RESTORATION LIBERALS 
 
Now, given the nature of these tendencies one might well assume that 
Tocqueville’s chapter on democratic historians is a chapter about German contributions 
to the philosophy of history. After all, thinkers like Kant, Hegel, and Marx are not only 
renowned for having systematized history, but also, for having argued that all historical 
change is the function, essentially, of a “superior force” (the “willing of Nature;” the 
“cunning of Reason;” and “economic relations,” respectively).107 At the time of writing 
Volume 2 of Democracy in America, however, Tocqueville was not yet acquainted with 
their thought—that is, at least not directly.108 Indeed, it was only in 1843 when his friend, 
Arthur de Gobineau (whose thought and correspondence with Tocqueville we shall turn 
to in Chapter 4), wrote for him an essay titled “Coup d’oeil générale sur l’histoire de la 
morale” (an essay which summarizes German contributions to the philosophy of history) 
that he apparently became aware of their respective historical systems.109 The question 
that therefore remains is who are Tocqueville’s democratic historians? To whom, exactly, 
is Tocqueville referring in this often-overlooked chapter? 
To be sure, the text of the chapter itself leaves few, if any, telling indications and 
for good reason: as Robert T. Gannett observes, “in keeping with a lifelong policy of 
‘systematic’ discretion, Tocqueville never broadcast his links with his sources.”110 Only 
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about in this chapter were heavily influenced by German thought, he was at the very least indirectly aware 
of it.  
109 Mitchell, Individual Choice and the Structures of History, 31. 
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in the Recollections does he name names, and only does he do so because the 
Recollections, unlike either Democracy in America or the Ancien Regime and the 
Revolution, is apparently “not intended for public viewing.”111 Luckily for us, however, 
the text of the chapter itself is not the only place to look for clues. There are also 
Tocqueville’s corresponding editorial notes in which he does broadcast his links with his 
sources and in which, near the beginning of this chapter, he writes the following: 
“Historians of antiquity did not treat history like Mignet and company.”112 
Concerning “Mignet,” Tocqueville is referring to his friend and colleague, 
François Mignet, with whom he worked at the Academy of Moral and Political 
Sciences.113 The “most scholarly French historian of the first half of the nineteenth 
century” (as Harry Barnes describes him) Mignet “made an implied attack on the 
Bourbon restoration” in his History of the French Revolution.” More specifically, he 
argued that the Revolution was “the necessary and inevitable outgrowth of the tendencies 
of the age and as the dawn of a new and better era in the history of the world.”114 As even 
a cursory reading of his History therefore reveals, Mignet exhibits precisely those 
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tendencies that historians in democratic centuries, according to Tocqueville, are liable to 
exhibit.  
To begin with, he focuses almost exclusively on general causes. Rather than 
identify all of the “fortuitous” and “secondary” causes that in times of equality are 
“infinitely more varied, more hidden, more complicated, less powerful, and consequently 
more difficult to disentangle,” he discusses the determining role of nebulous social and 
economic factors—in particular, “class.” Mignet therefore pays little attention to the 
influence of individuals and, on the rare occasions that he does, he does so only to point 
out that they are either less influential or less responsible for their actions than is 
generally assumed.115 For Mignet, individuals remain “defined by their roles” and their 
roles “defined by the external pressures of social change.”116  
Second, Mignet renders systematic that which on the surface presents itself as 
inherently chaotic. He identifies “phases” of (or rather, imposes phases on) history that 
do not obviously exist and therefore structures history in such a way as to make it 
philosophically coherent (rational).117 He “[clings] to the idea,” as Ceri Crossley 
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observes, “that beneath the shifting, unpredictable surface of events, forces [are] at work 
constructing a new order, that the spectacle of violence and disillusion [is] not the whole 
story, that in a mysterious way disintegration [confirms] the national will.”118 In short, 
Mignet clings to the idea that beneath the chaos lies some kind of cosmos and hence that 
what otherwise appears absurd is in actuality the playing out of a rational, meaningful, 
process.  
Finally, Mignet attributes all historical change to a “superior force”—what he 
terms “the necessity of things”—and therefore leaves nothing in history (no event and no 
personality) to chance.119  In his view, accident plays no role in shaping the outcome of 
events; contingency is non-existent. Just as the Revolution in general is a function of the 
“necessity of things,” so too is the Terror in particular. And just as the emergence of 
Robespierre is a result of the events that preceded his rise, so too is the emergence of 
Napoleon. In effect, the thread of history not only exists but for Mignet is binding. It is a 
thread that the “necessity of things” and not the accidental influence of individuals (as 
Tocqueville characterizes it), determines, rendering the otherwise accidental, seemingly 
undetermined influence of certain individuals as determined as anything else. 
The same, however, can be said of many other French theories of history during 
the Bourbon Restoration, including especially those put forward by the “company” 
Mignet apparently kept. If we recall, in the editorial note quoted above, Tocqueville does 
not simply single out Mignet. Rather, he singles out “Mignet and company.” Who is this 
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“company”? Unfortunately, Tocqueville does not elaborate. However, thanks to a letter 
written by German philosopher, Fredrich Engels, in 1894 (a letter that we shall return to 
at the beginning of Chapter 4), one can make an educated guess. In it, Engels answers 
two questions posed by the German economist Walther Borgius concerning the Marxist 
conception of history, one of which pertains specifically to the role that individuals like 
Napoleon and Caesar in shaping it. In the course of doing so, however, he also states the 
following: “While Marx discovered the materialistic conception of history, Thierry, 
Mignet, Guizot and all the English historians up to 1850 are the proof that it was being 
striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was 
ripe for it and that indeed it had to be discovered.”120  
As regards “Morgan,” Engels is referring to the American anthropologist Lewis 
Henry Morgan who, in 1877, published a book called Ancient Society in which he argues 
that while it is “undeniable that portions of the human family have existed in a state of 
savagery, other portions in a state of barbarism, and still other portions in a state of 
civilization…these three distinct conditions are connected with each other in a natural as 
well as necessary sequence of progress.”121 Alternatively and as regards “all the English 
historians up to 1850,” Engels is most likely referring to a group of historians commonly 
called the “Whig Historians” of the 19th century. In his seminal The Whig Interpretation 
of History, Herbert Butterfield identifies a group of mostly British historians including 
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Lord Acton who, according to him, exhibit in varying degrees the same “unexamined 
habit of mind.” All of them, he argues, exhibit what “might be called the historian’s 
‘pathetic fallacy.’ It is the result of the practice of abstracting things from their historical 
context and judging them apart from their context—estimating them and organizing the 
historical story by a system of direct reference to the present.”122 In other words, it is the 
result of systematizing the past for the sake of justifying the present ie. rendering the 
present the necessary or inevitable outcome of a long progression of seemingly 
unconnected chance occurrences and political events.123  Finally (and for our purposes, 
most importantly), with regard to “Thierry, Mignet, and Guizot,” Engels is referring to a 
group of French historians known collectively as the “Restoration Liberals”—a group of 
historians who as Stanley Mellon argues, realized that “one of the best ways to absolve 
the Revolution of any guilt was to insist that it had to be, that it had been a long time in 
the making, that it represented an accumulation of history, and therefore that to deny it 
was to deny time itself.”124   
According to Mellon, this group of historians includes François Mignet, Mme de 
Staël, Augustin Thierry, François Guizot, Edgar Quinet, August Trognon, Victor Cousin, 
Jules Michelet, Théodore Jourffroy and Adolphe Thiers—all of whom turned to writing 
history, he argues, in order to “sell the French Revolution.”125 In their view, a restored 
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monarchy threatened to destroy all that the Revolution—as regrettably destructive as it 
became—had accomplished. “Napoleon Bonaparte, while carrying the Revolution to 
Europe, had sought to end it at home, to reconcile the two Frances under the imperial 
palladium. But with the return of the Bourbons in 1814,” writes Mellon, “all the old 
questions [were] reopened.” Was France “to return to an ante-bellum 1789? What part of 
the Revolution—if any—[could] be maintained?”126 For those nobles and conservatives 
who fled it, the answer was clear: none of it could be maintained. The Revolution, they 
thought, was a mistake: an accident. It represented nothing more or less than an 
aberration from history and the Terror, culminating in the regrettable act of regicide, 
proved as much. The Restoration, they therefore argued, was a long overdue course 
correction—a return to homeostasis within the French body-politic.127 In effect, they 
placed their liberal opponents in a precarious situation. With the monarchy restored, 
partisans of the Revolution were left with one of two options: capitulate or resist; accept 
the conservative interpretation of the Revolution as an accident, on the one hand, or 
counter it with an interpretation of their own that emphasized its “necessity,” on the 
other. Not surprisingly, therefore, they decided to do the latter. In order to “defend the 
Revolution and its heritage,” the above individuals turned to writing, or rather, re-writing 
French history. As Mellon explains:  
The first political task faced by the Liberals—that group which, in speaking for the 
Revolution, represented everyone from the Doctrinaires to the Jacobin Left—was to sell 
the French Revolution. Their very existence during this period depended upon their 
ability to justify the Revolution, to acquit it of crimes, to explain away its criminals. 
There was no better and safer way to do this during the Restoration than to write 
history.128 
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The reason why this was determined to be the safest way to accomplish the task is fairly 
obvious: at a time in which “it was difficult, even treasonable, to proclaim the political 
principles of the Revolution,” writing history allowed them to defend that which was 
regarded as unpopular at best and indictable at worst.129  The reason that there was no 
better way to accomplish the task, however, is because the genre of history, especially 
when compared to that of poetry, has a less than obvious rhetorical advantage: it claims 
to be true. 
THE RHETORICAL ADVANTAGE OF HISTORY 
 In the Poetics, Aristotle distinguishes between poetry and history not so much by 
reflecting on how historians versus poets “speak,” but by reflecting on what the former 
versus the latter speak to, respectively. As Aristotle explains, “the historian and the poet 
do not differ by speaking in meters or without meters.”130 If Herodotus were to speak in 
meters instead of prose, he would not suddenly become a poet. He would simply become 
a historian who writes history in meters. No, the historian and the poet, writes Aristotle, 
“differ in this: the one speaks of what has come to be while the other speaks of what sort 
would come to be.”131  In other words, whereas the historian speaks to the past—to things 
that in no uncertain terms have happened—the poet speaks to the future—to things that 
may happen and, as a result, remain by definition uncertain. Unlike poetry, then, history 
is unique in that it purports to be rooted in and concern itself exclusively with facts.  
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But this begs the question: what exactly is a fact? According to Harvey Mansfield, 
Machiavelli is the one who introduces the idea of “fact” to political philosophy.132 
Although he writes that it is “fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than 
to the imagination of it,” the phrase “effectual truth could also be translated as…the 
factual truth.”133 A “fact” is therefore an “effect, not a cause…” Unlike effects, causes are 
often invisible and, as such, are often imagined and easily ignored. Effects, on the other 
hand, are “visible, unmistakable, impossible to be ignored.” They are something people 
actually experience or observe and hence are indisputable in a way that causes, which are 
at best every only assumed to exist, are not. Consequently, unlike disputable first causes 
(like God, for instance) facts actually hold out the promise of being reasoned from in an 
objective as opposed to subjective manner.134 They actually hold out the promise, for 
instance, of grounding political science on truth as opposed to mere opinion—just as 
Hobbes, in Leviathan, claims he has done. 
That history purports to be concerned only with recounting facts, then, means that 
it presents itself as being inherently trustworthy in a way that neither poetry nor 
philosophy, let alone revelation, can present themselves. Continuing his analysis of 
poetry and history in the Poetics, Aristotle notes that just as “we do not trust to be 
possible the things that have not yet come to be, so it is evident that the things that came 
to be are possible, for otherwise they would not have come to be…”135 As a genre, poetry 
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is therefore less trustworthy than history. It does not confine itself to recounting facts. It 
entertains things that have not yet and may never come to be. It therefore precludes itself 
from being able to claim that what it teaches or argues, what it wishes to convey to the 
reader, is necessarily accurate or reliable. Because history, however, does confine itself to 
what it claims is indisputable truth, its reputation stands or falls on the presumption that 
what it teaches is reliable and hence that what it teaches is actual knowledge as opposed 
to mere opinion: “real” instead of “ideal.” 
And herein lies history’s rhetorical advantage: it can be used to disguise that 
which is unreliable and unreal as reliable and real, and thus to dress up mere opinion in 
the garb of actual knowledge. As Geoffrey Vaughan observes, in Leviathan Thomas 
Hobbes, Aristotle’s great nemesis, identifies “two problems” with the genre of history 
“that he did not raise elsewhere.” Whereas the first problem is that “the details presented 
as facts in a history cannot be assured,” the second problem is the “use to which history 
can be put, whether intentional or unintentional.”136 The details presented as facts cannot 
be assured because the status of details as facts ultimately rests on how facts—via the 
historian—have been interpreted. Alternatively, the intended purpose of history depends 
on the reason for presenting details as facts to begin with. To what end is a given 
historian presenting a set of given details as facts? A recognition of the first problem 
therefore leads to an awareness of the second and, with that, a realization of the 
possibility that writing a history (as opposed to a political treatise or tract) may well be 
the best way to advance an entirely political teaching.  
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This is not only what Hobbes in Behemoth or the Long Parliament arguably does, 
but also and for our purposes, precisely what many of the Restoration Liberals did.  
These individuals came to realize that, because of the presumption of its content (that it is 
“true” or rooted in “fact”), the genre of history could be used to facilitate the transmission 
of otherwise contentious political opinions without ever being detected. In other words, 
they came to realize that history could be used as a “trojan horse” for the Revolution: a 
covert vehicle for keeping it alive during the Restoration. Writing history allowed them to 
present their otherwise punishable-by-death political beliefs as indisputable “facts,” and 
thus render their own respective interpretation of the Revolution as something 
“inevitable” or “necessary” (as opposed to “accidental”) incontestable—that is, as 
something “beyond politics” or, to use a more contemporary phrase, as something “post-
partisan.” In short, it allowed them to do what political progressives in general do when it 
comes to defending their political opinions: invoke the weight and force of “History” in 
order to make them seem or appear less politically contentious than they actually are.137  
“SPIRITUAL CRISIS” AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING 
 
From a purely political perspective, invoking the weight or force of “History”—in 
a way like the will of God or Providence—to defend less than true, partisan opinions may 
seem like a clever rhetorical tactic. However, just as it would be overly simplistic if not 
cynical to reduce the invocation of history by political progressives to mere rhetoric, so 
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too would it be overly simplistic to reduce the essentially liberal enterprise of writing 
history during the Bourbon restoration to a concern for politics alone.138 To be sure, 
politics mattered. But just as progressives are often as hopeful as they are cunning and 
thus, often sincerely convinced that “History” (in a way like God or Providence) is on 
their “side”—that the “arc of history” does, in fact, “bend toward justice”—so too were 
many of the democratic historians listed above sincerely convinced that what they were 
doing was more than just “selling” the Revolution.139  
Early on in Part 1, Volume 2 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville tells us that 
while “the Americans have a democratic social-state and a democratic constitution,” they 
“have not had a democratic revolution.” They did not need to.140 Because they “arrived 
on the soil that they occupy more or less as we see them,” they were already equal in 
condition and hence already democratic in their mores.141 The French, however, did 
experience a democratic revolution, which is to say that their democratic social-state and 
constitution came at the cost of having all of their “ancient beliefs” turned “upside 
down,” first. So it follows that everything Tocqueville says in the Introduction of 
regarding the “democratic revolution taking place among us” has considerably less to do 
with the Americans than it does with the French. True, at one-point Tocqueville writes 
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that much of what is taking place is “not only particular to France.” But this is not to say 
that what is taking place necessarily applies to America, as well; for as he later writes, 
There is a country in the world where the great social revolution that I am speaking about 
seems more or less to have reached its natural limits; it came about there in a simple and 
easy way, or rather it can be said that this country sees the results of the democratic 
revolution that is taking place among us, without having had the revolution itself.142 
 
If they had actually experienced a democratic revolution, the Americans, Tocqueville 
here suggests, would not have had it so “easy.” They would have experienced and 
suffered what the French, by contrast, experienced and suffered and, as a result, more 
than likely would have found themselves in the same situation in which the French 
eventually found themselves: one of moral, political, and perhaps most importantly, 
intellectual chaos. 
According to Tocqueville, French society once enjoyed “several kinds of 
happiness.” The nobles looked after the people like shepherds after a flock, while the 
people, “not having conceived the idea of a social state other than their own,” not only 
respected but even “loved” the nobles. A kind of “reciprocal benevolence” existed among 
them. Customs and mores, not laws and institutions, “founded a kind of right in the very 
midst of force,” he tells us.143 Then came the Revolution—a catastrophic political event 
that in one fell swoop destroyed this “reciprocal benevolence” and there with it, this 
particular “kind of right.” France descended into chaos: in place of the “several kinds of 
happiness” that society once enjoyed, there emerged several kinds of misery that it came 
to suffer. In place of a reciprocal benevolence on the part of the nobles and the people 
there grew a kind of mutual hatred on the part of the “rich and the poor;” and in place of 
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“a kind of right in the very midst of force” emerged “force alone.”144 Rather than 
transform society for the better, the Revolution—at least initially—made for a world 
where, as Tocqueville at one-point summarizes, nothing remained “connected; where 
virtue [was] without genius, and genius without honor; where love of order [merged] with 
the taste for tyrants and the holy cult of liberty with scorn for human laws; where 
conscience [threw] only a doubtful light upon human actions; where nothing any longer 
[seemed] either forbidden, or permitted, or honest, or shameful, or true, or false…”145 
Simply put, the Revolution did to France what the phenomenon of civil war, according to 
Thucydides, did to “all of Hellas” during the Peloponnesian War.146  
Consequently, in experiencing a democratic revolution the French (unlike the 
Americans) experienced an existential or “spiritual crisis”—to borrow a concept from the 
political theorist Tom Darby—of the kind that the Romans experienced after the sack of 
their “Eternal City.” As Darby defines it, a spiritual crisis is about “purpose.” It is…  
…about an acute disjunction between that which most concerns us and the common or 
overarching metaphors we embrace to find something common in the manifold of this 
varied and dense experience. Crisis then occurs when our shared or overarching 
metaphor becomes uprooted from our shared underlying concerns—when, as we might 
say figuratively, the sky above us no longer connects to the earth below us.147 
 
The Revolution and its aftermath resulted in precisely this kind of acute disjunction. As 
Tocqueville explains, it “took place in the material aspect of society without happening in 
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the laws, ideas, habits and mores, the change that would have been necessary to make [it] 
useful.”148 In effect, the overarching metaphors of the French—those unquestioned “self-
evident truths” or axiomatic principles undergirding their moral and political beliefs, their 
“mores,” as a people—no longer connected to that which most concerned them, namely, 
the moral and political chaos in which they found themselves. No wonder Tocqueville 
begins Democracy in America by telling us that “the entire book that you are about to 
read has been written under the impression of a sort of religious terror…”; no wonder he 
concludes Chapter 1 of the Ancient Regime and the Revolution by comparing the 
“religious terror” of writers during this period to that experienced by Salvianus “at the 
sight of the barbarians” (more on this in Chapter 5).149  
In addition to defending the Revolution, then, French historians during this era were 
also motivated by a more profound and perhaps all too human desire to find meaning in 
what happened. They wanted to know the significance of the Revolution and what it 
meant not only for France, but for the whole of Europe and even for mankind moving 
forward. “History at first seemed meaningless, valueless, but by virtue of the historian’s 
labour it was revealed to be rational and intelligible; its purposeful movement testified to 
the operation of laws akin to the laws of nature.”150 The Restoration Liberals firmly 
believed this. As much as they sought to cloak their political opinions in guise of facts, 
they sought also to identify in history “some transcendent purpose beyond the actual 
facts.”151 
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In fact, so too did one of their chief conservative rivals. In his Considérations sur 
la France, Joseph de Maistre also argued that the Revolution was inevitable or 
necessitated (ie. beyond the control of man)—and not just, it seems, for political reasons. 
A devout Catholic and counter-revolutionary, de Maistre believed that the Revolution 
was God’s way of punishing France for failing to fulfil her divine “mission” as a 
Christian nation.152 He thought that it was the just dessert of a people who had lost their 
way and that because it ultimately resulted in the Restoration, its violent character was 
entirely justified (that it was corrective as opposed retributive nature). It is true that by 
casting the Revolution as a divine punishment, de Maistre could better defend the 
political legitimacy of a restored monarchy—just as the Restoration Liberals, in casting 
the Revolution as “inevitable,” could better defend the latter’s heritage. That he did, 
however, was not simply because he thought it a convenient rhetorical tactic. He too, it 
seems, was genuinely trying to make sense of what happened; he too, it seems, was trying 
to identify “some transcendent purpose beyond the actual facts.” For as he at one point 
argues, while the phrase “‘I do not understand it at all’” is a “fashionable one,” uttering it 
is “sensible” only insofar as doing so connotes a recognition, on the part of the one 
uttering it, that Providence is the “first cause” of the “great spectacle” now before men’s 
eyes. If by uttering this phrase, however, one “expresses only vexation or sterile 
despondency,” then uttering it amounts to sheer “stupidity.”153  
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Thus, while de Maistre disagreed with Mignet politically, he did not so much 
disagree with Mignet’s method or motives as a historian. In order to provide a coherent 
account of historical change—in order to make the Revolution and its aftermath appear 
less than absurd—he too succumbed to the temptation to focus almost exclusively on 
general causes, create a historical system and finally, appeal to the existence of “superior 
force” which as he presents it, is wholly responsible for the movement of history. He too 
succumbed to the temptation to eliminate the phenomenon of accident from human 
affairs, altogether.154 The only difference is that whereas Mignet did so by appealing to 
the existence of a superior force that appears to be profane (what he calls “the necessity 
of things”), de Maistre did so by appealing to the existence of a superior force that is in 
no uncertain terms is sacred (Providence).155  
And so, while Mellon is not wrong to highlight their political motives, it remains 
of fundamental importance to recognize that the democratic historians to whom 
Tocqueville is referring in Democracy in America were as much engaged in a search for 
meaning in the world as they were in a partisan struggle. “The hope of 1789–was 
followed by division, civil war, the Terror, the despotism of Napoleon and finally defeat 
at Waterloo. The old centers of spiritual, political and moral authority were destroyed but 
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no stable new order emerged.”156 In addition to facilitating a kind of covert defense of the 
Revolution, therefore, making sense of the past held out the promise of being able to 
provide both oneself and one’s readers with a sense of direction moving forward—with a 
kind of much needed hope regarding the future, as well. It held out the promise, in other 
words, of being able to play the role of a kind of secular “prophet” in the midst of 
political and moral turmoil and, as we shall see next, an intellectual climate largely 
characterized by unbelief.  
DEMOCRATIC HISTORIANS AS SECULAR PROPHETS: AUGUSTIN THIERRY AND 
FRANÇOIS GUIZOT 
 
In the case of American Revolution, observes Tocqueville, “religion set its own 
limits.” Because the “religious order” in the United States had remained “entirely distinct 
from the political order,” the Americans, he writes, were able to “change ancient laws 
easily without shaking ancient beliefs.”157 Or to put it differently, because the church had 
always remained separate from the state, the Americans were able to embrace democracy 
without having to attack Christianity. In the case of the French Revolution, however, 
religion did not—because it could not—set its own limits. Because the ancient laws in 
France had remained inextricably connected to ancient beliefs—because in France, the 
state had never been separated from the church—to change the former necessarily 
required shaking the latter.  
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And shake the French did. As Tocqueville explains in the Ancien Regime and the 
Revolution, the French revolution is actually unique in that during this period something 
“totally unprecedented occurred.”158 Normally, he explains, “established religions” are 
attacked because the “ardor directed against them” stems from “the zeal inspired by some 
new religion”—like when Christianity offered itself as a replacement to the “detestable 
religions of Antiquity.”159 However, in the case of the French Revolution, there simply 
was no “new religion;” nothing offered itself as a replacement for Christianity. According 
to Tocqueville, instead “Absolute disbelief—a state contrary to man’s natural instincts 
and most painful to the soul—somehow appealed to the multitude.”160 Whereas 
“Christianity retained a great dominion over the mind of the Americans,” it therefore 
retained none over that of French. Contrary to the Americans, it seems the French not 
only attacked Christianity, but attacked it as an end in itself. 
And yet, despite their best efforts something did apparently retain great dominion 
over the French—something that according to Tocqueville, retains dominion over human 
beings in general. In Part 2, Volume 2 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville explains 
why material goods alone will never the satisfy man’s most profound spiritual longings. 
Despite just how materialistic the United States is, he writes, “religious madness is very 
common there” and this, he believes, “must not surprise us.”  “Man has not given himself 
the taste for the infinite and the love of what is immortal,” he explains. “These sublime 
instincts do not arise from a caprice of the will; they have their unchanging foundation in 
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his nature; they exist despite his efforts. He can hinder and deform them, but not destroy 
them.”161 Accordingly, although absolute disbelief somehow appealed to the multitude, 
the multitude did not—because it could not—embrace such disbelief wholeheartedly. 
Man’s natural taste for the infinite and love of what is immortal simply would not allow 
for it.162  
Rather than become a nation composed entirely of strong, rational, unbelievers, 
then, France became a nation composed instead of spiritually starved, weak individuals in 
search of solid ground. In other words, it became a nation of wanderers searching for 
something, anything, to fill a spiritual vacuum of its own making. As D. G. Charlton 
explains: 
…vast synthetic systems of any kind were sure of a ready hearing in France during the 
half-century and more of social upheaval and intellectual confusion that followed the 
Revolution and the advent of industrialization. Sensitive to the disruptions of economic, 
political, scientific, and industrial chance—almost obsessed, indeed, by the dangers of 
historical development—thinkers sought above all to reconstruct—and to reconstruct, 
first and foremost, philosophically, religiously.163 
 
According to Charlton, the essential background for understanding just why this occurred 
is “the decline of Christian belief;” for according to him, the construction of these vast 
synthetic systems was “undertaken, in considerable measure, in order to replace the 
Christian religion—a religion believed untrue, or incomplete, or maleficent, and yet 
thought of as the prototype of something greatly valuable in human life, whether social, 
moral, or psychological, or other reasons.”164 The goal for thinkers of “every shade of 
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opinion, from extreme Left to equally Extreme Right,” was to therefore provide “the new 
society with an ideological synthesis…”—to return to what had been lost if only by 
replacing it with something altogether new: 
…It may be the great summum of Catholicism, presented afresh by the traditionalists—
Bonald, Joseph de Maistre, the younger Lamennais, Chateaubriand. It may be the vast 
metaphysical structures of Hegel and his fellow idealists in Germany, quickly made 
known in France by Cousin and his eclectic disciples—who themselves devised a 
spiritualistic ‘natural religion’ drawn in part from Hegel and in part from that equally all-
embracing metaphysician, Spinoza. It may be the ‘positive philosophy’ of August Comte, 
whose principal works alone extend in the commonest editions to some eleven lengthy 
volumes. It may be the ‘religions’ of humanity, of Nature, of science, or of progress of 
other social thinkers—such as Saint-Simon and Enfrain, whose joint oeuvres in the 
definitive edition amount to forty-seven volumes in all…All these thinkers expound in 
detail and at length a philosophy to end all philosophies; all soar—in this resembling the 
Romantic poets—to a messianic oratory, a tone of prophetic revelation; all are persuaded 
that the fate of a nation can be swayed by ideological truth and error.165 
 
Simply put, in varying degrees many thinkers took on the role, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly, of replacing the dogmas of Christianity with the dogmas of speculative 
philosophy, and thus of replacing Christian revelation with a kind of revelation of their 
own. 
 This was especially true of many (albeit not all) of the democratic historians to 
whom Tocqueville is referring in Democracy in America. Consider first the example of 
Augustin Thierry—one of the other French historians who, along with Mignet, is 
identified by Engels in his 1894 letter. Originally, Thierry was a follower and friend of 
the famous Henri de Saint-Simon, intellectual godfather of a group of socialists 
commonly called “the Saint-Simonians.”166 According to J.B. Bury, Saint Simon was 
“one of the liberal nobles who had imbibed the ideas of the Voltarian age and 
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sympathized with the spirit of the Revolution.”167 His “chief masters were always 
Condorcet and the physiologists [Turgot] from whom he derived his two guiding ideas 
that ethics and politics depend ultimately on physics and that history is progress.”168 But 
whereas Condorcet had merely suggested that “the value of history lies in affording data 
for seeing the future,” Bury writes that Saint Simon “raised this suggestion to a 
dogma.”169 He claimed to have “educed” from history a law that according to Bury 
essentially holds the following: 
…epochs of organization or construction, and epochs of criticism or revolution succeed 
each other alternately. The medieval period was a time of organization, and was followed 
by a critical revolutionary period, which has not come to an end and must be succeeded 
by another epoch of organization.170 
 
As we have seen, Mignet posits something similar; he separates the period from 1789 to 
1815 into destructive” and “constructive” phases thereby also suggesting that historical 
change followed some kind of predictable pattern or “law.” But whereas Mignet does so 
merely to subordinate the past to the present—to render the present the necessary or 
inevitable outcome of a cacophony of otherwise unintelligible past events—Saint Simon 
did so in order to predict the future, as well. By invoking this law, he not only 
subordinated the past to the present, but also claimed that a new “physicist religion” 
would inevitably “supersede Christianity and Deism,” and that “men of science” would 
inevitably “play the role of organizers which the clergy played in the Middle Ages.”171  
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For his part, Thierry eventually parted ways with Saint-Simon, whose proto-
positivist/proto-socialist (which is not to say Marxist) understanding of history another 
“democratic historian,” August Comte, developed even further.172 But before he did so, 
he co-published a pamphlet with Saint Simon titled De la réorganization de la société 
européenne that concludes by asserting the following:  
There will no doubt come a time when all the peoples of Europe will feel a need to 
regulate their general interests, before addressing their national ones; then their ills will 
begin to decrease, their troubles subside, their wars cease; it’s there where we without 
cessation tend; it’s there where the course of the human spirit will carry us… 
The imaginations of poets have placed the golden age in the cradle of the human 
species, amidst the ignorance and coarseness of the earliest times; it was rather the iron 
age that should have been bequeathed to those times. The golden age of the human race is 
not behind us, it is before us, in the perfection of the social order: our fathers have not 
seen it, our children will arrive there one day...173 
 
Noteworthy here is the focus of Thierry’s and Saint-Simon’s attack on the imaginations 
of poets. It is not that the poets are wrong to imagine a “golden age;” it is not even that 
the poets are wrong to “imagine.” No, the poets are wrong only insofar as what they 
imagine exists in the past. In other words, they are wrong only insofar as they understand 
or interpret the past as something “better” than the future—as confirmation of the fact 
that Jean Jacques Rousseau was on to something when he argued, in The Second 
Discourse, that the perfectibility of man is “perhaps the source” of all his 
“misfortunes.”174 From the perspective of Thierry and Saint-Simon, however, Rousseau 
was not so much on to something as he was simply wrong: the past does not so much 
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represent a golden age as it does an iron age. The real golden age lies in the future. It lies 
in the realization of a “perfect social order” that has yet to be seen but that “our children” 
will arrive at one day. Perfectibility, it turns out, is the engine behind mankind’s moral 
and political progress—not his regress. The movement of history confirms as much.  
For Thierry, therefore, writing history was about more than simply “selling” the 
Revolution. He certainly understood that its legacy was at stake and he certainly 
understood that by writing history, he could defend it. In his Lettres sur l’histoire de 
France, he explicitly admits this.175 However, as Crossley observes, “The need to 
confront recent events, to ascribe meaning to them, was as much the starting point of 
[his] historical reflection as was the overt critique of royalist historiography.”176 As a 
liberal, Thierry was “obviously…not going to defend a nostalgic theory of organicist 
order; he recognized that conflict and insurrection had driven the process of historical 
change.” However, as a human being in search of solid ground, he also sincerely 
“believed that events unfolded in accordance with an underlying purpose which invested 
them with meaning. Historical laws existed. The disintegration of the old social order was 
the inevitable result of the movement of French history.”177   
That Thierry went on to argue that “the continued elevation of the Third Estate” is 
“the predominant fact” and “the law” of French history, and that “this law of Providence 
                                               
175 Mellon, The Political Uses of History, 5. As Mellon quotes him, “In 1817, preoccupied with a strong 
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has been accomplished more than once without the knowledge of those who were the 
agents of it,” is therefore hardly surprising.178 “In this way,” he writes,  
…the Third Estate advanced, from the time of its accession to a share of power, up to the 
concluding years of the eighteenth century; then came a day when it might be said that it 
was nothing in the political state; and on the morrow of that day, its representatives in the 
States-General, declaring themselves invested with the national sovereignty, abolished 
the system of the orders, and founded in France social unity, civil equality, and 
constitutional liberty.179 
 
Shortly before the outbreak of the Revolution, a French priest named Emmanuel Joseph 
Sieyès wrote a pamphlet titled Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état? in which he argued that while 
the third estate is “everything,” it has hitherto in the political order been treated as 
“nothing.”180 It is to this pamphlet that Thierry is referring but in the context of a much 
larger argument about the nature of French history as a whole.  French history, he 
thought, was the function of some kind of binding providential law that necessitated the 
gradual ascension to power over time of the Third Estate and, as a result, the 
establishment of “social unity, civil equality, and constitutional liberty” throughout 
France. Proof of this lay especially in the “fusion of the races,” which he thought 
foreshadowed an eventual fusion of “the classes.” Historical change was therefore not at 
all a function of chance; it was product of a “superior force:” a law of divine Providence. 
Finally, consider the example of François Guizot—the third and final historian 
grouped together with Mignet in Engels’ 1894 letter, and whose lectures on the history of 
civilization in Europe Tocqueville himself attended (something that we shall we return to 
in Chapter 4). Like Thierry, Guizot also understood that writing history was a political 
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act. Early in his academic career, he became actively engaged in French politics and 
joined a group of liberal intellectuals commonly referred to as the “Doctrinaires.” 
Political moderates, the Doctrinaires sought to carve out a middle path between ultra-
royalist reactionaries (like Joseph de Maistre) and ultra-progressive radicals (like the 
Saint-Simonians). However, given the intense partisanship of French politics, the 
Doctrinaires’ were less than successful. In keeping with the logic of what Tocqueville 
describes as “great party” politics, they were not so much applauded for their moderation 
as they were condemned for their apparent lack of conviction—something that made 
them the target of both reactionaries and radicals alike.181  Rather than stay in politics, 
therefore, Guizot returned to writing and teaching history which he proceeded to use as a 
vehicle for “attacking the ultra-royalist government.” As in the case of Thierry, he 
advanced the argument that history was not simply a function of chance but of a superior 
force (again, “Providence”) which guaranteed the “progress of civilization.”   
Even so, as for Thierry writing history for Guizot was more than just a partisan 
exercise—a “convenient” way to defend his politics. He too, it seems, was motivated by a 
more profound desire to find meaning in what had happened (discover the future by 
interpreting the past). In his Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe, the published version 
of his lectures on civilization, he begins by arguing that civilization is a “fact” about 
which we may ask “a great number of questions.”  “We may ask,” he writes,  
…whether it is a good or an evil? Some bitterly deplore it; others rejoice at it. We may 
ask, whether it is an universal fact, whether there is an universal civilization of the human 
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species, a destiny of humanity; whether the nations have handed down from age to age, 
something which has never been lost, which must increase, from a larger and larger mass, 
and thus pass on to the end of time?182 
 
Yet for Guizot, these questions are more rhetorical than they are serious because as he 
proceeds to tell us, he is already convinced of their answers. “For my part,” he writes, “I 
am convinced that there is, in reality, a general destiny of humanity, a transmission of the 
aggregate of civilization; and, consequently, an universal history of civilization to be 
written.”183 To be sure, Guizot himself does not, neither in this work nor elsewhere, 
undertake to write this universal history. But he does undertake to provide a “rational 
account” of the following essentially theological belief: that “European civilization has 
entered, if we may so speak, into the eternal truth, into the plan of Providence; it 
progresses according to the intentions of God” (more on this below). 184 As for Thierry, 
then, understanding the past for Guizot was also “part of a broader quest for meaning and 
rationality.”185 It was not just a political project; it was also a sort of spiritual exercise—
an attempt to discern and make intelligible the intentions of God in time (history). 
Consequently, while he was no doubt interested in the past, recounting it served a dual 
purpose. On the one hand, it served as a convenient means to attack the ultra-royalist 
government. On the other hand, it enabled him to address the spiritual woes of a nation 
left wandering. It allowed to him to look “forward to the future,” as well.186 
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It is ultimately for this reason, then, that both Guizot and Thierry (along with 
many other French historians that can rightly be called “democratic”) are sometimes 
characterized as secular “prophets.” In a book length study on French romanticism under 
the July Monarchy, Paul Bénichou argues that this period of French history might as well 
as be called “Le temps des prophètes” [The Era of Prophets], in that it was “dominated by 
the promotion of literature” to the “rank” of prophecy. During this period, he explains, 
“systems were created to account for the upheavals of modern France and to draw a 
formula for the future.”187 And among them were the historical ones to which 
Tocqueville, as we have seen, is anonymously referring in his chapter on historians in 
democratic centuries.  “Augustin Thierry,” writes Bénichou, “explained the history of 
France and the Revolution” by highlighting the determining role of racial conflict—by 
focusing on “the nature of the races,” just as historians in democratic centuries, according 
to Tocqueville, are sometimes wont to do. Class conflict between the third estate and the 
aristocracy, he thought, was ultimately the product of racial conflict between the Gauls 
and the Franks centuries earlier. The Gauls, he argued, were “conquered and became the 
third estate” while the Franks, who had conquered them, became the aristocracy.188 All of 
this, as we have seen, was due to the “law of Providence” which guaranteed the victory of 
the third estate over the aristocracy and hence a future whereby social unity and 
constitutional liberty would reign. Similarly, Guizot “crowned his liberal philosophy with 
a providential vision of the collective destiny of humanity…”189 He, too, “sang the hymn 
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of history.”190 “The progress of civilization,” he thought, was “irresistible;” it was for all 
intents and purposes axiomatic.191  And so, while Thierry focused on trying to understand 
the “nature of the races,” Guizot focused on trying to understand the “spirit of 
civilization,” just as historians in democratic centuries are also sometimes wont to do. He 
focused on trying to understand what exactly civilization was and where it came from in 
order to determine where it might be headed. 
THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORY: CHRISTIAN WORLD HISTORY 
 
Let us recall that the main reason why democratic historians like Mignet, Thierry, 
and Guizot tend to write about general causes instead of individuals, tend to create 
historical systems, and tend to believe that what happens in history is ultimately the 
function of some “superior force,” is that the “equality of conditions” characteristic of 
democracy has a way of making them naturally inclined to do so. As we have seen, 
because the equality of conditions obscures the power and influence of individuals, 
historians in democratic centuries find themselves in a difficult situation. Unlike their 
aristocratic predecessors, they have to somehow make sense of human affairs in a world 
where human beings, precisely because of their equality, appear to have little control over 
them. In their search for causes, therefore, these historians are liable to “tire” and, as 
Tocqueville all but says, take the lazy way out. Rather than do the painstaking work of 
trying to bring to light the influence of individuals, they are liable instead to write about 
things such as the “nature of races,” “the physical constitution of a country,” or the “spirit 
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of civilization”— “great words” that, as Tocqueville writes in a deleted passage, he 
“cannot hear said without involuntarily recalling the abhorrence of a vacuum…”192 
Moreover, rather than concede that history is often chaotic and, as such, often 
unintelligible, these historians tend instead to overcorrect. They connect everything they 
see into a single coherent whole and finally, posit that this whole is governed by a 
superior force.  
Important to recognize, however, is that although Tocqueville attributes these 
tendencies to the influence of the “equality of conditions,” the equality of conditions 
characteristic of democracy is but an intermediate variable (a secondary cause) in a much 
longer chain of causation that, at least as Tocqueville presents it, ultimately begins with 
Christianity. In the Introduction to Democracy in America, Tocqueville explains how 
upon visiting America, nothing struck him “more vividly” than the “equality of 
conditions.” This “primary fact,” he explains, exercises a “prodigious influence” in all 
aspects of American life. Not only does it give “a certain direction to the public mind” 
and a certain “turn to the laws,” but also “creates opinions, gives birth to sentiments, 
suggests customs and modifies all that it does not produce.”193 Even so, as primary a fact 
as the equality of conditions is, facts (let us also recall) are not so much causes as they are 
effects. They are the result or the outcome of some prior fact, set of facts, cause, or 
combination of causes and prior facts. And according to Tocqueville, the equality of 
conditions is no different. This primary fact, it turns out, grew out of a 700-year 
development that begins with “the Church” whose “clergy,” he explains, applied “within 
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its bosom the principle of Christian equality.”194 In other words, this primary fact finds its 
origins in the primary cause of Christianity: a religion that because it “has made all men 
equal before God, will not be loath to see all citizens equal before the law.”195 Just as it is 
therefore important to keep in mind that this primary fact is a function, essentially, of 
Christianity, so too is it important to keep in mind that the methodological tendencies of 
democratic historians is an indirect by-product of Christianity, as well.196  
Christianity, it is generally agreed, fundamentally transformed how time (history) 
came to be both perceived and understood.197 Prior to the advent of Christianity, the 
prevailing view (which is not to say the only view) was that time was both cyclical and 
indefinite. It was defined according to an “eternal recurrence” whereby that which came 
into being (whether it be a plant, a person, or an empire) would at some point fall out of 
being, only to come into being once again.198 Moreover, time was largely understood as 
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relating to the particular—that is to say, as pertaining to the life cycle of some specific 
thing (an individual, a nation, or a war, for instance).199 Following the advent of 
Christianity, however, time not only became perceived instead as something linear and 
finite—that is, as having a “beginning” and an “end”—but also, as relating to the 
universal. For insofar as all human beings regardless of time or place came to be seen as 
equal in the eyes of a single Abrahamic Creator God, all human beings regardless of time 
or place came to be seen as sharing in the same history.200 As a result, what came to 
matter in history was not so much the passing nature of any one being in particular, but 
rather the passing nature of Being (Creation) itself. No longer conceived as cyclical and 
eternal in nature, what came to matter instead was the “interim” between God’s creation 
of the world, on the one hand, and the end of that world—the second coming of Christ—
on the other.201 
Consequently, Christianity fundamentally transformed how history came to be 
both synthesized and written. Prior to the advent of Christianity, history was viewed as 
unsystematic and devoid of meaning or purpose—of any “transcendent purpose beyond 
the facts.” There was no unifying “thread” connecting otherwise disparate events together 
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into a coherent whole across linear time, much less a “superior force” dominating the 
entire human race. In writing history, not only did historians focus on writing about the 
determining role of individuals in shaping history, but also, on recounting the past—on 
the “things that have happened” as opposed to “the things that may happen;” on “facts” 
as opposed to imagined causes.202 Following the advent of Christianity, however, history 
became both systematic and meaningful—that is to say, understood in terms of a 
teleological process in which divine providence rather than individuals was considered to 
be the chief participant and architect. Thus, just as historians ceased to focus on the 
determining role of individuals in shaping history, so they ceased to focus exclusively on 
recounting the past.203  What came to matter instead was the human race as a whole and 
the question, more specifically, of its future salvation.204 History became, from the 
perspective of Aristotle, more poetic and hence more philosophical than political in 
nature.205  
As alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, this transformation occurred largely 
as a result of Saint Augustine, whose City of God practically (although not theoretically) 
refutes the classical view of time by arguing that all of human history, from its beginning 
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to its end, is governed exclusively by divine providence.206 Written after the sacking of 
Rome in 410AD, the City of God was intended “in large part to sustain the faith of 
Christians and to answer attacks on Christianity by its enemies.”207 Like many of the 
histories written by France’s Restoration Liberals, therefore, it was also written at a time 
of spiritual crisis and thus served both a political and spiritual purpose. In a way like de 
Maistre who argued that the Revolution was God’s way of punishing France for failing to 
fulfil her divine “mission,” the Romans argued that the sack of their eternal city was a 
kind of divine punishment for having embraced Christianity. In effect, in a way like the 
Restoration Liberals who felt it necessary to sell and defend the Revolution against its 
detractors, Augustine felt it necessary to sell Christianity and defend it “against the 
pagans”—those who argued for a restoration of Roman religion.  
At the same time, however, just as the Restoration Liberals were motivated by a 
more profound and all too human desire to find meaning in what had happened, so too 
was Saint Augustine. Although he “personally believed in the survival of the Roman 
Empire” (in that in provided for a condition of peace, necessary for preaching the Gospel) 
he also believed that its destruction—like the destruction of any empire in the so-called 
“city of man”—had a transcendent purpose.208 In Book 1, Chapter, 1 of the City of God, 
he argues that “divine providence often corrects and destroys the corrupt ways of men by 
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wars, and tests the righteous and praiseworthy by such afflictions of this mortal life...”209 
Consequently, Augustine did not so much consider the destruction of Rome an enigma as 
he considered it a vindication of the view that history is a “divinely appointed 
pedagogy.”210 According to him, “the gods of the pagans never laid down a right doctrine 
of living;” they took “no care of the lives and morals of the cities and people by whom 
they were worshiped.”211 It was therefore only a matter of time before God intervened to 
set them aright.  
What transpired history for Saint Augustine was neither a function of chance nor 
meaningless, either. At the very beginning of Chapter 1, Book 5 of the City of God, he all 
but says as much. As he explains: 
According to the judgment or opinion of some, things happen by ‘chance’ when they 
have no cause, or no cause arising from a rational order, and by ‘fate’ when they come 
about not by the will of God or men, but as a result of a necessary sequence. The cause of 
the greatness of the Roman empire is therefore neither chance nor fate; for it is beyond 
doubt that human kingdoms are established by divine providence. If anyone attributes 
them to fate because he uses the term ‘fate’ to mean the will or power of God, let him 
keep to this judgment but correct his language.212 
 
What is noteworthy about this passage is that it alludes to two pre-Christian views of 
causality in the world, neither of which comport with Christian cosmology.213 As 
presented by Augustine, the first view—commonly called “the Epicurean doctrine of 
chance”—affords to chance some kind of causal status independent from a “rational 
order.” It argues, in other words, that effects without causes exist, which is an argument 
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that Aristotle, in the Physics, ultimately declares an absurdity. It is therefore simply 
incompatible with Christian cosmology which assumes that what happens in the world is 
the result of either natural causes, voluntary causes, or the will of God (divine 
providence).214 True, the will of God remains unknown to us (ie. beyond human reason). 
However, as Augustine in no uncertain terms makes it clear, God is “not Fortune.”215 
Although God gives “earthly kingdoms to both good men and bad,” He “does not do this 
rashly, or as it were at random...”216 In effect, while the order of events in history is an 
order “hidden from us,” it is an order which is at once “entirely known” and entirely 
ruled by God.217 There simply is no such thing as chance outside of the mysterious nature 
of divine providence.  
Alternatively, the second pre-Christian view of causality in the world—otherwise 
known as “the Stoic doctrine of fate”—holds that events transpire not as a function of 
chance but rather as the function of a single “active principle” sometimes referred to as 
God, sometimes Providence, sometimes Nature, sometimes Fate, and sometimes Logos. 
The question of whether it is compatible with Christian cosmology is therefore more 
complicated, and Augustine recognizes as much. While he must of necessity reject the 
Epicurean doctrine of chance, it is not so clear that he must, of necessity, reject the Stoic 
doctrine of fate. In fact, he even pretends not to. In Book 5, Chapter 8 of the City of God, 
he claims that those “who use the name ‘fate’ to mean not the position of the stars,” but 
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rather, “the whole chain and series of causes according to which everything that happens 
occurs,” are essentially Christians without knowing it.218 “There is no need to devote 
great labour and effort to a merely verbal controversy with such persons,” he writes. “For 
they attribute this order and chain of causes to the will and power of the most high God: 
to the God Who is most excellently and truly believed to know all things before they 
come to pass, and to leave nothing unordained...”219 It turns out, therefore, that to make a 
distinction between the Stoic doctrine of fate and the Christian doctrine of providence is 
in a sense to make a distinction without a difference. It does not matter that the Stoics 
understand fate as a function of “Jupiter” while the Christians understand it as a function 
of divine providence. What the Stoics mean by fate, argues Augustine, is “chiefly the will 
of the most high God, Whose power stretches irresistibly forth through all things.”220 
Thus, while someone who subscribes to this view can “keep to his judgment,” he should 
simply “correct his language.” By Jupiter, what the Stoics actually mean is the Christian 
God.  
Still, important to note is that by correcting one’s language one would, in effect, 
be abandoning one’s judgement, as well. As a teacher of rhetoric Augustine must have 
known full well that what he presents is a distinction without a difference—as a petty 
disagreement over the mere use of a word—is anything but. Obviously, the supreme god 
of Stoicism—whether it is called Jupiter, Logos, Providence, Nature, or Fate—is not 
equivalent to the supreme God of Judeo-Christianity. Unlike the latter, the former does 
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not stand outside of nature or history. It is not an “interventionary” deity. On the contrary, 
the Stoic god is material as opposed immaterial, finite as opposed to infinite. 
Furthermore, the Stoic god did not create ex nihilo a world from which man, understood 
as fallen, can be “saved.” Whatever the Stoic god is and whatever its relationship to 
mankind might be, it simply has no personified form that at the end of history, “will come 
again to judge the living and the dead.” 
To conflate the supreme god of Stoicism with divine providence and, by 
extension, Stoic cosmology with Christian cosmology, is therefore disingenuous to say 
the least. According to the Stoic doctrine of fate, although determined by an “active 
principle,” what happens in history remains in the grand scheme of things meaningless 
because, as Susanne Bobzien reminds us, “for the Stoics the course of the world is 
cyclical,” and so “the conception of fate’s eternity leads to indefinite repetitions of all 
states and events.”221  In other words, because the Stoics did not believe in the Judeo-
Christian God and hence did not believe in a pedagogical “interim” between God’s 
creation of the world, on the one hand, and the second coming of Christ, on the other, 
they did not see a reason to speculate about let alone hope for the future. For the Stoics, 
the future is but the past which, in turn, is but the future. There is no future fundamentally 
different from the present. That their conception of time remains cyclical and indefinite 
means, in effect, that what happens in history has no “transcendent purpose beyond the 
actual facts.” 
By contrast, what happens in history for Augustine is inherently meaningful 
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because for him as for any orthodox Christian, God is an interventiary deity who, by 
appearing in the flesh as Jesus Christ, has revealed to us that contrary to what Stoics 
believed, time is not so much cyclical and indefinite as it is linear and finite. Insofar as 
the course of the world is a pedagogical “interim” between God’s creation of the world 
and the second coming of Christ, there is every reason to hope for the future. One need 
only read Paul’s Second Letter to the Thessalonians. In accordance with this view, 
history is not only “ordered” according to some “active principle” (as it is for the Stoics), 
but an interventionary one who created ex nihilo the heavens and the earth and, most 
importantly, whose Son “will come again to judge the living and the dead.” There is no 
question as to whether this will happen, only when.222 Thus, in Christian cosmology what 
happens in history is not simply fated (as it is for the Stoics) but fated for a reason, as one 
might say. Events do have a “transcendent purpose beyond the facts.” Whatever their 
similarities, then, the Stoic doctrine of fate is no more compatible with Christian 
cosmology than is the Epicurean doctrine of chance.223 
Of course, none of this is to say that for Augustine, like Tocqueville’s democratic 
historians, human history is predictable—that it follows some kind of intelligible, 
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progressive trajectory discernable by means of human reason alone. On the contrary, for 
Augustine as for any orthodox Christian, human history remains entirely unpredictable: a 
function of God’s will, which remains unknown to us.224 What it is to say, however, is for 
Augustine, rather like Tocqueville’s democratic historians, history is neither absurd nor 
tragic as the Epicurean doctrine of chance and the Stoic doctrine of fate imply, 
respectively. For whereas by rejecting the Epicurean doctrine of chance Augustine 
reduces causality in history to a function of either “voluntary causes” or divine 
providence, by assimilating the Stoic doctrine of fate to the Christian doctrine of 
providence, he endows history—mankind’s sojourn on the planet—with meaning in a 
way that the Stoic doctrine of fate never does. To put it another way, by attacking these 
pre-Christian views of causality in human affairs, Augustine in effect replaces both the 
absurd and tragic view of history characteristic of the ancients with a future oriented 
hopeful one characteristic of the moderns. He establishes not only an “eschatological 
pattern” on which “every conceivable view of history that can rightly be called 
‘Christian’” is predicated, but a pattern on which many modern interpretations of history, 
without acknowledging it, remain predicated as well.  
VOLTAIRE’S ATTACK ON ANCIENT AND CHRISTIAN WORLD HISTORY 
 
Near the beginning of Volume 2 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville tells us 
that it was during the sixteenth century that reformers such as Luther “submitted to the 
judgments of individual reason some of the dogmas of the ancient faith…” And as he 
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proceeds to tell us, “Bacon in the natural sciences and Descartes in philosophy rejected 
received formulations, destroyed the empire of tradition, and overthrew the authority of 
the master” soon after.225 What he stops short of explicitly articulating but might 
nevertheless be said to hint at, however, is that what Luther did in the realm of religion, 
Descartes in the realm of philosophy, and Bacon in the natural sciences, Voltaire 
accomplished in the realm of history and historical writing. 226 For as he at one point asks: 
“Who does not see that Luther, Descartes, and Voltaire all employed the same method 
and differed only as to breadth of applicability they claimed for it?”227  
In the Remarques sur l’histoire and the Nouvelles considerations sur l’histoire—
both purely historiographical essays—Voltaire attacks the French historian Charles de 
Rollin, author of a massive thirteen volume history titled Histoire ancienne des 
Egyptiens, des Carthaginois, des Assyriens, des Babyloniens, des Medes et des Perses, 
des Macedoniens, des Grecs. Important to recognize, however, is by attacking Rollin, 
Voltaire’s purpose is not so much to criticize the Histoire ancienne per se, but rather, to 
enter into a tacit “dialogue with many other contemporary, recent and ancient historians” 
so that he can attack both ancient and Christian world history alike. 228 
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With regard to ancient history, Voltaire makes his reservations clear. He opens the 
Remarques by lamenting the fact that we continue to take ancient history seriously. “Will 
we never stop deceiving ourselves about the future, the present and the past?” he 
provocatively begins. That we continue, even in this “enlightened century,” to take 
pleasure in reading the “fables of Herodotus” must mean that man is born to err. 229 
Similarly, in the Nouvelles considerations, he argues that to write ancient history is to 
compile “some truths with a thousand lies.”230 It is, again, to traffic in fable as opposed to 
fact.231 
As it soon becomes apparent, however, the fables that make up ancient history are 
neither Voltaire’s only nor perhaps even his primary concern. To be sure, he considers 
these fables useless—that is, at least insofar as they do nothing to clarify what truly 
matters when it comes to interpreting history. According to Voltaire, when it comes to 
interpreting history, what matters are what Tocqueville calls general causes: the forces of 
a country before a war and after a war; the wealth of a given nation; a country’s birth 
rate, population, and death rate; the virtues and vices of a given nation; the progress of 
the arts and manufacturing in one country versus another; and finally, the change in a 
country’s mores and laws over time.232 But what also irks Voltaire is the fact that, even in 
this most enlightened century, we continue to take pleasure in reading fables that, as he 
refers to them in the Remarques, “not even Herodotus himself” would have taught.233  
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What are these fables? Unfortunately, Voltaire does not say—at least not in the 
Remarques or in the Nouvelles considerations. Instead, he continues to criticize Rollin, 
along with a host of other unnamed “historians,” for failing to make use of his “reason;” 
for “transcribing more than examining;” for failing to write “only new and true things,” 
for lacking a “philosophical spirit;” and thus for telling “stories to children” as opposed to 
“discussing facts with men.”234 However, if we turn to yet another purely historiographic 
essay by Voltaire, it becomes clear that the unspecified fables to which he refers at the 
beginning of the Remarques are none other than those on which not ancient but Christian 
world history is predicated.   
In the Histoire, Voltaire divides the “history of events” into two categories: “the 
sacred and the profane.”235 Immediately after doing so, however, he writes the following: 
“Sacred history is a progression of divine and miraculous interventions by which it 
pleased God to lead the Jewish nation in the past, and to guide our faith in the present 
day. I will not address this respectable material at all.”236  And yet, as alluded to above, 
by attacking Rollin in both the Remarques and the Nouvelles considerations, he does just 
this. 
In the Introduction to the Histoire Ancienne, Rollin also divides history into the 
“profane” and “sacred.” Unlike Voltaire, however, he does address the latter—and in an 
altogether deferential way. Studying history, argues Rollin, serves not only to reveal the 
causes “of the rise and fall of Empires” and the “manners of different nations,” but also 
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or, in so doing, to demonstrate something of “infinitely greater importance:” “the 
greatness of the Almighty, his power, his justice, and above all, the admirable wisdom 
with which his providence governs the universe.”237 Studying history, in other words, 
serves not only explain the past, but in so doing, demonstrate the truth of what all three of 
the Bible, Augustine’s City of God, and most recently, Jacques Benigne Bossuet’s 
Discours sur l’histoire universelle, already posit: that “God reigns over every nation” and 
that, as a result, there is no such thing as “coincidence and fortune” in human affairs.238  
A French bishop during the counter-reformation, Bossuet found himself in a 
political situation not unlike that of Augustine, immediately following the sack of Rome. 
The Romans had long been defeated, but Christianity was yet again under attack—and by 
two main groups. On the one hand, it was under attack by a group of “Deist, Pantheist, 
and Atheist” intellectuals known collectively as the “Libertins;” on the other hand, by a 
“growing school of Biblical critics who had brought into question the Mosaic authorship 
of the Pentateuch,” including Spinoza.239 Christianity was under attack, in other words, 
by the very revolution that as noted above, began in the sixteenth century and culminated 
in the eighteenth—that began with Luther and ended with Voltaire. Like Augustine, 
therefore, Bossuet felt compelled to defend Christianity and he did so in a strikingly 
similar way. He wrote a universal history intended to at once combat what he considered 
to be the pernicious influence Christianity’s detractors and shore up the faith of its 
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defenders. He wrote an updated version of the City of God so as to reaffirm the argument 
that history was governed by “divine providence” and not by “natural causes” as the 
Libertins argued.240   
Consequently, when Voltaire accuses Rollin of failing to use his “reason,” of 
failing to “examine more than transcribe,” of lacking a “philosophical spirit,” and thus of 
failing to write “only new and true things,” he is not simply referring to Rollin’s credulity 
towards the histories of Herodotus, Plutarch and Livy, among others. He is not simply 
attacking ancient history. In addition, he is indirectly referring to Rollin’s credulity 
towards Bossuet’s Discours and thus Christian world history more generally. 
 In the Introduction to the Histoire ancienne, Rollin tells us that although did not 
“cite the authors” from whom he transcribed while writing it, he made “the best use” he 
could of the “solid reflections that occur in the second and third parts of the bishop of 
Meaux's Universal History, which is one of the most beautiful and most useful books in 
our language.”241 From the perspective of Voltaire, however, “the bishop of Meaux’s 
Universal History,” although perhaps beautiful, is clearly useless. For upon reflection, it 
comes into view as one of those fables that for obvious reasons “not even Herodotus 
himself” would have taught.  
It is on account of both the fables of ancient history and Christian world history, 
then, that Voltaire ends up calling for a revolution in historical writing. “Perhaps soon,” 
he begins the Nouvelles considerations, “what has happened in physics will happen in the 
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way of writing history.” In physics, “new discoveries have banned old systems.”242 
However, as evidenced by the example of Rollin, such a revolution has yet to occur in the 
way of writing history. Rollin writes of “iron spiked dolls embracing courtiers” while still 
others write of “bishops being eaten by rats.” What we need, however, is “modern 
history”—a kind of history “in which we find neither dolls that embrace courtiers, nor 
bishops eaten by rats.”243 What we need is a kind of history that focuses on identifying 
general causes and thus will do for the “human race” what modern physics has done for 
“natural philosophy.”244  
THE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORY: FROM THE “DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE” TO THE 
“DOCTRINE OF PROGRESS” 
 
What Voltaire tacitly suggests by attacking Rollin in both the Remarques and 
Nouvelles considerations, respectively, he makes much more explicit in his own 
universal history, his Essai sur les moeures et l’espirit des nations. While writing it, he 
apparently had Bossuet’s Discours “constantly in his mind” and in the preface, he tells us 
that his purpose in the Essai is merely to continue what the “illustrious” Bossuet has 
already begun; to extend Bossuet’s Discours by picking up precisely where Bossuet 
leaves off: the epoch of Charlemagne. Yet, as he goes on to explain, in order to 
effectively do so it will often be “necessary to revisit earlier times”—times that Bossuet 
already covers.245 Why? Because as it turns out, what the “illustrious” Bossuet already 
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covers is untrustworthy at best and inaccurate at worst. This “eloquent writer,” observes 
Voltaire, writes as if “everything that happens in the world” happens only because of 
special character of the “Jews.” He assumes the that if God gave the Asian empire to the 
Babylonians, it was to punish the Jews; that if God made Cyrus reign, it was to 
avenge them; that if God sent the Romans, it was again to punish [them].” “This could 
be,” admits Voltaire—as if to cautiously suggest that he’s not entirely closed off to the 
idea that divine providence is somehow pulling the strings. But as he proceeds to argue, 
“the grandeur of Cyrus and the Romans has other causes”—causes that the Libertins, 
against Bossuet, point to.246  
Despite at first presenting the Essai as a continuation of Bossuet’s Discours, 
therefore, Voltaire quickly reveals that its true purpose is actually to refute the 
“traditional”—which is to say theological or Christian—“view of history, in principle as 
well as in method and content.”247 “If you want to consider the globe as a philosopher [ie. 
not a theologian],” he writes, “you first direct your attention to the Orient, the cradle of 
all the arts, which gave everything to the West.” You begin with the Chinese, not the 
Jews, and you interpret general facts and causes by the standard of reason alone.248 
Finally, you tell the story that “everyone needs to know”—not the story that a Bossuet, 
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much less a Rollin, would have you believe. You tell the story of the “development of 
science and skills, morals and laws, commerce and industry,” not the story of “dogmatic 
religions and wars.”249 You tell the story of progress, not its obstacles. 
Interestingly, however, Voltaire’s Essai is altogether not that different from 
Bossuet’s Discours. No, it does not take for granted the “chosenness” of the Jews. No, it 
does not ignore the more “considerable” nature of the Indians and the Chinese. What it 
does do, however, is leave intact certain assumptions concerning the nature of time or 
history that, despite their theological origins, the otherwise irreligious Voltaire takes for 
granted, nonetheless. 
For example, although he attacks the content of Bossuet’s Discourse, Voltaire 
never once attacks its aim or purpose. He never once calls into question its goal: to be 
historical equivalent of “what a world map is to particular maps.”250 And for good reason: 
given Voltaire’s own aspirations to write a universal history, this is an aim that he rather 
like Bossuet thinks entirely legitimate.251 Nor, however, does Voltaire ever take explicit 
issue with Bossuet’s understanding of history as something “meaningful.” As Brumfitt 
observes, although he tries to develop an alternative theory of causation to that of Bossuet 
(one that is decidedly non-theological) “he never attempts to refute directly the idea of 
Providence.”252 And as Ernst Cassirer argues, he actually “falls prey to that naïve 
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teleology which as a pure theorist he so strongly rejects and attacks. Just as Bossuet 
projects his theological ideal into history, so Voltaire projects his philosophical ideal; as 
the former applies to history the standard of the Bible, so the latter freely applies his 
rational standards to the past.”253  
While his Essai therefore marks the liberation of universal or world history from 
its theological foundations, it nevertheless remains predicated on several key assumptions 
regarding the nature of time/history that “because of our habit of thinking in terms of the 
Christian tradition…[seem] so entirely natural and self-evident.”254 It does not simply 
return to a pre-Christian cyclical understanding of time, and so it neither abandons the 
eschatological framework on which Christian world history is predicated, nor the “hope 
for salvation” that thinking in terms of such a framework has a tendency to inspire. As 
Löwith explains: 
A universal history directed toward one single end and unifying, at least potentially, the 
whole course of events was not created by Voltaire but by Jewish messianism and 
Christian eschatology, on the basis of an exclusive monotheism. Once this belief had 
been adopted generally and had prevailed for centuries, man could discard the doctrine of 
providence, along with that of creation, judgment, and salvation, but he would not return 
to such views as had satisfied the ancients. Man will seek to replace providence, but 
within the established horizon, by secularizing the Christian hope of salvation into an 
indefinite hope of improvement and faith in God's providence into the belief in man's 
capacity to provide for his own earthly happiness.255 
 
And by telling the story that “everyone needs to know”—not the story that a Rollin or a 
Bossuet would have you believe—Voltaire’s Essai does just this. In the Essai, “God has 
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retired from the rule of history.”256 But that does not mean that history has all of sudden 
become meaningless, as one might expect. On the contrary, history remains meaningful 
and future oriented—just not in the way that Augustine and Bossuet, among other writers 
of Christian world history, claim. For its meaning lies not so much in the belief that 
Christ will at some point come again, but in the apparent “fact” that it is moving towards 
what Tocqueville, in his chapter on the “indefinite perfectibility of man,” calls an “ideal 
and always fleeting perfection:” an “immense grandeur” that man can see only “vaguely 
at the end of the long course that humanity must still cover” (more on this in Chapter 
3).257 For Voltaire, “The purpose and meaning of history are to improve by our own 
reason the condition of man, to make him less ignorant, ‘better and happier.’”258 The 
purpose and meaning of history are found in the idea of progress, not the idea of divine 
providence.  
Consequently, Voltaire’s Essai paves the way for a secular alternative to Christian 
world history to emerge. More specifically, it paves the way for a kind of history to 
emerge that, like Christian world history is, generally speaking, universal in its scope and 
teleological (meaningful) in its orientation but that, unlike Christian world history, is 
philosophical and progressive as opposed to theological and redemptive in its character. 
As Löwith explains: 
THE crisis in the history of European consciousness, when providence was replaced by 
progress, occurred at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth 
centuries. It is marked by the transition from Bossuet's Discourse on Universal History 
(1681), which is the last theology of history on the pattern of Augustine, to Voltaire's 
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Essay on the Manners and Mind of Nations (1756), which is the first "philosophy of 
history," a term invented by Voltaire. 259 
 
This is not, of course, to say that Voltaire is Turgot or Condorcet, let alone Saint-Simon. 
No, as Löwith observes, Voltaire is much “too intelligent” to “overwork the idea of 
progress.”260 And so, unlike Tocqueville’s democratic historians he actually leaves some 
room for accident or chance in his theory of causation. For him, “regress” remains a 
distinct—albeit temporary—possibility. Even so, because he is the first to secularize a 
kind of history that, prior to the publication of his Essai, had always remained overtly 
theological, he sets the stage for historians like Turgot, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon (and 
following them, historians like Mignet, Thierry, and Guizot) to complete an important 
transition—the transition from Christian world history to democratic history—which his 
Essai initiates. Indeed, that “all three” of Turgot, Condorcet, and Saint Simon can be 
understood as “working out the decisive transformation of the theology of history into a 
philosophy of history as inaugurated by Voltaire,” means in effect that all three can be 
understood as working out the decisive transformation of Christian world history into 
what Tocqueville understands as history in democratic times.261  
As Bury observes, “so long as the doctrine of Providence was indisputably in the 
ascendant, a doctrine of Progress could not arise.”262 From a purely philosophical 
perspective, the two are simply incompatible. Concerning the doctrine of providence, it 
holds (as we have seen) that history is the function, ultimately, of God’s will—an 
omnipotent superior force whose intentions remain shrouded in mystery (beyond our 
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comprehension as fallen beings). Alternatively, the doctrine of progress it holds that 
history is the function of certain ineluctable “laws”—laws that, like the laws of nature are 
presumably discoverable by means of human reason alone. Accordingly, the logic on 
which the former is predicated precludes the logic on which the latter depends and vice 
versa: if divine providence—whose “secret designs” remain unknown to us—is to exist, 
then historical laws can hardly be called “ineluctable;” otherwise divine providence 
simply cannot not be said to govern the world.263 By contrast, if historical progress exists 
then it cannot not be at “the mercy of any external will; otherwise, there would be no 
guarantee of its continuance” and it would simply “lapse into the idea of Providence.”264 
Given this incompatibility, French historians like Turgot, Condorcet, and Saint Simon 
came to realize that as long as the doctrine of providence remained a kind of history that 
would accomplish for the “human race” what modern physics has done for “natural 
philosophy,” as Voltaire describes it, would remain “rather a dream than a science” as 
well.265  They came to realize what Bacon and Descartes had come to realize centuries 
earlier vis. a vis. the natural sciences and philosophy. 
In order to replicate in the realm of history what had already happened in the 
realm of physics, therefore, democratic historians first had to overcome this difficulty, 
and did so through two main ways: either they substituted the doctrine of providence for 
the doctrine of progress outright—that is, replaced the idea of divine providence with the 
idea of progress—or, alternatively, tacitly collapsed the doctrine of providence into the 
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doctrine of progress—that is, subordinated the former to the latter. Substituting it 
outright, for instance, was Saint-Simon who, as we have seen, actually thought he had 
educed a “law” from history that enabled him to predict the future. In his Introduction 
aux travaux scientifiques au XIXe siècle, he completely rejects the theological doctrine of 
providence by engaging in a sustained attack on Deism. “If Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes 
affirmed that they were Deists, it was because they did not wish to shock public opinion,” 
he writes, “and did not wish wholly to abandon the old system before completing the 
organization of a new one.” The time, however, has come to do just that; for according to 
him, God is but man’s invention: no more does He “govern the world” than He does 
“exist” outside of man’s imagination. Of course, this is not to say that there is no 
“superior force” governing the world—just that divine providence, which remains 
unknown to us, is not it. As evidenced by the development over time of the sciences—
that is, from their “conjectural” beginnings to their “positive” ends—time (history) is 
clearly governed by some kind of universally binding, gravitational law akin to the one 
that, according to Newton, governs space (nature). In other words, history is also 
governed by a law that is discernible by means of human reason alone.  
As for Voltaire, then, history for Saint Simon remains both linear and meaningful, 
as well. But whereas Voltaire is much too intelligent to overwork the idea of progress, 
Saint-Simon is much too hopeful to even question it.266 In the tenth and final stage of his 
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Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de 1'esprit humain, Condorcet—one of 
Saint Simon’s “chief masters”—argues that, 
If man can, with almost complete assurance, predict phenomena when he knows their 
laws, and if, even when he does not, he can still, with great expectation of success, 
forecast the future on the basis of his experience of the past, why, then, should it be 
regarded as a fantastic undertaking to sketch, with some pretense to truth, the future 
destiny of man on the basis of his history? The sole foundation for belief in the natural 
sciences is this idea, that the general laws directing the phenomena of the universe, 
known or unknown, are necessary and constant. Why should this principle be any less 
true for the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than for the other 
operations of nature? Since beliefs founded on past experience of like conditions provide 
the only rule of conduct for the wisest of men, why should the philosopher be forbidden 
to base his conjectures on these same foundations, so long as he does not attribute to 
them a certainty superior to that warranted by the number, the constancy, and the 
accuracy of his observations?267 
 
Here, Condorcet makes what can only be described as an optimistic statement concerning 
man’s capacity to predict his future destiny. Yet, despite its hopeful outlook, it fails to 
capture the optimism characteristic of his student, Saint Simon.268 Never mind 
Condorcet’s concluding caveat. Because Saint Simon is convinced that time (history) 
functions according to a law of progress in the same way that space (nature) functions 
according to the law of gravity, he did attribute to his conjectures a “certainty superior to 
that warranted by the number, the constancy, and the accuracy of his observations.”  Put 
another way, unlike Voltaire he completely replaces the doctrine of providence with a 
doctrine of progress that rather like the doctrine of providence also happens to provide 
for the future salvation of mankind. The only difference is that whereas the doctrine of 
providence provides for mankind’s felicity in another world, the doctrine of progress 
provides for its felicity in this world.  
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Saint Simon’s thought—along with that of his disciples (in particular August 
Comte)—therefore completes a transition that Voltaire’s Essai only initiates: it 
transforms Christian world history into the most extreme form of democratic history by 
revealing precisely what that “immense grandeur” which man can otherwise see only 
“vaguely at the end of the long course that humanity must still cover,” namely,  a golden 
age characterized by the “perfection of social order.”269 In a letter to an unnamed 
“American” written in 1817,  Saint Simon explains that his “intention” (along with that, 
presumably, of his followers) as a writer is “simply to promote and explain a 
development which is inevitable.” “Our desire,” he writes, “is that men should henceforth 
do consciously, and with better directed and more useful effort, what they have hitherto 
done unconsciously, slowly, indecisively and too ineffectively.” 270 In other words, Saint 
Simon’s desire is simply to bring to the attention of men that, whether they like it or not, 
they are the agents of a historical process and, given this fact, should get with the 
proverbial program. Rather than slow down or attempt to stall the inevitable, they should 
accept and accelerate its coming into being. They should strive to build the very perfect 
social order that, according to Saint Simon, nevertheless awaits them.  
Finally, there are those historians who unlike Saint-Simon, tacitly collapse the 
doctrine of providence into the doctrine of progress—historians like Thierry and Guizot 
who, as we have seen, employ the language of providence but do so in the service of 
defending what are fundamentally progressive views of history. If we recall, in his Essai 
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sur l'histoire de la formation et des progrès du tiers état Thierry argues that “the 
continued elevation” of the Third Estate is not only “the predominant fact,” but also the 
providential law of French history. “This law of Providence,” he writes, “has been 
accomplished more than once without the knowledge of those who were the agents of 
it.”271  It might therefore seem, at first, like he too subscribes to the theological doctrine 
of providence. It may indeed appear that like Bossuet he too believes history is the 
function of an omnipotent “superior force” that works in and through men without their 
knowing it. But again, history as governed by divine providence is, as pointed out above, 
fundamentally at odds with the idea that history follows ineluctable “laws,” whether 
progressive or otherwise (an idea predicated on the assumption that genuine knowledge 
of the destiny of mankind in its sojourn on the planet, is possible). Thus, despite using the 
language of providence, it would be wrong to associate Thierry with Augustine and 
Bossuet—neither of whom as believing Christians subscribe to the modern idea of 
progress. For them as for any devout Christian, man is and will remain fallen—imperfect 
as opposed to perfectible—until Jesus comes again to judge the living and the dead. This 
a belief that continues to be professed every Sunday by Catholics across the globe. 
Thierry, however, does not subscribe to this creed. His belief in the idea of progress 
trumps his apparent belief in divine providence in that he subordinates the latter’s 
otherwise hidden designs to an observable “predominant fact,” which then uses to 
account for the past, rationalize the present, and speculate about the future. In short, he 
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demystifies providence to a point where there is, strictly speaking, nothing “providential” 
about it.  
And the same can be said of Guizot. As we have seen, like Thierry he too 
employs the language of “providence.” In his Histoire générale de la civilisation en 
Europe, he mentions “providence” no fewer than twelve times. To be sure, some of these 
mentions no doubt suggest some kind of fundamental agreement, on his part, with the 
traditional or theological understanding of divine providence. Yet, for the same reason 
that it would be wrong to associate Thierry with Bossuet and Augustine, it would also be 
wrong to associate Guizot with them, as well. Like Thierry, Guizot consistently subjects 
providence to an empirical test and in so doing he also demystifies it. The point of his 
History, he states, is to develop “the facts” and in so doing “furnish the proof” necessary 
to defend the hypothesis (which in his view has a “high degree of probability”) that 
European civilization “progresses according to the intentions of God.” Yet, to prove as 
much would from the orthodox perspective amount to proving too much; for it would in 
effect subordinate that which must, of necessity, remain unknown to us (the mind of God) 
to that which does not (empirical reality). Simply put, it would render faith redundant 
which is something that Guizot, unlike Montesquieu and Tocqueville, in no uncertain 
terms does (more on this in Chapter 5).272 
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HISTORY IN DEMOCRATIC TIMES: “CHRISTIAN BY DERIVATION, ANTI-CHRISTIAN BY 
CONSEQUENCE” 
 
In composing Volume 2, Part 1, of Democracy in America, Tocqueville originally 
planned to include a short chapter titled “Religious Eloquence or Preaching,” in which he 
was going to argue that despite being easier to destroy than to modify, democracy has 
somehow managed to modify without destroying the “language of the pulpit.” The reason 
is as follows. According to Tocqueville, there is nothing so litt le “variable” by nature as 
religion and it “cannot” be otherwise. That religion claims to be true—that it claims to be 
something eternal—makes it impervious to change in a way that “nothing” else is. 
Accordingly, in Tocqueville’s view, what applies to religion can be said to extend “to 
everything that is related to religion no matter how distantly, ” as well. Just as there is no 
religion so unimportant that it is not more difficult to change than to destroy, so “there is 
no religious custom so unimportant that it is not more difficult to change [versus destroy] 
than the constitution of a people.”273 
And yet, democracy has managed to do precisely that which is more difficult. It 
has somehow managed to modify religion without giving the lie to its supposed truth and 
hence modify the language of pulpit without destroying it. As proof, one need only pay 
attention to the character and content of “religious eloquence and preaching” in 
democracy vs. in aristocracy. “I enter a church,” writes Tocqueville… 
I see the priest mounting the steps of the pulpit. He is young. He wears priestly 
vestments, but beyond that there is already nothing of the traditional or of the 
conventional in his bearing, in his gestures, or in his voice. He doesn’t say “My 
brothers,” but “Sirs.” He doesn’t recite, but he improvises. He does not talk about the 
                                               
like Saint-Simon, he alluded to the general course of events or suggested that despotism, like anarchy, in 
the end served the cause of progress” (87).  
273 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 859. 
 99 
growing pain that our sins cause him; our good works do not fill him with ineffable joy. 
He engages his listener hand to hand, and armed like him, takes him on. He feels that it is 
no longer a matter of touching us, but of convincing us. He addresses himself not to faith, 
but to reason; he doesn’t impose belief, he discusses it and wants to have it freely 
accepted. He does not go to search for arguments in the old arsenal of scholastic 
theology, in the writings of the Doctors, any more than in the decrees of the Popes and 
the decisions of the Councils. He borrows his proofs from secular science; he draws his 
comparisons from everyday things; he bases himself on the most general, the clearest and 
most elementary truths [v: notions] of human philosophy. He cites the poets and orators 
of today almost as much as the Fathers of the Church. Rarely does it happen that he 
speaks Latin, and I cannot prevent myself from suspecting that the Kyrie Eleison of the 
Mass is all the Greek he knows.274 
 
Here, Tocqueville describes democracy’s net effect on the religious custom of preaching 
which, as we can see, was not to so much to destroy but rather drastically change it. Prior 
to the advent of democracy, preaching was either much less or not at all philosophical. It 
entailed invoking the authority of church doctrine instead of making arguments, which is 
also to say that it relied on ethos and pathos, not logos, as means of persuasion. 
Following the advent of democracy, however, preaching sought to appeal to one’s reason 
more than it did to one’s faith, and so it began to “convince” more than simply “touch.” 
A sermon delivered at the pulpit became far less formal and sacred in its character and far 
more informal and profane in its content. Rather than be destroyed, it adapted itself—like 
Christianity in general—to a world “entirely new.”275  
Now, the reason why Tocqueville did not, in the end, include this chapter in 
Democracy in America is rather simple. As he wrote in the margins of a draft version, “It 
cannot be applied to America. In America, by exception, religious beliefs are very firm 
and the language of priests is not a plea in favor of Christianity.”276 In other words, 
because Americans already believe, including such a chapter would have seemed odd. In 
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America, the language of priests need only “touch,” not “convince.” And so, to include a 
chapter which argues that the language of priests now does the opposite, would make 
little sense.  
 As evidenced from the foregoing, however, clearly such a chapter applied to 
France—that country which according to Tocqueville was constantly in his mind as he 
wrote Democracy in America. Because it actually had a democratic revolution, France, as 
we have seen, transformed into a country where religious beliefs became infirm at best 
and non-existent at worst. As a result, it became a nation where the religious custom of 
preaching, if it was to survive, was essentially forced to become a plea in favor of 
Christianity. Preaching had to begin addressing itself to reason, not simply to faith; it had 
to begin discussing belief, not simply imposing it; it had to utilize proofs from secular 
science, not just scholastic theology; and it had to incorporate the writings and sayings of 
today’s poets and orators, not just yesterday’s Church Fathers. In short, it had to 
secularize itself—that is, at least to a point where Christianity could be made respectable 
if not great again: compatible with the very cult of reason that tried to replace it.  
 Preaching in post-revolutionary France therefore underwent a transformation that, 
as we have seen, Christian world history also underwent in that country. In a footnote to 
this unpublished chapter—which, incidentally, was to appear immediately following his 
chapter on historians in democratic centuries—Tocqueville writes that, 
If, back in the solitude of your dwelling, you happen to compare the man whom you have 
just heard with the great Christian orators of past centuries, you will discover, not without 
terror, what the strange power that moves the world is able to do; and you will understand 
that democracy, after remaking in passing all the ephemeral institutions of men, finally 
reaches the things most immobile by their nature, and that, not able to change the 
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substance of Christianity, which is eternal, it at least modifies the language and the 
form.277 
 
Something similar, it might be said, happened to Christian world history. Compare the 
democratic historians of today with the Christian historians of past centuries, and you too 
will discover what the strange power that moves the world is able to do. Although 
secular, the overlap between a Condorcet, Turgot, Saint-Simon, Mignet, Thierry, or 
Guizot, on the one hand, and a Bossuet or Augustine on the other, is striking. You will 
also understand that democracy, after remaking in passing all the ephemeral ideas of 
men, finally reaches those most immobile by their nature, and that, rather than change the 
eschatological substance of Christian world history, has simply modified its form.  
 Consequently, although it claims to be scientific—philosophical as opposed to 
theological—democratic history is more a product of hope and faith than meets the eye. 
As we have seen, albeit in differing ways democratic historians tend, on the whole, to 
account for social and political change by assuming the existence of some “superior 
force,” whether it be an “inflexible providence” or some other necessity that “envelops 
the human race and binds it.”  For only by doing so are they able to make sense of the 
confused mixture” of “conditions,” “sentiments,” and “ideas,” that confront them. But 
herein lies the problem. As Nisbet explains, “The idea of necessity as it applies to human 
history, and above all to the future, is scarcely the product of science as we know it in 
such disciplines as chemistry and physics. In all truth, the idea of necessity is the product 
of nothing exclusively rational at all. It is also the child of religion—especially 
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Augustinian Christianity.”278 It does not so much stem from some kind of scientific 
inference or inductive reasoning as it does conjecture, the root of which an unexamined 
moral belief in the modern idea of progress, also called the indefinite perfectibility of 
mankind. Hence that Saint Simon was not a Restoration Liberal and that Mignet, Thierry, 
and Guizot were not Saint-Simonians does not really matter. What matters is the hopeful 
and across the board philanthropic attitude animating their respective interpretations of 
history, each of which attributes a transcendental purpose to events or facts by either 
positing or presupposing the existence of a “superior force” that, like divine providence, 
removes both the tragedy and absurdity otherwise characteristic of human history. 
Regardless of its scientific pretense, at its core democratic history remains is theological 
in nature.  
  Like the language of democratic priests, then, the histories of democratic 
historians are essentially what Löwith describes as “Christian by derivation and anti-
Christian by consequence.” On the one hand, they retain an eschatological substrate that 
is fundamentally Christian and not scientific—theological as opposed to philosophical—
in origin. On the other hand, however, they appeal to one’s reason instead of one’s faith 
and utilize secular science as opposed to scholastic theology in order to “convince” and 
not simply “touch” those who read them. In this way, democratic histories transform the 
fundamentally Christian idea of salvation—that Christ will come again to judge the living 
and the dead—into the fundamentally anti-Christian idea that a “golden age,” an 
“immense grandeur” that man can see only “vaguely at the end of the long course that 
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humanity must still cover,” approaches. According to Augustinian Christianity, nothing 
that happens in the city of man is of great consequence. In fact, the only thing that really 
matters is whether one accepts Christ as personal savior and lives according to the 
standard of God. There is no “progress” in the immanent sense of the term because, as 
discussed above, the golden age to come is not of this world. But for democratic 
historians of the kind that Tocqueville is concerned with, the city of man is all there is. 
As a result, in order to locate meaning in what transpires there, these historians bring 
heaven down to earth by collapsing the city of God into the city of man—that is, by 
“immanentizing the eschaton.”279 For them, the golden age to come, however vague it 
may appear, is of this world. And as we shall see next, it is precisely for this reason that 
democratic peoples are liable to find their histories so alluring.  
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Chapter 3: The Allure of Democratic History: Tocqueville on Pantheism 
and Its Historical Analog 
 
 
If in democratic centuries faith in positive religions is often shaky and beliefs in 
intermediate powers, whatever name you give them, grow dim, men on the other hand are 
disposed to conceive a much more vast idea of Divinity itself, and the intervention of the 
divine in human affairs appears to them in a new and greater light. Seeing the human 
species as a single whole, they easily imagine that the same design rules over its 
destinies, and in the actions of each individual, they are led to recognize the mark of this 
general and constant plan by which God leads the species.280 
 
 
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America  
 
 
From the previous chapter, it should be clear that democratic history came onto 
the historiographical scene in large part because of Voltaire’s desire to accomplish in the 
realm of history and historical writing what Bacon and Descartes had already 
accomplished in the realms of natural science and philosophy, respectively. As we have 
seen, because Voltaire attacks both ancient and Christian world history, he plays a 
singularly important role in the genesis and rise of democratic history. Despite attacking 
Bossuet, he nevertheless takes over Bossuet’s fundamentally theological project by 
secularizing it in Essai sur les moeurs, thus paving the way for democratic history to 
develop into what it eventually became: a type of history that as Löwith defines it, is 
“Christian by derivation and anti-Christian by consequence,” philosophical and 
progressive as opposed to theological and redemptive.  
And yet, to understand this is in a way to understand only one side of the story. 
The fact is that democratic history would not have risen to such prominence (and as we 
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shall see in Chapter 4, become such a problem worthy of Tocqueville’s attention) had it 
not been for the embrace of its readers: the Christian, democratic peoples or audiences for 
whom Tocqueville’s democratic historians were writing. In Restoration France, “every 
effort” was apparently made to “provide historical works with the largest possible 
audience.”281 And as we have seen, this was largely because doing so became the most 
convenient—that is to say, politically effective—way for the Restoration Liberals to keep 
the Revolution alive. Important to keep in mind, however, is that to provide historical 
works with the largest possible audience—whether for strictly political or as I have 
argued, for more profound, psychological reasons—is not necessarily to sell them, just as 
to provide a contemporary pop song with the largest possible audience—whether for 
money or for fame—is not necessarily to make it a “hit.” For that to happen, there must 
be a buyer with a need just as there must be a listener with an itch or, what in the case of 
a particular historical work amounts to a reader with an interest. 
Now, in Restoration France there were many such readers because, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, during the first half the 19th century there was a pervasive desire 
on the part of the French to fill a spiritual vacuum of their own making. After having 
destroyed their “ancient beliefs,” they found themselves in search of something, anything, 
that would allow them to not only make sense of the Revolution, but also, to intuit what 
the Revolution might mean for the future—something that would provide for them 
direction and meaning in a world turned upside down. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
democratic histories like Thierry’s Lettres sur l’histoire de France (1807), Mme de 
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Staël’s Considérations sur les principaux événements de la révolution française (1817); 
Mignet’s Histoire de la révolution française (1824); and Thiers’ Histoire de la revolution 
française (1823-1827) became “best sellers,” so to speak. Thiers’ Histoire, for instance, 
“benefited from 150,000 buyers,” something “prodigious for the time since it was 
composed of ten volumes,” meaning that a total of 1,500,000 volumes were sold.282  
Yet, as I hope to convey in this chapter, however great the appetite was for 
democratic history during this period, it would be a mistake to assume that it was due 
exclusively to the moral and political climate of Restoration France. The fact is that this 
demand, this craving for history—this “historical fever,” as Berantes called it—was as 
much a function of the nature of the democratic mind itself as it was of any other 
contextual factor whether it be French romanticism, the “intellectual sterility” of 
Napoleon’s Empire, or the peculiar nature of French politics—as Mellon, for instance, 
contends.283 Yes, many democratic histories were written during the French Restoration 
and yes, Tocqueville himself personally knew many of the historians who wrote them. He 
was therefore no doubt careful not to name names. However, just as this kind of history 
exists outside of the context of Restoration France, so does this kind of historian exist 
outside of Tocqueville’s immediate social and political orbit.284 Lest one forget, 
Tocqueville titles his chapter on democratic historians in Democracy in America “On 
Some Tendencies Peculiar to Historians in Democratic Centuries.” He does not title it 
“On Some Tendencies Peculiar to Historians in Restoration France.” What he is 
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ultimately discussing in this chapter, then, is a kind of history that wherever and as long 
as the social-state of democracy (a social-state that, like democratic history itself, also 
finds its roots in Christianity) continues to exist will not only continue to be written but 
will also continue to be read. 
THE STRANGE PERSISTENCE OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORY 
 
Since the publication of Volume 2 of Democracy in America, democratic 
historians of the kind that Tocqueville describes appear to have vanished—that is, at least 
officially. According to David Christian, towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
“professional historians expelled universal history from the discipline.”285 Recognizing 
just how unscientific it actually was—recognizing for themselves that it was more a 
product of hope and conjecture than scientific inference—they turned their backs on 
writing what today is called “master” or “meta-narrative,” and opted instead to specialize. 
This, they thought, was the only way to actually make history scientific and thus to 
actually carry out the revolution in historical writing that, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, Voltaire initially calls for in his Remarques. Then, in the twentieth century, 
professional historians began to doubt the validity of science itself and, as a result, did to 
democratic history what Voltaire did to ancient and Christian world history, centuries 
earlier: debunked its presumed authority by exposing its hidden bias. In effect, while at 
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the end of the nineteenth century democratic history became a victim of the very 
rationalism it purported to be a product of, in the twentieth century it became a victim, 
like rationalism itself, of postmodernism.286 At first, it came into view as failing to live up 
to standards of modern science. Then, it came into view as being “Eurocentric” for 
having tried.   
 Nevertheless, despite these efforts democratic historians of the kind that 
Tocqueville describes did not so much vanish as they did rebrand themselves—as 
political scientists, sociologists, geographers, and evolutionary psychologists. According 
to Kerwin Lee Klein, “the idea that we have escaped universal history threatens to 
become an article of academic faith.”287 But an article of faith, whether academic or 
otherwise, is just that: a universally accepted belief in something that upon reflection may 
not actually be true. “None of us, it seems, wants to be a narrative master of squishy 
metaphysics and totalitarian politics,” writes Klein. But “whether careful policing of our 
own storytelling habits will keep us from that fate is another question.”288 The truth is 
that “we remain haunted by history, returning ever and again to the big story even as we 
anxiously affirm our clean break with the evils of narrative mastery.”289 As evidence, one 
need only consult Brett Bowden’s recent book The Strange Persistence of Universal 
History in Political Thought.  
In this book, Bowden shows how, 
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Despite the occasional dissenting voices, the idea of universal history remains central to 
the Western tradition of studying and theorizing about history, progress, civilization, and 
human perfectibility. It is a big-picture version of history that seeks to explain and 
document the history of humankind—savages, barbarians, and the civilized—as a single 
coherent unit of study. It is about fitting all peoples and places into the narrative of 
history, which means placing them somewhere on a continuum between the poles of state 
of nature and civilized modernity. At the same time, it means knowing that all will 
ultimately arrive at the same end: civilization, or Western modernity.290  
 
To be sure, since the rise of democratic history much has happened in the world that, on 
its face, would seem to undermine the ontological assumptions (assumptions that, as we 
have seen, are at their core theological in origin) on which it is predicated. Major and 
regrettable world historical events including World War One and World War Two stand 
in the way of, if not totally refute, the legitimacy of these assumptions. Yet as Bowden 
observes, while “the catastrophic events of the first half of the twentieth century—the 
First and Second World Wars, including the Holocaust, and the Great Depression in 
between—put something of a dent in the air of confidence surrounding the idea of 
progress…the wavering of faith in the general idea of progress was less than fatal.”291  
In the 1950s and 60s, comparative political scientists essentially re-packaged 
democratic history in the guise of “modernization theory”—a theory that despite also 
being accused of ethnocentrism, also nevertheless persists.292 “Most writers on 
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modernization,” observes Samuel Huntington, “implicitly or explicitly assign nine 
characteristics to the modernization process.”293 Not only do they argue that 
modernization is a “revolutionary,” “complex,” and “systemic,” process, but also—and 
for our purposes, more importantly—a “global,” “lengthy,” “phased,” “homogenizing,” 
“irreversible,” and “progressive” one.294 Thus, as Huntington concludes, “many of the 
characteristics and consequences which the post-World War II theorists ascribed to the 
Grand Process of Modernization” can actually be found in the “writings of nineteenth 
century writers such as Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx”—both of whom would no doubt 
qualify as “democratic historians” of the kind that, as we have seen, Tocqueville 
describes.295  
In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, Francis Fukuyama revived for a less than 
philosophic audience Hegel’s—or rather Kojève’s disputed interpretation of Hegel’s—
philosophy of history. In a now famous essay published in The National Interest titled 
“The End of History?” he argued that “while it is impossible to rule out the sudden 
appearance of new ideologies or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal 
societies,” what Kojève posited in his lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind is 
essentially right: history has ended; the fundamental principles of liberty and equality are 
here to stay.296 Consequently, in his view to understand the end of the Cold War as 
simply the end of a protracted rivalry between two superpowers would be to overlook 
something much more important—nay, meaningful; for as he went on to argue,  
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What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War or the passing of a 
particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point 
of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.297 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, despite breaking with the Christian tradition, 
Voltaire (in Christian fashion) nevertheless manages to find “meaning” in history as well; 
he simply locates in it in the modern idea of progress instead of the Christian idea of 
divine providence. He locates this meaning, in other words, in what Tocqueville calls the 
“indefinite perfectibility of man,” an idea which holds out the promise that humanity is 
moving towards some nebulous end point in history, an “immense grandeur” that it can 
but vaguely make out or see. In this essay (and later on in his book), Fukuyama does 
something similar, but with one important difference: whereas for Voltaire this immense 
grandeur remains “ideal and always fleeting”—a mirage that continually suggests but that 
never confirms some kind of linear movement towards a definite “end”—for Fukuyama 
as for Kojève’s Hegel this immense grandeur is neither ideal nor always fleeting. Rather, 
it is real because it is already here. It is not that humanity it is moving towards some 
nebulous immense grandeur or golden age that it can but dimly make out; it is that 
humanity has already arrived because, according to Fukuyama, what Tocqueville dubs an 
“ideal and always fleeting perfection” is but modern democracy itself. 
Finally, in the year 2000 journalist Robert Wright published an influential, best-
selling book titled Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny—a book “about how we 
[humanity] got where we are today, and what this tells us about where we’re heading 
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next.”298 According to Wright, those who claim that there is no directionality to history 
are simply wrong; for as he states, 
When you look beneath the roiled surface of human events, beyond the comings and 
goings of particular regimes, beyond the lives and deaths of the ‘great men’ who have 
strutted on the stage of history, you see an arrow beginning tens of thousands of year ago 
and continuing to the present. And, looking ahead, you see where it is pointing.299 
 
Leo Strauss may have thought that for the “unbiased historian, ‘the historical process’ 
revealed itself as the meaningless web spun by what men did, produced, and thought, no 
more than by unmitigated chance—a tale told by an idiot.”300 Like Fukuyama, however, 
Wright would obviously beg to differ. No, he does not rely on Kojève’s Hegel to advance 
his argument. But that is because he does not have to. For him, the historical process is 
neither a meaningless web spun by the thoughts and actions of men nor a product of 
unmitigated chance. It is the product of what appear to be less than contingent “non-zero-
sum” interactions between human beings over time. It is the product, he ultimately 
suggests, of some kind of teleological process that far from being at odds with evolution 
appears to employ evolution as a means.301  
Despite being attacked and rejected by professional historians, then, democratic 
history has not only survived but outside of the ivory tower has continued to thrive. 
Indeed, as the commercial success of books like Fukuyama’s The End of History and the 
Last Man (1992), Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human 
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Societies (1997),  Robert Wright’s Non-Zero (2000), Yuval Noah Herari’s Sapiens: A 
Brief History of Humankind (2011), and  most recently, Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment 
Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (2018) would seem to 
suggest, charges of being “unscientific” and “Eurocentric” have, quite simply, failed to 
relieve the proverbial “many” of what can only be described as a persistent attraction to 
“the big story.”302  
My goal in this chapter, therefore, is to explain why despite being criticized from 
within the academy, this attraction to “the big story” remains so pervasive outside of it. 
Bowden calls the persistence of big-picture, progressive theories of history “strange.” But 
as an in-depth examination of Part 1, Volume 2 of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America 
reveals, what seems strange from the perspective of academics is much less strange than 
meets the eye. Expanding on the logic underlying his analysis of the democratic attraction 
to pantheism, I argue that the persistence of democratic history ultimately stems from the 
widespread adoption of a philosophical method that Tocqueville at first associates with 
the Americans: “to seek on one’s own and in oneself alone the reason for things;” to “rely 
solely on the unaided effort of [one’s] own individual reason.” According to Tocqueville, 
such a method fosters mores (sentiments, instincts, and opinions) that in turn conspire to 
make certain philosophical doctrines and political ideas especially attractive to 
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democratic peoples: “pantheism” in the realm of philosophy and “centralization” in the 
realm politics, respectively. What he stops short of fully articulating, however, is how 
these same mores conspire to make another idea attractive as well: the idea that a “single 
design” presides over the destiny of the human race as a whole; that human history is 
both universal and meaningful—just as democratic historians, as we have seen, have a 
tendency to argue. In what follows, therefore, I show how this same philosophical 
method and the habits of mind that it in turn fosters also accounts for the democratic 
attraction to what might be called pantheism’s historical analog. For as we shall see, just 
as pantheism comes into view as something that, in a post-Christian world, attaches 
meaning to democratic man’s existence in space (nature), so democratic history comes 
into view as something that, in a post-Christian world, attaches meaning to his existence 
in time (history). 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 
 
In Chapter 1 of Part 1, Volume 2 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
discusses what he calls the “philosophical method of the Americans.” “I think that in no 
country in the civilized world,” he begins rather disparagingly, “is there less interest in 
philosophy than in the United States.” The Americans “have no philosophical school of 
their own,” and they “worry very little” about the various schools that “divide Europe.”303 
They are, in a sense, unburdened by thought and so concern themselves primarily if not 
exclusively with action. Interestingly enough, however, this does not mean that they have 
                                               
303 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 698. 
 115 
no “common philosophical method.” On the contrary, because they “direct their minds in 
the same way, and conduct them according to the same rules,” they do indeed have such a 
method, Tocqueville insists; they simply have not “taken to the trouble to define its 
rules.”304 
What is that method? According to Tocqueville it would seem to consist in a 
number of features. For instance, it would seem to consist in being free from the 
systematic spirit, the “yoke of habits,” “the maxims of family,” the “opinions of class,” 
and, to a certain point, “the prejudices of the nation.” Furthermore, this method would 
seem to consist in accepting “tradition only as information” and treating information only 
as a means—as something that can be employed to either do things “differently,” or 
“better.” Yet, as he eventually tells us, all of these features are derivative of—and hence 
can actually be reduced to—a single more “principle” one: seeking “by yourself and in 
yourself alone the reason for things” or, as he finally describes it, relying exclusively on 
the “individual effort” of one’s own “reason.”305  
It turns out, then, that despite having “no philosophical school of their own,” the 
Americans have a common philosophical method that is nevertheless consistent with one. 
“America is one of the countries of the world where the precepts of Descartes are least 
studied and best followed,” Tocqueville famously declares. Obviously, Americans do not 
read his works—as noted above, they are unconcerned with philosophy. Yet, this 
disinterest in philosophy does not really matter. For according to Tocqueville, the very 
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thing that “diverts” Americans from philosophy also “naturally disposes” them to adopt 
Descartes’ maxims:  their democratic social-state.306   
Democracy has a way of undermining traditional forms of authority. To begin 
with, it has a way of undermining the authority of ancestral wisdom. “Amid the constant 
movement that reigns within a democratic society,” writes Tocqueville, “the bond that 
links generations together weakens or breaks; each man easily loses track of the ideas of 
his ancestors, or is hardly concerned about them.”307 At the same time, however, 
democracy subverts the authority of class opinion. “Nor can the men who live in such a 
society draw their beliefs from the opinions of class,” he continues, “for they are so to 
speak no longer any classes…”308 Perhaps most significantly, democracy subverts the 
authority of intelligence itself. “As for the action that the intelligence of one man can 
have on that of another,” explains Tocqueville, “it is necessarily very limited in a country 
where citizens, having become more or less similar, all see each other at very close 
range.”309 Consequently, as a result of their democratic social-state Americans are left 
with nothing other than their own reason as a source of intellectual authority and thus 
with no choice but to become Cartesian. Democracy, it would appear, teaches Descartes 
without assigning him. 
And yet, it is not that simple. For as it also turns out, Americans are not so much 
the unwitting followers of Descartes as Descartes is a “proto-American.” According to 
Tocqueville, even though Descartes, unlike the Americans, did take the time and effort to 
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define the rules of this method, he no less than the Americans was a student of 
democracy. This method, explains Tocqueville in an editorial note, “was discovered in a 
period when men began to become equal and similar to one another,” and this was no 
accident. Men who live “during these centuries,” he explains in a footnote, are 
“particularly disposed by their social-state to find and to accept [it].”310 It would be 
wrong, then, to assume that Descartes somehow conceived of this method on his own. 
“Like all great revolutionaries,” writes Tocqueville in discarded fragment, what he 
effectively did was make “clear and systematic” ideas that were “already” in the minds of 
most people.311 Put another way, what Descartes effectively did was give form to a 
method that democracy disclosed to him, not that he disclosed to others.  
Accordingly, it is important to recognize that despite calling it “the philosophical 
method of the Americans,” this method is no more American than it is Cartesian, and no 
more Cartesian than it is, strictly speaking, American. Rather, it is democratic—which is 
also to say that it is as American as it is Cartesian and hence as European as it is 
American, just as Tocqueville proceeds to argue.  “This same method,” continues 
Tocqueville, also “became established and popularized in Europe”—and it did so for 
essentially the same reason. Beginning in the sixteenth century, “the men of the 
Reformation,” writes Tocqueville, subjected “some of the dogmas of the ancient faith to 
individual reason; but they continued to exclude all the others from discussion.”312 Then, 
in the seventeenth century Bacon effected in the natural sciences what Descartes 
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accomplished in “philosophy strictly speaking:” he abolished “formulas,” destroyed “the 
rule of traditions,” and overthrew the “authority of the master.”313 Finally, in the 
eighteenth century “philosophers” undertook “to submit to the individual examination of 
each man the object of all his beliefs.”314 However, as Tocqueville eventually concludes, 
while the men of the Reformation and, following them, Bacon and Descartes, may have 
established this method in Europe, neither them nor the philosophers of the eighteenth 
century popularized it. It was only when conditions “had finally become nearly similar 
and men almost the same,” argues Tocqueville, that this method became generally 
followed.315 It was only when Europeans became more American (ie. democratic) that 
they too became Cartesian.  
In sum, when Tocqueville tells us that relying solely on one’s own reason 
characterizes American thinking, what he at the same time means is that relying solely 
one’s own reason characterizes how democratic peoples in general think. Indeed, the 
observation that Europeans as much as Americans operate according to this method 
confirms that what Tocqueville calls the “philosophical method of the Americans” is 
American in name only. In actuality, it is the philosophical method of what Pierre Manent 
calls “democratic man.”316 
THE MORES OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 
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According to Manent, when compared to his aristocratic predecessor democratic 
man is “in a very real sense” a “new man.”317  No, he does not differ in his biology from 
aristocratic mam. He is still a man in the most basic sense of the term. However, given 
his new-found condition of equality and corresponding new-found way of thinking—
given, in other words, his new-found “philosophical method”—he exhibits an altogether 
different moral and political psychology than his aristocratic ancestor. He has “mores” 
that are in a very real sense new “mores.” 
In Volume 1 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville makes a point of telling us 
that by the term “mores,” he does not mean “mores strictly speaking, which could be 
called habits of the heart.” To be sure, he means that. However, his understanding of the 
term mores is much broader. By mores means not only habits of the heart but also “the 
different notions that men possess,” “the diverse opinions that are current among them,” 
and “the ensemble of ideas from which the habits of the mind are formed.” In short, he 
means what the ancients meant: “the whole moral and intellectual state of a people” or, 
more generally, aristocratic and democratic peoples.318  
What, then, are the mores—the diverse opinions, ideas, and habits of mind—of 
democratic man? Arguably the most important is what Tocqueville calls his “passion for 
material-well-being,” a passion that in turn gives him a certain predilection for 
materialism. According to Tocqueville, the passion for material well-being in America is 
general. That “everyone does not experience it in the same way” does not matter; 
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“everyone feels it.”319 However, just as the philosophical method of the Americans is less 
American than it is democratic and hence as European as it is American, so too, it turns 
out, is this passion for material well-being. As Tocqueville proceeds to tell us, 
“something similar is seen more and more in Europe,” as well.320 Part of this, to be sure, 
is due to the fact that in a democratic social-state, a major psychological shift takes place 
in how both the rich and the poor, the few and the many, come to view their respective 
material conditions. Whereas for the first time the poor come to view their station in life 
as something that, potentially if not actually, can be improved upon, for the first time the 
rich come to view their station in life as precarious—as something which is as readily lost 
as it is gained.321 Accordingly (and paradoxically), both the rich and the poor become 
inordinately focused on their material well-being. They become obsessed with acquiring 
or preserving the material comforts and pleasures they either do or do not yet have. At the 
same time, however, this passion for material well-being also stems from a major 
psychological shift in how democratic man, when compared to his aristocratic 
predecessor, regards “the supernatural.” As Tocqueville explains, because he sees that he 
can “without help” solve all of the “small difficulties” that life might throw at him, 
democratic man perceives the world as rationally ordered. He assumes that how the world 
operates is knowable by means of human reason alone, and so believes that “nothing is 
beyond the limits of intelligence.”322 In effect, democratic man comes to develop what 
Tocqueville calls “little faith in the extraordinary and an invincible distaste for the 
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supernatural.” He comes to disregard anything apart from or transcendent of the natural 
world, and thus easily loses sight of the “non-material pleasures” that only religion, 
according to Tocqueville, can provide.323 In fact, he is liable to conclude that there simply 
are none of these pleasures because as Tocqueville later tells us, his passion for material 
well-being may well lead him to conclude that “everything,” including even himself, is 
“only matter.”324 In sum, democratic man’s passion for material well-being fosters in him 
a corresponding predilection for materialism. To the extent that he disdains looking 
upwards towards heaven, his gaze remains fixated on the earth and thus on his corporeal 
self, forgetting almost entirely about the immaterial and therewith it, his soul.  
A second habit of mind characteristic of democratic man is his preference for the 
useful over the beautiful, a preference which in turn gives him a certain predilection for 
utilitarianism. In Tocqueville’s view, democratic man’s preference for the useful over the 
beautiful is so obvious that it is barely worth pointing out. He even suggests that by doing 
so, he may-well be wasting both his time and that of his readers.325 However, as 
Tocqueville also states in his editorial notes, this idea “is too important to be found only 
accidentally in my book. The preeminence granted in all things to the useful is in fact one 
of the principal and fertile characteristics of democratic centuries.”326 According to 
Tocqueville, there are several reasons why democratic man prefers the useful to the 
beautiful, but the main reason is his passion for material well-being, as discussed above. 
That he is concerned, above all, with making life “comfortable” means that when it 
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comes to cultivating the “arts”—both technical and fine—he will cultivate those that best 
facilitate living a comfortable life ie. those that are most useful to his material well-
being.327 Democratic man is therefore as much given to the philosophical doctrine of 
utilitarianism as he is to materialism. Just as his passion for material well-being makes 
him naturally disposed to embrace the latter, so his preference for what is useful makes 
him naturally disposed to embrace the former: he “will want the beautiful to be 
useful.”328 
A third habit of mind characteristic of democratic man is a fondness of the “the 
real” over “the ideal,” a fondness which in turns gives him a certain predilection for 
empiricism. Because he is accustomed to relying only on himself as “witness,” he loves 
to see anything that concerns him “very clearly…”329 Not only is he therefore ready to 
“deny” what he cannot immediately understand, he is also quick to “push aside” anything 
that might be said to obscure his sight. Consequently, just as democratic man harbors “an 
invincible distaste for the supernatural” and just as he prefers the useful to the beautiful, 
so he harbors a profound contempt for “forms” and, as Tocqueville later reveals, “the 
ideal.”330 “Poetry,” writes Tocqueville, “is the search for and portrayal of the ideal;” its 
aim is to embellish the truth and in so doing, “offer a higher image to the mind.”331 
Insofar as democratic man naturally seeks to push aside anything that stands between him 
and “the truth,” however, he neither desires nor appreciates what poetry aims to do and 
thus offers. On the contrary, he devotes himself to “imagining the useful and representing 
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the real.”332 Because he is accustomed to trusting only in what he himself can verify, he 
has little appreciation for anything other than what is directly observable. In keeping with 
his predilection for materialism and utilitarianism, then, he also has a corresponding 
predilection for empiricism; for just as he loses sight of the immaterial and the beautiful, 
so he loses sight of the ideal.333  
A fourth habit of mind characteristic of democratic man is his ironic willingness 
to accept without examination whatever the majority of people around him happen to 
believe. From the foregoing, it would seem as though democratic man is much more 
independent minded than his aristocratic ancestor. It would seem that, by comparison, he 
is a man who “thinks for himself.” Interestingly enough, however, democratic man is on 
the whole less independent minded than he might at first seem, and thus as Tocqueville at 
first presents him. Yes, he thinks for himself. But only to the extent that doing so does not 
hamper his ability to function as an individual. “If man was forced to prove to himself all 
the truths that he uses every day,” observes Tocqueville, he would never finish doing so; 
he would wear himself out with preliminary demonstrations without advancing.”334 He 
would, in effect, paralyze himself. Accordingly, as independent minded as he considers 
himself to be, like all human beings (including even philosophers) democratic man 
nevertheless needs to accept certain things on faith, too. He too needs what Tocqueville 
terms “dogmatic beliefs.” Otherwise, he would enter into a state of “perpetual agitation,” 
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a constant state of intellectual uncertainty.335 The only question is from where these 
dogmatic beliefs will come and how powerful their source will be. Or as Tocqueville 
himself puts it: “the question is not to know if an intellectual authority exists in 
democratic centuries, but only to know where its repository is and what its extent will 
be.”336 
According to Tocqueville, its repository is “common opinion” and what its extent 
will be is troubling to say the least. “When conditions are unequal and men dissimilar,” 
he explains, there is, on the one hand, some individuals who are “very enlightened, very 
learned, [and] very powerful because of their intelligence,” and there is, on the other 
hand, a multitude of ignorant individuals who are very “limited” in their intelligence.337 
The multitude is therefore much more likely to put its faith in the “superior reason of one 
man or of one class” more than trust its own reason. Aristocracy, unlike democracy, 
operates in accordance with the wisdom of the few—not the many. In “centuries of 
equality,” however, the opposite is true. “As citizens become equal and more similar,” 
the tendency of each of them to “blindly” believe in a “certain man or class decreases,” 
while the tendency “to believe in the mass increases…”338 Thus, the intellectual authority 
of one man or class is replaced by the intellectual authority of the multitude, the wisdom 
of the few with what contemporary democratic theorists, following Aristotle, call the 
“wisdom of the many.”339  
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Yet, unlike contemporary democratic theorists, Tocqueville does not regard the 
wisdom of the many as inherently “superior” to the wisdom of the few. According to 
Hélène Landemore, to the extent that there is more “cognitive diversity” among the many 
than there is among the few, “the epistemic properties of democracy make it superior to 
dictatorship and any plausible variant of the rule of the few.”340 But from the perspective 
of Tocqueville, to believe this is tantamount to believing in justice of one’s own 
partisanship. “The wisdom of the many is part of the ideology of democracy, not its 
reality.”341 The reality is that because “common opinion” is the only source of dogmatic 
beliefs in democracy—because it is “the sole guide that remains for individual reason”—
the epistemic structure of democracy makes it so democracy is, paradoxically enough, 
not only much less cognitively diverse than aristocracy (and hence, much less wise than 
Landemore believes), but also, much more cognitively oppressive as well. As the only 
source of dogmatic beliefs in democracy, common opinion exercises a hitherto 
unimaginable power over the minds of men. Rather than simply “persuade” them of its 
beliefs, common opinion “imposes” its beliefs on them because rather than simply appeal 
to their reason, it “penetrates” their souls.342 In reality, the wisdom of the many is more 
monolithic and oppressive, not diverse and “superior.” 
Consequently, common opinion makes democratic man more intellectually servile 
than he arguably needs to be. As Tocqueville earlier remarks, although it is true that 
“every man who receives an opinion on the word of others puts his mind into slavery,” 
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such slavery is actually quite salutary.343 As mentioned above, without this slavery or 
something like it, man’s mind would remain in a state of “perpetual agitation” making his 
“intelligence” at once “independent and weak.” Such slavery is therefore a good thing in 
that it functions as an intellectual ballast which “allows” men to make “good use of 
liberty.”344 Democratic man, however, subjects his mind to a kind of slavery that, far 
from allowing him to make good use of his liberty induces him instead to forfeit that 
liberty—to embrace common opinion not as a guide for individual reason but as a 
replacement for his individual reason altogether. “You can predict that faith in common 
opinion will become a sort of religion whose prophet will be the majority,” writes 
Tocqueville, and this spells danger for the future. The hitherto unprecedented amount of 
intellectual authority that common opinion wields may well become “too great” and thus 
may well “enclose the action of individual reason within more narrow limits than are 
suitable for the grandeur and happiness of the human species.”345 
Finally, democratic man has what Tocqueville terms an “aptitude and taste for 
general ideas.” As in the case of dogmatic beliefs, relying on “general ideas” is less a 
function of choice than necessity. Because man is not God—because he cannot see “all 
the beings who make up humanity” separately—man must generalize.346 He must, on 
account of his relative intellectual weakness, do what God has no need to do. He must 
“encompass a very great number of analogous objects within the same form in order to 
think about them more comfortably.” Otherwise, explains Tocqueville, man would 
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become “lost amid the immensity of details and would no longer see anything.”347 He 
would become as intellectually confused as a man without dogmatic beliefs would 
become perpetually agitated. He would not be able to make rapid judgements about “a 
great many things at once” and hence would not be able to operate in a world that, unlike 
the world of aristocracy, often requires him to do just that.  
Even so, unlike aristocratic man, democratic man has an aptitude and taste for 
general ideas that far exceeds what necessity alone requires and again, this is largely 
because of his philosophical method. As Tocqueville explains:  
I showed previously how equality of conditions brought each man to search for truth 
by himself. It is easy to see that such a method must imperceptibly make the human mind 
tend toward general ideas. 
When I repudiate the traditions of class, of profession and of family, when I escape 
from the rule of example in order, by the sole effort of my reason, to search for the path 
to follow, I am inclined to draw the grounds of my opinions from the very nature of man, 
which brings me necessarily and almost without my knowing, toward a great number of 
very general notions.348 
 
Here, Tocqueville reveals that just as the philosophic method of democratic man has a 
way of making him more intellectually servile than his aristocratic ancestor, so it has a 
way of making him less intellectually sophisticated than his aristocratic ancestor, as well. 
Seeking his way by the light of unaided reason alone, he not only becomes inordinately 
dependent on common opinion for his dogmatic beliefs, but also, on a single axiom for 
his opinions: human nature. Thus, he is not only liable adopt a “host of ready-made” 
moral and political “opinions” but a host of ready-made moral and political opinions that 
apply to humanity as a whole. He is liable, in short, to become a proponent of either 
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liberalism or socialism—ideologies which are predicated on universal claims about what 
human beings need and long for most.  
THE SELF-NEGATING TENDENCY OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 
 
As I briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, in Chapter 12 of Part 2, Volume 2 
of Democracy in America, Tocqueville explains why material well-being alone will never 
satisfy man’s most profound spiritual longings. Despite just how materialistic the United 
States is (and Europe is becoming), “religious madness is very common there,” he writes, 
and this “must not surprise us.” “Man has not given himself the taste for the infinite and 
the love of what is immortal,” he explains. “These sublime instincts do not arise from a 
caprice of the will; they have their unchanging foundation in his nature; they exist despite 
his efforts. He can hinder and deform them, but not destroy them.”349 Important to 
recognize, however, is that precisely because of his new mores, democratic man is 
naturally (and tragically) predisposed to try, regardless. 
According to Tocqueville, when compared to spiritualism, materialism suffers 
from a natural disadvantage. “When you read Plato,” he writes, “you notice that in the 
times prior to him and in his time, many writers existed who advocated materialism.” 
However, the fact that most of their works have either not survived or, if they have, exist 
in only fragmentary form tells of something important: that as a philosophical doctrine, 
materialism finds little support among human beings because as a philosophical doctrine, 
materialism is simply contrary to human nature.350 
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Scholars disagree over the extent to which Tocqueville believes in human nature, 
and for good reason. In A Fortnight in the Wilderness, he seems to deny its very 
existence. In the midst of recounting his time on the Saginaw Trail, he writes the 
following: 
Philosophers have believed that human nature is everywhere the same and varies only 
according to the institutions and the laws of different societies. That is one of those 
opinions that every page of the history of the world seems to belie. Nations, like 
individuals, all appear with a physiognomy that is their own. The characteristic features 
of their countenance are reproduced throughout all the transformations that they 
undergo.351 
 
It would therefore seem that for Tocqueville there simply is no such thing as a “human 
nature” that transcends time and place, and hence that scholars like Michael Zuckert are 
right when they argue, for instance, that Tocqueville’s political science takes its bearings 
from the “social state” and not from human nature, because for Tocqueville the human 
being is “at bottom… ‘nothing.’”352 Yet as many other scholars point out, there is also a 
substantial amount of textual evidence which suggests that Tocqueville does, ultimately, 
believe in a constant human nature and hence that however distinct the physiognomy of 
both nations and individuals might be, there is, in his view something about the nature of 
man that nevertheless transcends time and place such as, for instance, the “sublime 
instincts,” mentioned above.353 Indeed, one need only consider what he says regarding 
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the relationship between religion and human nature in the Ancient Regime. According to 
Tocqueville, “The rules of conduct that religions lay down pertain not so much to man in 
a particular country or period as to the son, the father, the servant, the master, the 
neighbor. Because religions are thus rooted in human nature, they can be accepted 
equally by all men and applied everywhere.”354 If nothing else, then, Tocqueville does 
seem to think that there is a spiritual dimension to human existence, to human “being” 
which is not simply the product of convention.  
In fact, like Pascal he seems to think that precisely because of this spiritual 
dimension to human existence, human beings are at their core divided. In a letter to his 
close friend, Louis de Kergorlay, Tocqueville remarks that there are three authors with 
whom he lives a “little every day:” Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.355 However, as 
many scholars observe, when it comes to his understanding of human nature, Tocqueville 
is especially indebted to Pascal.356 In several passages in the Pensées, Pascal posits 
something that Tocqueville apparently agrees with: that man is neither beast nor angel, 
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but a combination of both.357 Indeed, near the end of Part 1, Volume 2, of Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville argues that while human beings and animals have the “same 
senses” and “more or less the same desires,” human beings nonetheless differ from 
animals in one crucial respect: whereas animals use their “instinct alone” to find 
“material goods,” human beings use their “souls.”358 As a result, while human beings, 
like animals, exhibit a primordial concern for the body—for that which is mortal and 
finite—they also and unlike animals exhibit a concern for that which transcends the 
body—for that which is immortal and infinite.  They are, Tocqueville tells us, part 
“brute” and part “angel” and thus are “capable of rising above the goods of the body and 
even of scorning life, an idea animals do not even conceive.”359  
That it is the instinct and taste of humanity to “uphold” the doctrine of 
spiritualism and not materialism, according to Tocqueville, should therefore come as no 
surprise.360 In his editorial notes for Chapter of Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
distinguishes between what he calls the “final outcome” of materialism and the “final 
outcome” of spiritualism. The final outcome of materialism, he explains, is to be 
concerned “only with satisfying the needs of the body and to forget about the soul.” It is 
to live like the Roman Emperor Heliogabalus. Alternatively, the final outcome of 
spiritualism is “to flee into the deserts, to inflict sufferings and privations on yourself in 
order to live the life of the soul;” that is, to live like St. Jerome.361 Neither way of life, 
Tocqueville concludes, is suitable for humanity; for whereas each of them are “suitable 
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for some men,” neither are suitable for most. However, as he also seems to suggest, 
despite our primordial concern for the body, we human beings nevertheless exhibit a 
greater respect (if not personal preference) for the life of Saint Jerome—for the final 
outcome of spiritualism—than we do for the life of Heliogabalus. According to 
Tocqueville, “Most of the great literary reputations are joined with spiritualism” and this, 
he assures us, is no coincidence. As a doctrine which emphasizes the immortality of the 
soul over and against the mortality of the body, spiritualism appeals to that part of us 
which makes us more than mere brutes. It appeals to that part of us which, for all intents 
and purposes, makes us “human” beings to begin with. Alternatively, as a philosophical 
doctrine which acknowledges only the reality of the brute—which teaches, in effect, that 
the angel does not actually exist—materialism precludes itself from ever being embraced 
wholeheartedly by man as a human being ie. as more than mere brute. For as Tocqueville 
tells us, “The heart of man is more vast than you suppose; it can at the same time enclose 
the taste for the good things of the earth and the love of the good things of heaven; 
sometimes the heart seems to give itself madly to one of the two; but it never goes for a 
long time without thinking of the other.”362  
Yet, what the heart of man cannot help but contemplate is an altogether different 
question from what democratic man, given his new opinions, sentiments, and instincts—
given his new mores—is naturally disposed to scorn, regardless. According to 
Tocqueville, “it must not be believed that in any time, and in whatever political state, the 
passion for material enjoyments and the opinions that are linked with it will be able to 
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suffice for an entire people.”363 However, to say that the philosophical doctrine of 
materialism will fail to “suffice for an entire people” is not to say that “the taste and 
instinct of humanity” will, in democratic centuries, somehow continue to uphold the 
doctrine of spiritualism as it did in centuries past. In Chapter 2 of Part 1, Volume 2, 
Tocqueville reminds us that “in the preceding chapter,” he explained how the “equality of 
conditions” makes democratic man “conceive a kind of instinctive unbelief in the 
supernatural…”364 What Tocqueville did not explain in that chapter, however, is that as a 
direct result of this instinctive unbelief, democratic man has both “a very high and often 
quite exaggerated idea of human reason,” on the one hand, and a corresponding very low 
opinion of revelation, on the other.365  As Tocqueville explains, that democratic man 
looks to either himself or to common opinion for “truth” means not just that he will want 
to locate the “principal arbiter” of his beliefs “within humanity and not beyond,” but that 
he will also regard any attempt to do the opposite as “ridiculous and unreasonable.” In 
effect, democratic man will “not easily believe in divine missions” and “readily scoff at 
new prophets…” To the extent that he believes in the power of human reason he will 
scorn revelation, the supposed truth of which stands or falls on whether there is in fact 
something “beyond the limits of human intelligence.”366  
Consequently, when compared to the taste and instinct of humanity, the taste and 
instinct of democratic man is not so much to uphold the doctrine of spiritualism as it is to 
negate those qualities of soul which make him human to begin with. As a doctrine which 
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does locate the principal arbiter of man’s beliefs outside and above humanity, 
spiritualism encourages human beings to look up—to transcend the body which is finite 
and mortal and instead contemplate the soul which is infinite and immortal. If we recall, 
however, given his new mores, democratic man is naturally disposed to look down—to 
focus on his body to the exclusion of his soul. Insofar as he has “little faith in the 
extraordinary and an almost invincible distaste for the supernatural;” that he has little 
patience for the beautiful understood as something separate from the useful; and to the 
extent that he prefers “the real” to “the ideal” means, in effect, that contrary to “man 
simply” democratic man prefers the body to the soul. It means, in effect, that he is 
naturally inclined to pursue the life of Heliogabalus than he is to look up to the example 
of Saint Jerome. Put a final way, it means that his eros has only a horizontal (as opposed 
to both a horizontal and a vertical) trajectory, and hence that his concern for the good is 
reducible to a concern for what is most immediately “his own.”  
In Plato’s Symposium, the philosopher-priestess Diotima holds out the promise of 
being able to make the good “one’s own always” by sketching an erotic ascent towards 
knowledge of the beautiful.367 As she frames it, this ascent begins by being “pregnant in 
terms of body” but eventually leads to being “pregnant in terms of soul.” It would be 
wrong, she explains, to assume that what separates the animals from human beings is 
eros. Even the animals—that is, insofar as they too exhibit some kind of concern for the 
good as it relates to “one’s own”—can be said to possess it. Unlike the eros of human 
beings, however, their eros leads them only to procreate because as she explains, it makes 
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them pregnant in terms only of the body. It does not make them pregnant in terms of the 
soul. Their eros has only a horizontal trajectory in that what they perceive to be “good” 
is, essentially, the satisfaction of primordial desires which reflect a concern for what is 
most immediately their “own:” their bodies and their offspring. Human beings, however, 
differ. What is unique about human beings is that their erotic desires often transcend 
those of animals causing them to become pregnant in terms not simply of the body but 
also of the soul. And as Diotima explains, to be pregnant in terms of the soul is to 
perceive as being “good” the satisfaction of desires or longings that transcend those of 
animals, and hence that transcend what is most immediately “one’s own.”368 
As evidenced above, however, although a human being democratic man would 
seem to exhibit few of these desires because he is naturally disposed to deny their very 
existence. According to Tocqueville, he cannot destroy these instincts because they have 
an “unchanging foundation in him nature.” But whether or not he can destroy them is an 
altogether different question from whether or not he will try. The fact is that given his 
new mores, democratic man is nevertheless disposed to try and negate the very essence of 
that which distinguishes him from the animals to begin with. He is disposed to become a 
“modern slave:” an “intermediate being between brute and man.”369 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FATE OF DEMOCRATIC MAN: RESTLESSNESS UNTO DEATH 
 
In a lengthy footnote in Lecture Six of his Lectures on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Alexander Kojève argues that at the end of history, man will “disappear.” What he 
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means by this, of course, is not that man will literally disappear—that is, cease to exist in 
a material or physical sense. Rather, he means that “man properly so-called” will 
disappear. He means only that man understood as a ‘historical being’—a being distinct 
from animals—will disappear. As Kojève explains:  
The disappearance of Man et the end of History… is not a biological catastrophe…Man 
remains alive as animal in harmony with Nature or given Being. What disappears is man 
properly so-called…In point of fact, the end of human Time or History—that is, the 
definitive annihilation of Man properly so-called or of the free and historical individual—
means quite simply the cessation of Action in the full sense of the term. Practically, this 
means: the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions. And also the disappearance of 
Philosophy; for since Man himself no longer changes essentially, there is no longer any 
reason to change the (true) principles which are at the basis of his understanding of the 
World and of himself. But all the rest can be preserved indefinitely; eft, love, play, etc., 
etc.; in short, everything that makes Man happy.370 
 
In his famous “Note to Second Edition” of his Lectures, Kojève admits that his argument 
in this passage “is ambiguous, not to say contradictory. If one accepts ‘the disappearance 
of Man at the end of History,’ if one asserts that ‘Man remains alive as animal,’ with the 
specification that ‘what disappears is Man properly so-called,’ one cannot say that ‘all the 
rest can be preserved indefinitely: art, love, play.”371 Put another way, if at the end of 
history man has disappeared, then how can those things which are said to make man 
happy, “be preserved?” The answer to this question, according to Kojève, is that just as 
man will not literally disappear at the end of history, neither will all of those things that 
are said make him happy: “his arts, his loves, and his play.”372 They, too, will survive—
but only insofar as they correspond to the essentially primordial needs of man understood 
as an animal living in harmony with nature. Thus, as Kojève proceeds to elaborate,  
If Man becomes an animal again, his arts, his loves, and his play must also become 
purely “natural” again…it would have to be admitted that after the end of History, men 
would construct their edifices and world of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin 
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their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas would 
play like young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts. But one cannot then 
say that all this “makes Man happy.” One would have to say that post-historical animals 
of the species Homo sapiens (which will live amidst abundance and complete security) 
will be content as a result of their artistic, erotic and playful behavior, in as much as, by 
definition, they will be contented with it.373  
 
In effect, man at the end of history will not so much be “happy” as he will be “content.” 
He will be “happy” in the sense that animals are said to be “happy” in that like animals, 
he too will want for nothing more or less than to live in abundance and complete security. 
He too will long for nothing more or less than what animals long for. His happiness will 
be the happiness of Nietzsche’s “Last Man” because his eros, similar to the eros of 
democratic man, will cease to have a vertical trajectory.374 
Now, at one point in Democracy in America, Tocqueville appears to agree with 
Kojève that eventually “man properly so-called”—man understood as a being distinct 
from the animals—will indeed disappear. For just as Kojève posits that “if man becomes 
an animal again, his arts, his loves, his play must also become purely natural again,” so 
Tocqueville argues that  “If men ever succeed in being content with material goods, it is 
to be believed that they would little by little lose the art of producing them, and that they 
would end by enjoying them without discernment and without progress, like the 
animals.”375  Furthermore, in his analysis of “What Type of Despotism Democratic 
Nations Have to Fear,” Tocqueville entertains the possibility of a future where each 
nation has become “nothing more than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which 
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the government is the shepherd.”376 He therefore seems open to (if not wholly on board 
with) the idea that at some point in the future democratic man will degrade himself to a 
point where his love of the immortal and taste for the infinite will in fact disappear—that 
democratic man will ultimately succeed in negating his own humanity. 
Even so, unlike Kojève Tocqueville does not actually believe in the “end of 
history,” much less that man ‘properly so-called’ is a purely historical being. In Volume 
One of Democracy in America, Tocqueville discusses the nature of political parties in the 
United-States. However, in so doing he makes a revealing statement concerning how 
periods of political instability versus stability, motion versus rest, influence the human 
mind’s perception of the movement of history. According to him,  
There are periods of time when nations feel tormented by such great ills that the idea of 
a total change in their political constitution occurs to their mind. There are other periods 
when the malaise is even more profound and when the social state itself is compromised. 
That is the time of great revolutions and great parties. 
Between these centuries of disorders and miseries, you find others when societies are at 
rest and when the human race seems to catch its breath. In truth, that is still only outward 
appearance. The march of time does not stop for peoples any more than for men; both 
advance each day toward an unknown future; and when we believe them stationary, it is 
because their movements escape us. They are men who are walking; to those who are 
running, they seem immobile. 
Be that as it may, there are periods when the changes that take place in the political 
constitution and social state of peoples are so slow and so imperceptible, that men think 
they have arrived at a final state; the human mind then believes itself firmly seated on 
certain foundations and does not look beyond a certain horizon.377 
 
Here, Tocqueville explains why in his view those who believe there is an “end” to history 
are mistaken. In periods of history characterized by motion, men become cognizant of 
“the march of time”—something that, as Tocqueville presents it, is unending. It “does not 
stop,” he tells us, whether for “peoples” or for “men.” As a result, these are periods 
characterized by political possibility: they reveal to the human mind that nothing which 
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currently is has to be and hence that the future is open-ended: “unknown.” They are 
periods of revolution. Alternatively, in periods of history characterized by “rest” men lose 
sight of “the march of time” altogether. So it follows that these are periods characterized 
by political stasis: they do not so much reveal to human mind that the future is open-
ended as they do convince the human mind that there is no future beyond the present. 
Unlike periods of history characterized by motion, then, periods of history characterized 
by rest obscure the “truth.” The truth, explains Tocqueville, is that “rest” is an “outward 
appearance;” men (like Kojève or Fukuyama) who believe they have “arrived at a final 
state,” who do not look beyond a certain horizon, simply do not recognize just how 
imperceptible and slow the march of time can sometimes be. They mistake “walking” for 
being “immobile.”  
Consequently, while the annihilation of “man properly so-called” is for Kojève 
something “already present,” it remains for Tocqueville only a future possibility—and a 
far-fetched one at that.378 As discussed above, although Tocqueville no doubt believes 
that human nature is malleable, he does not believe that it is so malleable as to be 
“nothing.” Kojève, however, does believe that human nature is “nothing.” Unlike 
Tocqueville, he explicitly affirms as much. Man “properly so-called,” he writes, is 
“Time, and Time is History, and only History.”379 Man properly so-called is, strictly 
speaking, temporal. His existence or ‘being’ is therefore “nothing” or “nothingness” in 
that it is directly opposed to that of Space or Nature which, unlike Time or History, is 
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“eternal.”380 History, Kojève therefore argues, consists of nothing more or less than the 
negation of the opposition between Man or History (which is nothing), on the one hand, 
and Space or Nature (which is something), on the other. It is but a story of man’s 
overcoming his temporal ‘being’ by conquering—through both his “Action” and his 
“Work”—that which is eternal (Nature).381 At the end of Time (History), therefore, man 
properly so-called will have destroyed himself. He will disappear as a ‘historical being’ 
opposed to Space or Nature and become instead as a post-historical “animal” living in 
harmony with it. According to Kojève, man will become “re-animalized” and, in this 
state (which is both universal and homogeneous) will be perfectly satisfied or 
“content.”382  As intimated above, however, for Tocqueville man is more than just 
“Time” ie. “nothing.” To be sure, he is partly that: his shift from ‘being’ aristocratic to 
‘becoming’ democratic proves as much. But he is also “Space” in that he has certain 
“sublime instincts that do not arise from a caprice of the will” and hence that have an 
“unchanging [ie. eternal] foundation in his nature.” Consequently, where Kojève is 
adamant Tocqueville is at best ambivalent. The latter is not convinced that “man properly 
so-called” is destined to annihilate himself and thereby “succeed in being content with 
material goods…like the animals.” If he were, he would not call for “new political 
science” aimed at preventing such a fate. Rather, Tocqueville is convinced that precisely 
because man is more than “nothing,” precisely because he more than just “time,” he is in 
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his democratic form liable to suffer from an affliction, “a sickness,” that aristocratic man 
never knew.  
 In his notes on Plato’s Laws, Tocqueville claims that Plato’s “doctrine is nothing 
but the application of morality to politics.” It is an “admirable tendency,” but something 
which should be “conducted by sober and practical minds…” Otherwise, he explains, it 
leads “to the absurd” which, in the case of Plato, it certainly did: “[Plato} wants the 
legislator to be involved in everything,” writes Tocqueville—something that even “les 
centralisateurs français” [the French centralizers] concede and find ridiculous. Whether it 
be “property, family, amusements, meals, or music,” Plato would have the legislator to 
regulate it all.383 Nevertheless, in a deleted passage in Democracy in America, 
Tocqueville admits that given the historical context in which Plato was writing, his 
doctrine comes into view as being less absurd than meets the eye. “When I see…Plato in 
his sublime reveries want to forbid commerce and industry to the citizens and, in order to 
relieve of them of coarse desires, want to take away even the possession of their 
children,” writes Tocqueville, “I think of his contemporaries, and the sensual democracy 
of Athens makes me understand the laws of this imaginary republic whose portrait he has 
drawn for us.”384 True, in Democracy in America Tocqueville is referring specifically to 
Plato’s Republic as opposed to Plato’s Laws. If anything, however, this only reinforces 
Tocqueville’s point: that by relieving citizens of their “coarse desires”—by forcing them 
to live like Saint Jerome instead of like Heliogabalus—Plato’s otherwise absurd doctrine 
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of the application of morality to politics at the very least prevents them from having to 
suffer from a sickness that democratic man, given his new mores, is all too susceptible to 
contract: what in the Recollections Tocqueville  calls “the most common sickness of our 
time.”385  
 In Volume 1 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville tells us that he “encountered 
in America passions analogous to those we see in Europe.” However, as he also tells us, 
“only some” of these passions were due to the very nature of the human heart; others, to 
the democratic state of society.” Chief among these are what he calls a “restlessness of 
heart,” a passion that is “natural to man when, all conditions being more or less equal, 
each one see these chances to rise.” 386 Unlike Pascal, therefore, Tocqueville understands 
restlessness as something that is either unique to or, at the very least, exacerbated by 
democracy.387 For Pascal, restlessness is a defining feature of the human condition—
something that plagues all human beings in all times and places. Given man’s corrupted 
nature, he finds himself in a “wretched” situation. Unable to cure all that ails him, 
whether death or ignorance, he has “decided, in order to be happy, not to think about 
these things.”388 This, however, turns out to be but a delusory coping mechanism that 
does not so much furnish happiness as it does distract him from his wretchedness, which 
in the end will cause “inevitable distress.” True happiness, insists Pascal, can only be 
achieved by submitting to God—by embracing faith over reason. For Tocqueville, 
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however, this is not necessarily the case. At the beginning of his chapter titled “Why the 
Americans Appear So Restless Amidst Their Well-Being,” he states that in certain 
remaining pockets of aristocracy, human beings are at once “ignorant” and “serene,” 
“wretched” and “cheerful”—and for the following reason: unlike human beings in 
democracy, they do not exhibit an “immoderate desire for happiness in this world.” 
As discussed above, in an aristocratic social-state there simply is no “passion for 
material well-being.” The rich do not desire what they already have; the poor do not 
desire what they are already lacking. Accordingly, human beings in aristocracy are, 
paradoxically, at once more miserable and happier. They are more miserable because of 
the inequality of condition in which they for the most part find themselves. But they are 
also happier because they believe this condition is permanent, which keeps them focused 
on the transcendent and thus on tending to their souls. They “do not think about the evils 
that they endure” and so happily endure them. Alternatively, one of the defining features 
of a democratic social-state is the passion for material well-being. The poor focus all of 
their energy on becoming rich, while the rich focus all of their energy on preserving their 
wealth. As a result, human beings in a democracy are, paradoxically, at once less 
miserable and less happy, more prosperous and more restless. They are less miserable 
because of the equality of condition in which they for the most part find themselves. But 
they are far less happy because they recognize their condition as being fluid or subject to 
change, which in turn keeps them focused on the material and thus tending to the state of 
their bodies. Consequently, they come to exhibit an immoderate desire for happiness in 
this world which not only convinces them that the state of their souls is ultimately 
dependent on the state of their bodies, but also (and for our purposes, more importantly) 
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that perfect happiness lies not in another world but in the future. They live by what 
Augustine calls the standard of the flesh and therefore believe that redemption lies in 
progress as opposed to in God’s grace. 
The modern idea of progress first emerges as a theme in Volume 2 of Democracy 
in America in a chapter titled “How Equality Suggests to the Americans the Idea of 
Man’s Indefinite Perfectibility.” In The Second Discourse, Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(another one of those thinkers with who Tocqueville apparently lived a little every day) 
introduces the faculty of “perfectibility” (along with free will) as a faculty that separates 
human beings from animals and in this chapter, Tocqueville (presumably following 
Rousseau) does the same: “Although man resembles animals in several ways,” he writes, 
“one feature is particular only to him alone: he perfects himself, and they do not perfect 
themselves.”389 Unlike Rousseau, however, Tocqueville discusses this faculty not so 
much to account for some kind of paradoxical relationship between mankind’s historical 
development on the one hand and moral decline on the other, but rather, to demonstrate 
how democracy or, more specifically, “equality,” has given it a “new character.”390 
It used to be that this idea had certain limits placed on it. As Tocqueville explains, 
“When citizens are classed according to rank, profession, birth, and when all are 
compelled to follow the path on which chance placed them, each man believes that near 
him he sees the furthest limits of human power, and no one tries any more to struggle 
against an inevitable destiny.”391 As a result, while they do not deny man’s “ability to 
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perfect himself,” they do not regard the perfectibility of man as “indefinite” either. They 
“conceive of amelioration, not change” and they “imagine the condition of society 
becoming better, but not different.”392 In short, while they believe in a certain kind of 
progress, they do not believe in what Bury, as we saw in Chapter 2, defines as “the idea 
of Progress.”393 For as Tocqueville himself puts it, while “they like to persuade 
themselves that they have almost attained the degree of grandeur and knowledge that our 
imperfect nature entails,” they “do not believe that they have reached the supreme good 
and the absolute truth (what man or what people has been so foolish ever to imagine 
that?).”394 Their belief in progress is therefore “qualified,” to quote Leo Strauss, “with a 
view to the fact that human nature does not change.”395 Because they will be what they 
are all their life, the human species, they readily conclude, will be at the end of a 
thousand years essentially if not apparently what it was at the beginning of that 
thousand.396  
Democratic man, however, believes in precisely the opposite. For him, there are 
no limits to the idea of progress; human perfectibility, in his view, is indefinite. As 
equality takes root and “castes disappear, as classes come closer together” and everything 
becomes “tumultuously” mixed together, explains Tocqueville, “the image of an ideal 
and always fleeting perfection presents itself to the human mind.”397 Immersed in a world 
characterized by “continual change,” democratic man sees only possibility, and hence 
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readily concludes that “man, in general, is endowed with the indefinite ability to 
improve.”398 True, sometimes this change makes democratic man’s “position worse,” 
thereby leading him to conclude that “no nation or individual, no matter how enlightened, 
is ever infallible” and hence that “no one can claim to have discovered absolute good.”399 
Sometimes this change has a sobering effect, reminding him of the precariousness of his 
station in life. However, when it “improves his lot,” he becomes inflamed with hope and 
pursues “the absolute good without respite.”400 Democratic man forgets entirely about the 
precariousness of his station in life and comes to believe that the human species will not 
be at the end of a thousand years what it was at the beginning of that thousand. He comes 
to believe, writes Tocqueville, that mankind is inevitably headed towards an “ideal 
perfection,” an “immense grandeur that he half sees vaguely at the end of the long course 
that humanity must still cover.”401  
Democratic man therefore exhibits a new kind of idealism that, paradoxically, 
finds its roots in the realism of Machiavelli and reaches its apex in the historical 
materialism of Marx.402  This is an idealism that does not so much cause him to look 
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upward towards heaven as it does forward towards the future. It is an idealism 
compatible with his predilection for materialism, utilitarianism, and empiricism because 
it is an idealism that collapses the City of God into the City of Man—the ideal into the 
real (more on this below). Indeed, as Tocqueville’s single example of an American sailor 
illustrates, rather than exhibit an unexamined belief in heaven and the power of 
Providence, democratic man exhibits instead an unexamined belief in history and the 
power of progress.  
According to Tocqueville, he “once met an American sailor,” and asked him why 
“his country’s ships are not built to last.” “Without hesitation,” writes Tocqueville, the 
sailor responded that because the art of navigation was making such rapid progress,” it 
would be pointless to build a longer lasting craft. “The finest ship,” he argued, “would 
soon be useless if its existence were prolonged for more than a few years.”403 As Stauffer 
observes, this example is “telling” for a number of reasons—not least of which is the 
sailor’s concern for usefulness over beauty.404 It also illustrates democratic man’s 
confidence in scientific and technological progress and his belief that “the whole human 
race will inevitably advance and improve by these means.”405 He cannot explain exactly 
how or in what way, much less why. But given what he himself has witnessed, he is 
convinced that it will. 
But alas, just as tending to the body will not save one’s soul, the future—no 
matter how scientifically and technologically advanced—will not save mankind. That 
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neither the former nor the latter are beyond this world means, in effect, that neither are 
capable of satisfying our most profound longings as human beings. Thus, just as 
democratic man finds himself restless in space—amidst his material well-being—so 
democratic man finds himself restless in time—amidst his temporal well-being. On the 
one hand, he believes that mankind is headed something, somewhere: towards some kind 
of ideal “perfection” or end point in history. On the other hand, however, he cannot 
imagine, much less see, what this “ideal perfection” consists in because it is an end-point 
that is “always fleeting.” Upon reflection, therefore, democratic man’s belief in progress 
is less philosophically coherent—and as a result, less a belief in actual progress—than 
meets the eye. For progress to actually qualify as progress it must entail movement 
towards an actual end. It must entail movement towards an actual “finest ship.”  
According to Tocqueville’s American sailor, however, there is no finest ship because 
there is no end to progress. What he believes is “progress” is, in reality, just endless, 
aimless, wandering. It is a belief in something that can only further contribute to his 
restlessness because it is upon reflection a belief in an immense grandeur at the end of a 
long course that, paradoxically, has no end.  
THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRATIC MAN: LIBERTY IN FAITH OR SERVITUDE IN REASON 
 
From the foregoing, it should be clear that unlike either aristocratic or “re-
animalized” man, democratic man finds himself in an awkward middle position. More of 
a brute than aristocratic man but less of a brute than man at the end of history, he is at 
once less serene than his predecessor and less content than his possible future self. His 
existential condition is therefore one of restlessness which means that, unlike either 
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aristocratic man or Kojeve’s re-animalized man, he is all the more in need of God or 
religion. For as Tocqueville eventually argues, only religion will enable him to “from 
time to time” tear “himself away for a moment from the petty passions that agitate his life 
and from the transitory interests that fill it…” Only religion, will allow him to “enter 
suddenly into an ideal world where everything is great, pure, eternal.”406  
But again, what democratic man needs most is an altogether different question 
from what he is naturally disposed to embrace, on the one hand, and reject, on the other. 
According to Tocqueville, because “there is virtually no human action, no matter how 
particular we assume it to be, that does not originate in some general human conception 
of God, of his relations with the human race, of the nature of the human soul, and of 
man’s duties towards his fellow,” human beings have “an immense interest in developing 
very definite ideas about God, the soul, and their general duties toward their Creator and 
their fellow men.”407 Simply put, these ideas are of the utmost importance for human 
beings to develop and believe in; for without them, “everything they do” would be left to 
“chance,” which would “in a sense condemn them to disorder and impotence.”408 
Nevertheless, that which human beings have an immense interest in developing is 
precisely that which democratic man, given his self-negating tendency and corresponding 
restlessness is least likely to develop. As a human being, democratic man is for the most 
part already incapable of “breaking through to such necessary truths.” This, writes 
Tocqueville, is a feat that only “truly emancipated” minds can accomplish.409 Yet, as a 
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democratic human being, he is at an even greater disadvantage. Not only is he (like most 
other human beings) too preoccupied with his daily activities to do what only 
philosophers are naturally equipped to do, he is in addition the adherent of a 
philosophical method that, as evidenced above, fosters certain habits of mind that 
naturally encourage the debunking of very definite ideas about God, the soul, and man’s 
duties towards his neighbors.  
Of all types of men, therefore, democratic man is the most likely to suffer from a 
kind of paralyzing doubt with regard to God and religion that not only cripples the 
intellect, but in so doing, primes the soul for servitude. As Tocqueville explains:  
When religion is destroyed among a people, doubt takes hold of the highest portions of 
the intellect and half paralyzes all the others. Each person gets accustomed to having only 
confused and changing notions about the matters that most interest his fellows and 
himself. You defend your opinions badly or you abandon them, and, since you despair of 
being able, by yourself, to solve the greatest problems that human destiny presents, you 
are reduced like a coward to not thinking about them. 
Such a state cannot fail to enervate souls; it slackens the motivating forces of will and 
prepares citizens for servitude. 
When authority no longer exists in religious matter, any more than in political matters, 
men are soon frightened by the sight of this limitless independence. This perpetual 
agitation of all things disturbs and exhausts them. Since everything shifts in the 
intellectual world, they at least want everything to be firm and stable in the material 
order, and, no longer able to recapture their ancient beliefs, they give themselves a 
master.410 
 
Here, Tocqueville provides a brief three-stage sketch of what happens when a democratic 
people’s more Cartesian instincts come home to roost. First, doubt takes hold of the 
highest regions of the intellect in effect throwing them into a morass of moral confusion. 
Second, anxiety grips them. In the absence of any “self-evident” truths concerning God 
and the soul, they become agitated and afraid. Finally, a feeling of resignation sets in. 
Having become tired or fatigued, they readily conclude that living under a “Leviathan,” 
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so to speak, is a preferable fate to living in a condition of moral confusion and chaos. 
Unable to resume their “ancient beliefs” their souls relent; they readily embrace what is 
“firm and stable” and thus voluntarily forgo their freedom as a people.  
Accordingly, in Tocqueville’s view it is of paramount importance that religious 
belief somehow be made compatible with democracy. In fact, one might go so far as to 
say that the success of his entire political project hinges on whether this can be done.411 
“For me,” he writes, “I doubt that man can ever bear complete religious independence 
and full political liberty at the same time; and I am led to think that, if he does not have 
faith, he must serve, and, if he is free, he must believe.”412  As the only thing that can 
truly provide what human beings have an immense interest in developing, religion comes 
into view as essential for the preservation of liberty and human dignity in a democratic 
age. It comes into view as essential for preserving what Tocqueville, by his own 
admission, cares for most.  
Even so, what is of paramount importance is no small undertaking. Aside from 
the fact it is an undertaking that few people are qualified to take up, it is undertaking that 
is exceptionally difficult to execute. According to Tocqueville, religions should be 
modified in such a way as to make them appealing to the democratic mind. They should 
be modified in such a way as to “make use of democratic instincts”—just as religion in 
America, he argues, does. Specifically, this means making religion less orthodoxic and 
orthopraxic in character. It means making religion easier to understand, on the one hand, 
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and easier to practice, on the other.413 As we saw at the end of Chapter 2, however, to 
modify a religion is a precarious task. If we recall, in his deleted chapter on religious 
eloquence, Tocqueville states that religions are by nature “immobile.” “There is nothing 
so variable by their nature as religions and it cannot be otherwise,” he writes. Their claim 
to rest on “absolute truth” depends on it.414  To modify them, Tocqueville therefore 
admits, is to run the risk of giving the lie to their supposed absolute truth. It is to run the 
risk of destroying them and thus destroying precisely what democratic man needs most. 
And yet, given democratic man’s psychological makeup, this is a risk that must be taken. 
The survival of political liberty depends on it. The only questions that remain, then, are 
these: will the few people who are qualified to modify religion rise to the occasion? And 
if not, what then? To what “master” will democratic man turn? 
THE ALLURE OF PANTHEISM 
 
It is in the context of this dilemma that democratic man’s propensity not only to 
give himself a “master,” but also, embrace what might be called “ersatz religion” comes 
into view. At the beginning of Chapter 6 of Part 1, Volume 2, Tocqueville declares that 
“America is the most democratic country on earth, and at the same time the country 
where, according to trustworthy reports, the Catholic religion is making the most 
progress.”415 There are several reasons for this, one of which is simply the fact that those 
who regulate Catholicism in the United-States do precisely what Tocqueville 
recommends for all “who are charged” with regulating religions in democratic centuries. 
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In America, observes Tocqueville, “There are no Catholic priests who show less taste for 
small individual observances, extraordinary and particular methods of gaining your 
salvation, or who are attached more to the spirit of the law and less to its letter than the 
Catholic priests of the United States…”416 Another more specific reason for the success 
of Catholicism in America, however, is that it has one powerful advantage over 
Protestantism: unity. “Two things must be clearly distinguished,” explains Tocqueville. 
“Equality disposes men to want to judge by themselves; but from another side, it gives 
them the taste and the idea of a single social power, simple and same for all.”417 
Catholicism therefore caters to the democratic instinct for unity in a way that 
Protestantism, which caters to the democratic instinct to judge for oneself, can never 
match. Catholicism provides “uniformity” thereby allowing democratic man to make a 
sort of uneasy compromise between his high and often quite exaggerated idea of human 
reason, on the one hand, and his corresponding very low opinion of revelation, on the 
other. After all, if religion or faith is to appear reasonable, it must present itself as a 
unified, coherent whole. Yet, as Tocqueville also makes clear, even Catholicism may not 
prove to be a religion that persists in democratic centuries. True, it has one thing going 
for it that Protestantism does not: unity.  But as Tocqueville also readily admits, despite 
having a “taste for, and an idea of, a single social power that is both simple and the same 
for all,” democratic man is on the whole less likely to do what human beings otherwise 
tend to do: “reconcile contrary principles” in order to “buy peace at the expense of 
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logic.”418 In Tocqueville’s view, because there will be a much smaller number of people 
capable of achieving this reconciliation of opposing principles “in democratic centuries 
than in other centuries,” human beings will “tend more and more to divide into only two 
parts, some leaving Christianity entirely, others going into the Roman Church”—some 
becoming Catholic, others turning elsewhere—just as the French, following the 
Revolution, themselves did.419 
If we recall, immediately following the Revolution France entered into what 
might be called a “spiritual crisis.” Rather than become a nation composed entirely of 
strong, rational, unbelievers, she became a nation composed instead of spiritually starved, 
weak individuals in search of solid ground. To be sure, some of these individuals returned 
to their “ancient beliefs.” They embraced “the great summum of Catholicism, presented 
afresh by the traditionalists” including Bonald, Joseph de Maistre, the younger 
Lamennais, and Chateaubriand.420 Many others, however, abandoned Christianity 
altogether and in the wake of experiencing a spiritual vacuum of the kind alluded to 
above, began to embrace seemingly secular alternatives. They began turn to “vast 
synthetic systems”—systems such as pantheism which, as Tocqueville proceeds to reveal, 
“will have a secret charm for men in democracy.”421   
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Returning to the “democratic aptitude and taste for general ideas,” Tocqueville 
tells us that “later” he will show how it manifests itself in politics; for now, he will call 
attention to “its principal effect on philosophy.”  “There is no denying that pantheism has 
made great progress in recent years,” he begins. “Writings from a portion of Europe 
visibly bear its stamp. The Germans have introduced it into philosophy and the French 
into literature.”422 That they have, however, is no accident. As Tocqueville explains, “as 
conditions become more equal and each man in particular becomes more similar to all 
others, weaker and smaller ones stop looking at citizens and become accustomed to 
considering only the people; one forgets individuals and thinks only of the species.”423 
Put another way, whereas in times of inequality one misses the forest for the trees, in 
times of equality one misses the trees for the forest; in finding humanity, one loses the 
individual.  
It is important to recognize, however, that for the very same reason that 
Catholicism appeals to the democratic mind, so too does the philosophical doctrine of 
pantheism. The reason is as follows: in times of equality, the human mind is “keen to 
embrace a host of diverse objects simultaneously” and it “invariably aspires to associate a 
multitude of consequences with a single cause.”424 Furthermore, “because it becomes 
obsessed with the idea of unity, it looks for it everywhere.”425 However, as we have seen, 
democratic man wants to locate the “principal arbiter” of his beliefs within the limits of 
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mankind alone. Therefore, Catholicism may well cease to facilitate and provide what 
democratic man invariably aspires to do and looks for everywhere. In other words, 
because the idea of a single Creator God may well cease to qualify as a believable “single 
cause” with which a multitude of consequences can be associated, Catholicism may well 
cease to qualify as a legitimate source of intellectual unity—something that Tocqueville 
all but affirms when he argues that even in the wake of discovering “in the world only 
one creation and one creator,” democratic man will remain unsatisfied.426 Accordingly, 
there is a real question as to whether Catholicism can fully satisfy the epistemological 
instincts and expectations of a man who, because he has a very high and exaggerated 
view of human reason has a corresponding very low opinion of revelation. In the event 
that he cannot “buy peace at the expense of logic,” such a man may very well be inclined 
to look elsewhere. He may well turn to a philosophical doctrine or system that purports to 
deliver what from an epistemological perspective, Catholicism simply cannot provide.  
Like Catholicism, pantheism not only caters to what democratic man “invariably” 
aspires to achieve, but also—or rather, in so doing—provides precisely what democratic 
man “looks for everywhere.” Pantheism not only fulfills his aspiration to associate 
everything with “single cause” but as a result, provides him with the sense of intellectual 
unity that he so desires. Unlike Catholicism, however, pantheism does not insist on 
distinguishing the material from the immaterial, the natural from the supernatural, and 
therein lies its allure: rather than pit democratic man’s indestructible spiritual longings 
against his predilection for materialism—rather than pit his “invincible distaste for the 
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supernatural” against his ineradicable love of the immortal and taste for the infinite—
pantheism reconciles the former with the latter by collapsing the supernatural and the 
natural into a single whole. 
For this reason, pantheism comes into view as an alternative and more attractive 
cure than positive religion for democratic man’s restlessness, as discussed above. On the 
one hand, it validates democratic man’s taste for material well-being and corresponding 
predilection for materialism, and thus assures him that his instincts with regard to the 
“supernatural” are fundamentally correct. On the other hand, however, it validates his 
indestructible longings for the immortal and the infinite because, rather than reject the 
idea of God outright, it simply adjusts what is meant by Him. It used to be that He was 
not us; that He was separate from His creation. According to pantheism, however, this 
view is fundamentally mistaken. In turns out that God is his creation. It turns out that He 
is we and we are Him—that He is “everything” and hence “everywhere.” Consequently, 
pantheism operates according to the following paradox: that while everything is material, 
everything is also somehow more than matter—including especially the human being.427 
It at once denies and affirms the special status of human beings, and so allows human 
beings to think of themselves as angels all the while living like brutes. It enables them to 
live like Heliogabulas whilst claiming to be Saint Jerome.  
Pantheism is therefore a “seductive lullaby,” as Peter Augustine Lawler calls it, in 
that it is “much more compatible with democracy and modern science than 
Christianity.”428 As intimated above, despite being radically opposed to one another, 
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spiritualism and materialism share one thing in common: from the perspective of 
democratic man, they both demand too much. Whereas the former demands too much in 
the way of belief and thus flies in the face of how he generally perceives and interprets 
the world around him, the latter demands too much in the way of unbelief and thus flies 
in the face of what democratic man cannot help but long for as a human being. As we 
have seen, however, because pantheism claims to accommodate both, it in effect 
demands neither. It promises a kind of satisfaction that neither spiritualism nor 
materialism on their own can provide, making it much more psychologically appealing.  
Of course, whether pantheism actually accomplishes what it purports to 
accomplish is another question. For our purposes, however, it is important simply to note 
the following: that regardless of how philosophically coherent or incoherent, how true or 
untrue it is, pantheism appeals to democratic man in a way that neither spiritualism nor 
materialism do. Unlike spiritualism, pantheism does not require or encourage democratic 
man to relinquish his very high and exaggerated view of human reason; unlike 
materialism, it does not require that he reduce his spiritual longings to delusion. It is for 
this reason that, according to Tocqueville pantheism feeds his “intellectual pride” and 
flatters his “intellectual sloth.” Too proud to be a believer yet too lazy to be an 
unbeliever, pantheism allows him to be both without having to be, strictly speaking, 
either.  
And yet, as we shall see next, pantheism is not the only philosophical doctrine or 
“ersatz religion” that, given his psychological makeup and corresponding restlessness, 
democratic man is liable to find alluring. For what pantheism does for democratic man in 
the context of his being in “space”—rendering all that is matter, more than just matter—
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democratic history does for him in the context of his being in “time”—rendering all that 
is history, more than just history.  
THE ALLURE OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORY 
 
As previously discussed, whereas for Kojève “man properly so-called” exists only 
in time and is therefore “nothing,” for Tocqueville man exists in both space and time and 
is therefore something, not simply “becoming.” Consequently, despite being “in a very 
real sense” a “new man,” democratic man is still a human being and so continues to 
exhibit the same love for the immortal and taste for the infinite that all human beings 
exhibit, regardless of time or place. Despite the newness of his mores, these “sublime 
instincts” remain, meaning that despite the newness of his predilections he will continue 
to long for some kind of spiritual satisfaction, despite his Cartesian way of thinking. This 
is especially true given the fact that democratic man, unlike his aristocratic predecessor, 
lives in a world or time where restlessness, not contentedness, reigns.  
And yet, precisely because democratic man exists in both space and time, this 
spiritual satisfaction will not be found by turning to pantheism alone—no matter how 
much more charming than either materialism or spiritualism it might initially seem. No, 
as Tocqueville reveals in his chapter on poetry in democratic centuries, because 
democratic man has immoderate expectations for happiness in this world, divinizing the 
material—collapsing the supernatural into the natural—will not suffice. In order to truly 
satisfy his spiritual longings and calm his restlessness, he will also have to divinize 
history; he will also have to collapse the supernatural into time; for only then will 
everything truly become a “single whole.” 
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As we have seen, when compared to aristocratic man, democratic man neither 
desires nor appreciates what poetry portrays and offers. Because he naturally seeks to 
push aside anything that stands between him and the “the truth”—because he is 
accustomed to trusting only in what he himself can verify—he prefers “the real” to “the 
ideal,” the useful to the beautiful. In effect, just as he altogether less spiritual that he is 
materialistic, he is altogether less poetic than he is prosaic. Again, he is naturally 
disposed to look down, not up, and by offering a “higher image to the mind,” poetry, like 
spiritualism, appeals to those who are disposed to do the latter, not the former. At the 
same time, however, just as none of this is to say that he has no spiritual longings, none 
of this is to say that he has no idealism, either. For as we have also seen, despite his 
psychological make-up, he nevertheless retains a love of the immortal and taste for the 
infinite, on the one hand, and nevertheless remains somewhat open to the ideal, on the 
other. He just imagines the ideal in a fundamentally different way.  
In aristocratic centuries, explains Tocqueville, poetry is “populated with 
supernatural powers” that, instead of being discovered via “the senses,” are discovered 
instead “by the mind.”429 Why? Because by keeping society from changing, aristocracy 
favors the “steadiness and duration of positive religions…”430 It keeps the mind’s eye 
looking upward towards heaven as much as it keeps man’s body in place on earth. In 
addition to being populated with supernatural beings, however, aristocratic poetry is 
populated with heroes or great men—certain “privileged individuals” who, like God 
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himself, exist “above and beyond the human condition.”431 According to Tocqueville, 
because the most people who live in aristocracy never see these men up “close, ” they 
never cut through to the empirical truth about who they are, what they do, and how much 
power they actually wield. In effect, these “privileged individuals” are liable to be 
depicted in a poetic rather than in a realistic way. Shrouded in obscurity, they are liable to 
be depicted as more powerful, more distinguished, and more influential than they actually 
are. 432 
In democratic centuries, by contrast, poetry is devoid of the supernatural because 
for the democratic poet, that which cannot be apprehended by the senses—that which is 
not empirically verifiable—most likely does not exist. Democratic man’s “doubt” 
regarding that which might otherwise be discovered by the mind alone has the effect of 
pulling his imagination “back down to earth,” confining him to the natural—to the 
“visible and real world.”433 Nor is poetry in democratic centuries filled with heroes 
because where equality reigns, “men are all very small and very similar...”434 As a result, 
“poets who live in democratic centuries cannot ever take one man in particular as the 
subject of their portrait” as they can in aristocratic centuries. Because no one enjoys an 
existence that is in a sense “outside of the human condition,” no one stands out as worthy 
of being depicted as more than merely human. All are equally worthy.435 
Unlike aristocratic poets, therefore, democratic poets depict neither gods nor 
heroes but nature or space. As Tocqueville explains, “When doubt depopulated heaven 
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and when the progress of equality reduced each man to better known and smaller 
proportions, poets, not yet imagining what they could put in place of these great subjects 
that withdrew with aristocracy, turned their eyes to inanimate nature.”436 Upon losing 
sight of gods and heroes, they turned instead to “rivers and mountains.”437 They turned 
away from the supernatural and towards the natural and in so doing began to idealize 
space—just as pantheism divinizes the material. 
However, as Tocqueville goes on to explain, the idealization of space or nature, 
like the divinization of the material, has a ‘best before’ date: 
Some have thought that this embellished portrayal of the material and inanimate things 
which cover the earth was poetry appropriate to democratic centuries; but I think that is a 
mistake. I believe that it only represents a period of transition. 
I am persuaded that in the long run democracy diverts the imagination from everything 
that is external to man, in order to fix it only on man. 
 Democratic peoples can be very amused for a moment by considering nature; but they 
get really excited only by the sight of themselves. Here alone are the natural sources of 
poetry to be found among these peoples, and it may be believed that all poets who do not 
want to draw upon these sources will lose all sway over the souls of those whom they 
claim to charm, and will end by no longer having anything except cold witnesses to their 
transports.438 
 
In this passage Tocqueville qualifies his previous argument that instead of depicting gods 
and heroes, democratic poets will depict inanimate nature or space. As it turns out, their 
depicting inanimate nature “represents” only a transition period. Because democratic 
peoples are less attracted to inanimate nature than they are to their animate selves, they 
will eventually become unmoved by poetry that idealizes or embellishes the former. This 
kind of poetry, Tocqueville reveals, will eventually “lose sway” over its audience. It will 
in the long run cease to capture the democratic imagination. 
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Consequently, democratic poets will in the long run need to find another muse. 
They will need to depict what does capture the democratic imagination: man understood 
as a ‘being’ that is not only separate from but opposed to inanimate nature. While there 
are “some in Europe,” writes Tocqueville, who remain enamored with the American 
wilderness, Americans themselves are indifferent to it. They pay attention to nature only 
insofar as it stands in their way—that is, as something to be domesticated or “subdued.” 
In other words, Americans pay attention to inanimate nature only insofar as presents itself 
as an object to be conquered by animate man. In fact, their entire conception of courage, 
as Tocqueville later reveals, is predicated on man’s ability to do just this: “In the United 
States,” he writes, “warrior valor is little prized; the courage that is known the best and 
esteemed the most is the one that makes you face the furies of the Ocean in order to 
arrive earliest in port” and “bear without complaint the miseries of the wilderness…”439 
In order to charm democratic peoples, therefore, democratic poets will need to idealize 
this ‘American’ opposition to nature. They will need to idealize what constitutes 
democratic man’s belief in the idea of progress in the first place: his belief in man’s 
“indefinite perfectibility.”440 
As alluded to above, democratic man’s belief in the idea of progress is idealistic 
one that, paradoxically, finds its roots in the realism of Machiavelli.441 If we recall from 
the Introduction, in Chapter 15 of the Prince, Machiavelli rejects the idealism of the 
ancients by famously declaring that unlike them, he will go “directly to the effectual truth 
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of a thing” as opposed to “the imagination of it.”442 But his rejection of ancient and 
Christian idealism, of the “imagination of a thing,” is nevertheless coupled with the 
promotion of an idealism of his own—one rooted in the effectual truth—that ultimately 
reaches its apex in Marx.443 This is an idealism which, metaphorically speaking, places 
the power of God in the hands of man; for it is an idealism which ultimately posits that 
man can or, at the very least ought to try, to “hold down,” “strike,” and “beat” God’s 
creation (what Machiavelli calls fortune but nevertheless likens to something quite 
natural) into submission.444 It is an idealism that, rather than quell or temper democratic 
man’s passion for material well-being inflames that passion because it is an idealism 
which grants him the ability to provide for himself, here in this world, what he would 
otherwise have to wait for in the next.445 In other words, it is an idealism that encourages 
him to put his faith not in the prospect of being saved by the “unmerited” grace of God, 
but in the indefinite perfectibility of mankind. It is an idealism that encourages him to 
place his faith in the modern “doctrine of progress,” not the orthodox “doctrine of 
Providence.”446  
Accordingly, this is an idealism that is actually compatible with democratic man’s 
preference for the material, utilitarian, and empirical, because it is an idealism that, given 
all of progress that he himself has witnessed, warrants his dreaming not about the next 
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world but about the future of this one. Aristocracy, explains Tocqueville, has a way of 
focusing the mind on the “past” and “fixes” it there.447 It has a way of focusing the mind 
on what was or has been as opposed to what might or will be. Again, because life in 
aristocracy is static, aristocratic peoples remain closed off to the modern idea of progress. 
They do not spend their days dreaming about the future because their future is their 
present which is also their past. They do not so much live in “time” as they do in “space.” 
Their ‘being’ in “time” is for the most part overshadowed by the fact of their immobility 
in space, which keeps them focused on looking up as opposed to looking forward. 
Democratic peoples, however, live more so in “time” than they do in “space” because 
democracy has a way of focusing the mind not on what is or has been, but on what might 
or may be. Because life in democracy in fluid, it has a way of “suggesting” to the 
democratic mind that mankind is headed towards an “ideal perfection” in the less than 
perfect real—a City of God in the future of the fallen City of Man. Hence the future, 
writes Tocqueville, “offers as a vast opening to poets and allows them to move their 
portrayal far away from what is seen.”448 
And yet, as also mentioned above, democratic man’s belief progress amounts to 
an idealism that, unlike the idealism of the ancients does not so much relieve as it does 
exacerbate his restlessness. If we recall, although democratic man believes that mankind 
is headed towards some kind of “ideal perfection”—some end-point in history—he 
cannot imagine, much less see, what this “ideal perfection” consists in. It is an end-point 
that is “always fleeting” because in his view, there is no end to progress. Upon closer 
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examination, therefore, democratic man’s belief in progress comes into view as a belief 
in endless wandering—a belief in something that does not actually exist and will never be 
strictly speaking “real,” and thus that will never truly satisfy his “immoderate desire for 
happiness in this world.” Upon closer examination, democratic man’s belief in progress is 
a belief in mankind’s heading towards nothing, nowhere. 
 In turning from the depiction of inanimate nature to writing about what does 
capture the democratic imagination, then, it will become the task of democratic poets to 
give form and substance to this nothing, nowhere—that is, to depict it as something, 
somewhere.449 Put another way, it will become to the task of democratic poets to depict 
the “ideal perfection” and “immense grandeur” that on his own, democratic man can see 
only “vaguely at the end of the long course that humanity must still cover.” As 
Tocqueville explains:  
If in democratic centuries faith in positive religions is often shaky and beliefs in 
intermediary powers, whatever name you give them, grow dim, men on the other hand 
are disposed to conceive a much more vast idea of Divinity itself, and the intervention of 
the divine in human affairs appears to them in a new and greater light. 
Seeing the human species as a single whole, they easily imagine that the same design 
rules over its destinies, and in the actions of each individual, they are led to recognize the 
mark of this general and constant plan by which God leads the species. 
This can also be considered as a very abundant source of poetry that opens in these 
centuries. 
Democratic poets will always seem small and cold if they try to give bodily forms to 
gods, demons or angels, and try to make them descend from heaven to quarrel over the 
earth. 
But, if democratic poets want to connect the great events that they are relating to the 
general designs of God for the universe, and, without showing the hand of the sovereign 
master, cause his thought to be entered into, they will be admired and understood, for the 
imagination of their com- patriots itself follows this road.450  
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This passage is noteworthy for a number of reasons, the first of which is the seemingly 
contradictory logic underlying what Tocqueville prophesizes. As he presents it, the 
appearance of grand poetic narratives about the destiny of mankind (of its meaningful 
journey towards some “ideal perfection”) somehow correlates with the weakening, not 
the strengthening, of religious belief. “If” faith in positive religions often becomes shaky, 
he explains, “then” democratic man will conceive a far vaster idea of Divinity and see its 
intervention in human affairs in a “new and greater light.” This brings us to a second 
reason why this passage is noteworthy. If conceiving of a far vaster idea of Divinity and 
its intervention in human affairs is contingent upon democratic man losing, not retaining, 
his religion, then Divinity’s appearing to him in a “new and greater light” must somehow 
correspond with his very high and often exaggerated idea human reason and distaste for 
the supernatural as opposed to any orthodox belief in the “doctrine of Providence” as 
inaugurated by Augustine. It must mean appearing to him in a way that is, at least to a 
certain extent, empirically verifiable (through actual events and actions)—which brings 
us to a third. and final reason why this passage is noteworthy. What Tocqueville is 
essentially saying here is that it will eventually become the task of democratic poets to 
write what he later identifies as democratic history—a type of history that as we have 
seen, although Christian by derivation is anti-Christian by consequence and that, as such, 
promises to do for democratic man’s ‘being’ in “time” what pantheism does for his 
‘being’ in “space.” 
Let us recall that the reason why pantheism will hold a secret charm for men in 
democracy is because it satisfies or, at the very least, holds out the promise of satisfying 
the epistemological biases of a being who, despite his very high and often exaggerated 
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idea of human reason, is liable to nevertheless find materialism as unsatisfying as 
spiritualism. That democratic man cannot destroy his love for the immortal and taste for 
the infinite means, in effect, that he will continue to have spiritual longings that 
materialism—by virtue of its being materialism—simply cannot acknowledge as being 
anything more than the by-product of an irrational fear “of things invisible.”451  
Democratic man is therefore liable to turn to pantheism as an attractive alternative to 
“positive religion” because, while it does not reduce his spiritual longings to delusion, it 
also does not demand that he let go of his distaste for the supernatural and low opinion of 
revelation, either. Pantheism holds out the promise of being able to heal the tension 
between his predilection for materialism, on the one hand, and his indestructible spiritual 
longings, on the other. It holds out the promise of being able to cure his restlessness in 
“space,” amidst his material well-being.  
Something similar, however, can be said of democratic history—albeit with 
respect to “time” as opposed to “space.” As with pantheism, democratic history not only 
caters to what democratic man “invariably” aspires to do, but also—or rather, in so 
doing—provides precisely what democratic man “looks for everywhere.” It not only 
fulfills his aspiration to associate everything, all historical events and individual actions, 
with “single cause” (a “superior force” as Tocqueville calls it in his chapter on historians 
in democratic centuries) but as a result, also provides him with the sense of intellectual 
unity that he so desires. Moreover, just as pantheism does not insist on distinguishing the 
material from the immaterial, democratic history does not insist on distinguishing the real 
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from the ideal. Hence, rather than pit democratic man’s new-found idealism against his 
preference for the real—rather than pit his belief in indefinite progress against his 
predilection for empiricism and utilitarianism—democratic history reconciles the former 
with the latter by collapsing the ideal into the real or rather, by employing the real 
(history) in the service of an ideal (progress). Democratic history thus holds out the 
promise of being able to reconcile the tension between democratic man’s preference for 
the real, on the one hand, with his new-found idealism, on the other. It attaches meaning 
or purpose to his existence in time just as pantheism attaches meaning to his existence in 
space because just as the latter renders all that is matter more than just matter, democratic 
history renders all that is history more than just history.  
THE “STRANGE” PERSISTENCE OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORY RECONSIDERED 
In his essay “Progress and Return,” Leo Strauss diagnoses what he calls the 
“contemporary crisis of Western civilization”—a crisis that, as he later reveals, “may be 
said to be identical with the climactic crisis of the idea of progress in the full and 
emphatic sense of the term.”452 What is the idea of progress in the full and emphatic 
sense of the term? According to Strauss, it consists in the following set of beliefs: that 
“the development of human thought as a whole is a progressive development”; that there 
is a “fundamental and necessary parallelism between intellectual and social progress”; 
that “there are no assignable limits to intellectual and social progress”; that “infinite 
intellectual and social progress is actually possible”; and finally, that “once mankind has 
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reached a certain stage of development, there exists a solid floor beneath which man can 
no longer sink.”453 Simply put, the idea of progress in the full and emphatic sense of the 
term is the idea of the indefinite perfectibility of man as discussed by Tocqueville in 
Volume 2 of Democracy in America. It is an idea that democratic peoples, given their all 
too Christian “hope” for the future, are naturally liable to embrace and thus an idea that 
democratic poets turned historians are naturally liable to write about. 
Still, according to Strauss faith in the idea of progress the full and emphatic sense 
is fading. As he earlier notes, “The term ‘progress’ in its full and emphatic meaning has 
practically disappeared from serious literature. People speak less and less of ‘progress’ 
and more and more of ‘change.’ They no longer claim to know that we are moving in the 
right direction.”454  One reason for the decline of faith in the modern idea of progress, he 
observes, is simply the “incredible barbarization which we have been so unfortunate as to 
witness in our century.” Above all, it is events like the Holocaust which seem to have 
exposed the idea of progress for what it is: an idea “based on wholly unwarranted 
hopes.”455 Nevertheless, as Strauss goes on to argue, even the incredible barbarization 
which we have been so unfortunate as to witness in our century does not fully account for 
the decline in this faith. No, there is another much more profound reason why people no 
longer claim to know that we are moving the right direction: the replacement of “the old 
distinction of good and bad, good and evil” with the new distinction of “progressive and 
reactionary.”456  
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To be sure, the replacement of the old distinction of “good and bad, good and 
evil” with the new distinction of “progressive and reactionary” may seem 
inconsequential—that is, at least insofar as ‘progressive’ is typically conceived of as a 
stand in for what is ‘good’ and reactionary a stand in for what is ‘bad’ or ‘evil.’ However, 
as Strauss explains, progressive and reactionary are categories bereft of any moral 
meaning. At the end of the day, all they represent is change in one direction versus 
another which, from a purely normative perspective, amounts to rudderless, aimless, 
wandering—just like democratic man’s belief in indefinite progress.457 Accordingly, the 
replacement of the old distinction of good and evil with the new distinction of 
progressive and reactionary amounts, in actuality, to the replacement of faith in 
something with faith in nothing. It amounts to the embrace of nihilism and is therefore 
ultimately what accounts for the climatic crisis of the idea of progress and therewith it, 
the “contemporary crisis of Western civilization.” 
 And yet, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, although faith in the idea of 
progress has no doubt fluctuated over the past two centuries, it has not simply gone away. 
People may, from time to time, speak less of progress and more of change. But even 
when speaking of the latter they cannot, it seems, help but at the same time appeal to 
“hope.”458 The fact is that because there is no real prospect for a “return” (that is, at least 
insofar as by “return” is meant a restoring faith in “positive religion”), this faith in 
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progress persists and, since the collapse of communism in the 1980s has arguably taken 
on a new, invigorated form.459  
In his book Liberal Democracy and Political Science, James Ceaser explains why 
until recently, liberal democratic leaders have for the most part eschewed “theories of 
historical inevitability.”460 According to him, “because fascism and communism were 
based on ideas of historical inevitability, liberal democracy more easily defined itself 
against historicism…”461 To be sure, it too had a “sustaining faith in the idea of progress, 
but this was quite distinct from fatalistic doctrines of inevitability.”462 Then came the 
sudden of collapse of communism—an event which, as Ceaser explains, far from 
discrediting historicism (as one might expect), had the unanticipated consequence of 
somehow strengthening it. “How curious,” he writes… 
…that this same mode of thought should appear in the argument on behalf of liberal 
democracy. Frank Fukuyama, in the article “The End of History?” is the one of the first 
serious thinkers to attach the idea of historical inevitability to liberal democracy. The 
great attention his thesis received, both in academia and the popular press, suggests the 
attraction his new historicism holds for intellectuals in liberal democracies. 463 
 
What, exactly, accounts for this attraction? Unfortunately, Ceaser does not speculate. Just 
as Brett Bowden stops short at calling the persistence of universal history “strange,” so 
Ceaser stops short at calling the appearance Fukuyama’s inevitability thesis “curious.” 
However, given what Tocqueville brings to light concerning the psychological make-up 
and corresponding existential fate of democratic man, this attraction is upon reflection 
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less strange and less curious than it appears. In accordance with that make-up and 
corresponding fate, this attraction speaks to democratic man’s search for ersatz 
alternatives to a “positive religion” (Christianity) he no longer really believes in. Simply 
put, this attraction speaks to his desire to overcome his restlessness and find meaning in a 
world where God is dead.  
When this persistent desire is taken into account, therefore, the persistence of 
democratic history can hardly be called “strange.” The fact is that in societies where 
individual reason reins and “doubt has depopulated heaven,” human beings will 
nonetheless turn to and seek out other, less overtly theological, sources of meaning—one 
of which is history. As we have seen, lest they suffer from restless wandering in 
perpetuity, they will turn to “vast synthetic systems” or “alternative spiritualities” that, 
for reasons noted above, are arguably even more compatible with their democratic 
instincts than positive religion. After all, as Tocqueville reminds us, “The soul has needs 
that must be satisfied; and whatever care you take to distract it from itself, it soon grows 
bored, restless and agitated amid the enjoyments of the senses.”464 The question, then, is 
not so much whether these needs will be satisfied, but how? According to Tocqueville, 
“some men” will satisfy their spiritual longings by rejecting the enjoyments of the senses 
altogether—by “throwing themselves frantically into the world of spirits.”465 They will, 
on account of a “prodigious reaction” to materialism, “look only to heaven” and take up 
the life of St. Jerome (something that, as we will see in the next chapter, has a secular 
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equivalent).466 But what about the vast majority of others? To what will they turn? As I 
have argued in this chapter, one answer is that they will eventually turn to democratic 
history which, precisely because it is a derivation of Christian world history, comes into 
view as being especially alluring to the democratic imagination—an imagination which 
already “follows this road.” No, it is not overtly theological. On the contrary, it claims to 
be scientific and secular. Nevertheless, because it caters to democratic man’s idealism, 
democratic history comes into view as a surrogate for positive religion. It implicitly 
attaches meaning to his otherwise meaningless existence in “time” just as pantheism 
attaches meaning to his otherwise meaningless existence in “space”—and as we shall see 
next, to the detriment of his well-being in both.   
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Chapter 4: The Danger of Democratic History: Voegelin, Tocqueville, 
Gobineau, and the “Gnostic Attitude” of Democratic Historians 
 
I rehearsed in my mind the history of the past sixty years and smiled bitterly at the 
illusions we nursed at the end of each phase of our long revolution; at the theories that 
thrived on those illusions; at the learned daydreams of our historians; and at the many 
ingenious but erroneous systems with which we attempted to explain a present that we 





As discussed in Chapter 2, in a famous letter addressed to the German economist, 
Walther Borgius, Friedrich Engels identifies Tocqueville’s democratic historians (The 
Restoration Liberals) as being instrumental in the development of the Marxist conception 
of history. “If it was Marx who discovered the materialist view of history,” he writes, 
“the work of Thierry, Mignet, [and] Guizot…goes to show that efforts were being made 
in that direction…”468 Not discussed, however, was the actual content of that letter, which 
consists of Engels answering two important questions related to the Marxist conception 
of history. 
The first question asks about the extent to which, within this conception, 
“economic relations” are “causally effective”—to which Engels replies that because such 
relations are “the determinant upon which the history of society is based,” they are not 
only causally effective, but also, causally definitive.469 Everything from the “manner in 
which men of a certain society produce the necessities of life,” to the manner in which 
those necessities are exchanged; from the “distribution of products,” to the “dissolution 
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of gentile society”; from the “division of  classes,” to the “relations of rules and subjects, 
and hence the state, politics, [and] the law…,” he tells Borgius, is ultimately determined 
by such relations.470 They are, so to speak, the motor of history—the “superior force” or 
gravitational law governing the progressive development of mankind over time. They are 
that which “in the final analysis, determines historical development.”471 
The second question therefore takes the form of an important follow-up: if this is 
the case—if economic relations are what “in the final analysis, determines historical 
development”—then to what extent are individuals and, in particular, “great men” active 
participants in determining their own political fate? According to Engels, the answer to 
this question is more complicated but it essentially comes down to the following: while it 
is true that men “make their own history” they nevertheless do so in a pre-determined or, 
to use more theological language, foreordained way. They operate, he writes… 
…in a given environment by which they are conditioned, and on the basis of extant and 
actual relations of which economic relations, no matter how much they may be 
influenced by others of a political and ideological nature, are ultimately the determining 
factor and represent the unbroken thread which alone can lead to comprehension.”472  
 
Here, Engels clarifies an argument initially advanced by Marx at the beginning of The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonarparte. Immediately after expressing his disagreement 
with Hegel who “remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages 
appear, so to speak, twice,” Marx writes the following: “Men make their own history, but 
they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, 
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but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”473 To be 
sure, what Marx here posits seems self-evident: of course men “do not make history as 
they please.” That they cannot change the past means that whether they recognize it or 
not, the future is not as open-ended as they might perceive or wish it to be. In light of 
what Engels writes above, however, what seems self-evident is not actually what Marx is 
saying. What Marx is saying, rather, is that whatever history men do happen to make, 
they make as a result of and in keeping with how history—understood as an unbroken 
comprehensible thread—has, paradoxically, already made them.474 What Marx is saying, 
according to Engels, is that men make what history compels them to make, whether they 
realize it or not.475  
So it follows that while the emergence in history of certain great men in 
particular—of Napoleon or Caesar—is a function of “chance,” the emergence in history 
of great men in general—of a Napoleon or a Caesar—is not. Rather, their emergence is 
as necessitated as everything else. “That Napoleon, this particular Corsican, was the 
military dictator rendered necessary by a French Republic bled white by her wars, was 
fortuitous,” writes Engels. However, “in the absence of a Napoleon, someone else would 
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have taken his place,” and this is “proved by the fact that when someone becomes 
necessary—Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc.—he invariable turns up.”476 Simply put, 
the emergence of great men in history is, in Engels and Marx’s view, like the emergence 
of a flood in nature. Some floods are more destructive than others, and in this they vary. 
That all floods, however, are “in the final analysis” necessitated—that is, are naturally 
occurring phenomena—means that none are strictly speaking, accidental. Rather, they 
occur for entirely natural and thus predictable reasons.  
 In keeping with Tocqueville’s democratic historians, then, Engels and Marx 
essentially eliminate the phenomenon of accident from history. For them as for Mignet, 
Thierry, and Guizot, what appears accidental is always, upon closer inspection, 
necessitated or “superstructural;” for as Engels later writes: 
The further removed is the sphere we happen to be investigating from the economic 
sphere and the closer to the purely abstract, ideological sphere, the more likely shall we 
be to find evidence of the fortuitous in its development, and the more irregular will be the 
curve it describes. But if you draw the mean axis of the curve, you will find that the 
longer the period under consideration and the larger the area thus surveyed, the more 
approximately parallel will this axis be to the axis of economic development.477 
 
In this passage Engels explains the nature of the relationship between what in Marxist 
theory is called the “substructure” and the “superstructure”—the “economic” and 
“ideological” spheres of society, respectively. According to Engels, when the sphere 
under investigation (philosophy or the law, for instance) is far removed from the 
substructure or economic sphere, evidence of the “fortuitous” or accidental in its 
development is more likely to present itself. For, when the sphere under investigation is 
                                               
476 Engels to W. Borgius, January 25, 1894, Marx and Engels: Collected Works Vol. 50: Letters from 1892-
1895, 266 (emphasis mine). 
477 Engels, 266-267. 
 179 
far removed from the substructure, the inextricable connection between the two becomes 
obfuscated and thus much more difficult to discern. If, however, this sphere is 
nevertheless investigated in the context of the substructure—that is, if it is analyzed in the 
context of long-term trends in “economic development”—then what might otherwise 
present itself as evidence of the fortuitous in its development comes into focus instead as 
being itself necessitated: a product of the very economic relations that “in the final 
analysis” determines historical development to begin with. 
Consequently, in concluding his letter to Borgius, Engels makes an argument 
initially advanced by Immanuel Kant: that while men have hitherto failed to make history 
“with a concerted will in accordance with a concerted plan,” a “necessity” still reigns 
which makes it so their diverse and otherwise contradictory “aspirations” contribute to 
the execution of concerted plan, nonetheless. At the very beginning of his Idea for 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, Kant argues that “since men neither 
pursue their aims purely by instinct, as the animals do, nor act in accordance with any 
integral, prearranged plan like rational cosmopolitans, it would appear that no law-
governed history of mankind is possible.” But as he proceeds to explain, what appears 
impossible is just that: an appearance. Men do, in fact, act in accordance with such a plan. 
“They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would 
scarcely arouse their interest.”478  
Of course, unlike Marx and Engels, Kant never goes so far as to work out the 
details of such a plan (his aim—at least as he relates it here—is merely to prove that such 
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a plan is possible).479 Nevertheless, he does express his confidence that, in time, someone 
will take it upon themselves to work out what is “prearranged.” For just as “nature 
produced a Kepler who found an unexpected means of reducing the eccentric orbits of the 
planets to definite laws,” he writes, so she produced a “Newton who explained these laws 
in terms of a universal natural cause.”480 The same, he therefore predicts, will eventually 
occur in the realm of history, as well. 
Now, Tocqueville was unacquainted with—because he died well before—what 
Engels, in his letter to Borgius, reveals concerning the causally definitive status of 
economic relations and connected to it, the predetermined role that individuals play in 
shaping history. Even so, in what follows I will show why it would hardly be an 
exaggeration to say that what Engels elucidates in this letter qualifies as a perfect 
example of what Tocqueville diagnoses as the danger of democratic history: namely, its 
tendency to “undermine the fundamental condition for the perpetuation of liberal 
democracy—the human being’s belief in his ability to control his own fate.”481 
To begin, I consult Eric Voegelin’s Science, Politics, and Gnosticism—a work in 
which he diagnoses what he calls the “gnostic attitude” of modern intellectuals. 
According to Voegelin, this attitude consists of six characteristics that, in one variation or 
another, can be found in “gnostic mass movements” or “ersatz religions” including (but 
not limited to) “progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism, 
fascism, and national socialism.” As I argue below, however, it is also an attitude that, 
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coincidentally enough, more or less captures the psychology and corresponding 
intellectual hubris of democratic historians for whom “showing how facts happened,” 
according to Tocqueville, is “not enough.” 
From there, I turn to Tocqueville’s correspondence with Arthur de Gobineau. 
With a few exceptions, this correspondence is typically read as an exchange between 
friends over the enduring relevance of religion in modernity, the nature of modern 
politics, or the concept of race.482 As I present it, however, it can also be read as a less 
than friendly—and ultimately fruitless—debate between Tocqueville and a democratic 
historian who, precisely because of his gnostic attitude and corresponding intellectual 
hubris, is convinced that he and he alone has discovered the “master-key” to interpreting 
all of social and political reality.  
Finally, I discuss the “practical consequences” of this intellectual hubris. More 
specifically, I show how by creating absolute historical systems that, as Tocqueville 
describes them, are “false beneath the air of their mathematical truth,” democratic 
historians (whether on the political Left or the political Right) ultimately distort how 
human beings perceive themselves as political actors in world—and in fundamentally 
dangerous ways. For as we shall see, by teaching their readers that they are not so much 
autonomous, self-legislating ends in themselves as they are either the collateral damage 
or dispensable means, decelerants or accelerants, of a historical process beyond their 
control, such historians inadvertently encourage their readers to adopt one of two forms 
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of behavior inimical to the preservation of dignity and human liberty in a democratic age: 
what Isaiah Berlin calls “irrational passivity,” on the one hand, and “irrational fanatical 
activity,” on the other. 
ERIC VOEGELIN AND “THE GNOSTIC ATTITUDE” 
Just as Aristotle never provides a precise definition of moral virtue, so Voegelin 
never provides a formal definition of gnosticism. As bewildering as this is to some, 
however, the reason is actually quite simple: following Aristotle, Voegelin admits that for 
methodological reasons he cannot.483 Insofar as political science is not geometry—insofar 
as moral and political things are irreducible to a precise science—providing formal or 
precise definitions for such phenomena would serve only to obfuscate rather than clarify 
their true nature.484 It would serve only to follow in the footsteps of Hobbes as opposed to 
Aristotle and thus become a gnostic intellectual oneself.485 Accordingly, rather than 
provide a precise definition of gnosticism, Voegelin lists “six characteristics that, taken 
together,” reveal the essence of what he calls “the gnostic attitude”.486 
The first characteristic of the gnostic attitude, explains Voegelin, is being 
“dissatisfied” with one’s situation.487 It is essentially what, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, Tocqueville identifies as the “most common sickness of our time”: restlessness. 
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According to Voegelin, this is a characteristic that “in itself” is understandable. After all, 
“we all have cause to be not completely satisfied with one aspect or another of the 
situation in which we find ourselves.”488  Our lives are never, strictly speaking, perfect. 
However, in the context of modernity and, more specifically, the post-Christian world of 
modern democracy, this otherwise completely understandable fact of human existence is 
liable to give rise to a less than understandable belief. No longer convinced that 
happiness lies in another world, democratic man, as we have seen, believes instead that 
he can attain happiness in this one. He demands in the here and now what his aristocratic 
predecessor was content to wait for in the hereafter. Consequently, unlike his aristocratic 
predecessor, democratic man is liable to interpret his restlessness as being primarily if not 
exclusively a function of his physical or material condition and not of his unrequited 
spiritual longings. He is liable to interpret his dissatisfaction as a function exclusively of 
his ‘socio-economic status’ and is thus predisposed to believe the following: that as long 
as he remains restless or unhappy, it is because the here and now, the material world, 
remains “intrinsically poorly organized.”489  
The second characteristic of the gnostic attitude, this belief that the material world 
is intrinsically poorly organized is altogether less understandable than “the most common 
sickness of our time” because, as Voegelin explains, while it is certainly possible to 
assume that one’s restlessness is the result of an intrinsically poorly organized world, it is 
“likewise possible to assume that the order of being as it is given to us men (wherever its 
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origin is to be sought) is good and that it is we as human beings who are inadequate.”490 
In other words, it is likewise possible to assume what both Plato and Augustine, 
respectively, assume: that our dissatisfaction or restlessness is the result of either our 
erotic or fallen natures rather than our living in an intrinsically poorly organized world; 
that our unhappiness as human beings is the result of our having either a disordered soul 
or a divided will and not of our living in some miserable, “natural condition.”491 Those 
with a “gnostic attitude,” however, tend to assume the opposite. They tend to assume 
what democratic man in general tends to assume: that our dissatisfaction or restlessness 
stems from something external to us; that, not our erotic or fallen natures but “fortune” or 
nature (physis) understood as something separate from convention (nomos) is to blame 
for our misery.492  
Consequently, while the third characteristic of the gnostic attitude is the Christian 
belief that “salvation from the evil of the world is possible,” the fourth characteristic is 
the anti-Christian notion that this salvation consists in changing the “historical 
process”—in man’s progressively conquering that which is external to him, whether it be 
fortune or nature herself. According to Voegelin, this fourth characteristic is not 
“altogether self-evident, because the Christian solution might also be considered—
namely, that the world throughout history will remain as it is and that man’s salvational 
fulfillment is brought about through grace in death.”493 However, we saw in Chapters 2 
and 3, just as the Christian belief that salvation from the evil in the world eventually 
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became immanentized, so too did the Christian solution. The doctrine of progress and the 
idea of man’s salvation in the here and now came to replace the doctrine of Providence 
and therewith it, the idea of man’s salvational fulfillment “brought about through grace in 
death.” As a result, for the same reason that those with a “gnostic attitude” tend to assume 
that something external to us is to blame for our misery, they tend also to assume that 
something intrinsic to us can provide for the felicity, the happiness, that we so desire. To 
put it another way, those with a gnostic attitude tend to assume that rather than being 
dependent on the saving grace of God for salvation from the evil of world, man is 
dependent instead on what Machiavelli refers to as “virtue,” Hobbes calls “the art of 
man,” Rousseau calls “perfectibility,” and Marx understands as “labour,” respectively. 
Those with a gnostic attitude tend to assume salvation depends man’s ability to 
manipulate and control both himself and the “intrinsically poorly organized world” 
around him—on man’s ability to become both a “tyrant of himself and of nature.”494 
Not surprisingly, therefore, while the fifth characteristic of the gnostic attitude is 
“the belief that a change in the order of being lies in the realm of human action,” the sixth 
and final characteristic of the gnostic attitude is “the construction of a formula for self 
and world salvation, as well as the gnostic’s readiness to come forward as a prophet who 
will proclaim his knowledge about the salvation of mankind.”495 In Voegelin’s view, if 
the idea that man has it within his power to save himself—if the idea that man is capable 
of transforming an imperfect reality into a perfect one—is taken for granted, then it is 
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only a matter time before someone will take up the task of seeking out “the prescription 
for such a change.” Enter the modern thinker who, on account of his gnostic attitude, will 
see it as his task to construct a formula or system for precisely this change and, in so 
doing, reveal himself as a prophet with knowledge (gnosis) about the salvation of 
mankind. As a result of being dissatisfied with his situation, this thinker will eventually 
transition from philosophizing to claiming knowledge of a sort that is beyond critical 
reflection (ie. beyond questioning).496 He will transition from trying to understand “what 
is” to disclosing, on the basis of his unimpeachable wisdom, “what is to be done”.497  
THE GNOSTIC ATTITUDE OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORIANS 
While many modern intellectuals exhibit this “gnostic attitude,” not all of them 
are what Tocqueville calls historians in democratic centuries. In fact, some do not write 
history at all.498 Moreover, of the many gnostic thinkers who are democratic historians, 
not all of them exhibit each and every characteristic of the gnostic attitude listed above. 
Indeed, as we shall see below, although no less a gnostic thinker than Hegel and Marx, 
Gobineau never goes so far as to argue (that is, at least explicitly) “that a change in the 
order of being lies in the realm of human action,” let alone construct a “formula for self 
and world salvation.”499 On the contrary, Gobineau constructs the mirror opposite: what 
might be called a formula for self and world damnation. For now, however, it is 
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important simply to note the following: that whether a democratic historian of the kind 
who, like Hegel and Marx, constructs a formula for self and world salvation or a 
democratic historian of the kind who, like Gobineau, constructs a formula for self and 
world damnation, what all gnostic thinkers share in common is a pathological desire to 
demonstrate their “absolute cognitive mastery over reality”—which is to say to say, 
present themselves as intellectually infallible.500 
According to Voegelin, what prompts someone to develop a gnostic attitude and 
claim this intellectual infallibility is all too human: it is the “loss of meaning that results 
from the breakdown of institutions, civilizations, and ethnic cohesion…”; it is the loss of 
meaning that results from a nation’s or people’s descent into what, as we saw in Chapter 
2, the political theorist Tom Darby calls a “spiritual crisis.”501 As Voegelin characterizes 
it, this type of crisis occurs when the “interpenetration of cultures reduce men who 
exercise no control over the proceedings of history to an extreme state of forlornness in 
the turmoil of the world, of intellectual disorientation, of material and spiritual 
insecurity.”502 They occur during periods of history when, as Tocqueville himself puts it, 
“nations feel tormented by such great ills that the idea of a total change in their political 
constitution occurs to their mind.” But as Voegelin also brings to light, while these crises 
(quite understandably) have a way of evoking attempts, whether by theologians or 
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philosophers, to find or locate cosmos in chaos—to provide society with an ideological 
synthesis so that people can not only make sense of, but also, find meaning in the turmoil 
that surrounds them—they also have a way of evoking attempts by less than philosophic 
intellectuals to construct systems that purport to explain social and political reality as a 
whole. They have a way of evoking attempts by gnostic intellectuals, in other words, to 
construct “absolute systems” that as Tocqueville, in the Recollections, characterizes 
them, are “false beneath the air of their mathematical truth.”503   
As Tocqueville presents them, these systems are often historical in nature. They 
are often the products of democratic poets-turned-historians, and for good reason. Let us 
recall that despite his realism, democratic man nevertheless exhibits a new form of 
idealism with respect to the future and thus with respect to history in general. Given his 
inordinate hope for happiness in this world, he exhibits a new form of idealism with 
respect to the future of “the real” that, as we saw in Chapter 3, finds its roots in 
Machiavelli and reaches its apex in Marx. Accordingly, when confronted by a spiritual 
crisis of the kind that confronted the French, for instance, following the Revolution, 
democratic man is naturally inclined to look to history as opposed to nature for meaning. 
He is naturally inclined to embrace a grand historical narrative that vindicates his belief 
in progress and, in so doing, hold out the promise of bringing serenity and calm to his 
otherwise perennially restless soul. 
 Important to recognize, however, is that by building absolute systems and, in 
effect, giving form and substance to the future of “the real” (to the “immense grandeur” 
                                               
503 Tocqueville, Recollections, 45. 
 189 
or “ideal perfection” that supposedly awaits humanity at the end of history) democratic 
poets-turned-historians are not simply providing a spiritual lift to otherwise restless 
readers. They are not simply providing meaning to democratic man’s otherwise 
meaningless existence in time. Ultimately, they are engaging in something much more 
intellectually nefarious: what Voegelin provocatively calls “the murder of God.” As 
Voegelin explains:  
The aim of parousiastic gnosticism is to destroy the order of being, which is experienced 
as defective and unjust, and through man’s creative power to replace it with a perfect and 
just order. Now, however the order of being may be understood—as a world dominated 
by cosmic-divine powers in the civilizations of the Near and Far East, or as the creation 
of a world-transcendent God in Judeo-Christian symbolism, or as an essential order of 
being in philosophical contemplation—it remains something that is given, that is not 
under man’s control. In order, therefore, that the attempt to create a new world may seem 
to make sense, the givenness of the order of being must be obliterated; the order of being 
must be interpreted, rather, as essentially under man’s control. And taking control of 
being further requires that the transcendent origin of being be obliterated: it requires the 
decapitation of being—the murder of God.504 
 
As should be evident, by “God,” Voegelin does not necessarily mean a supernatural 
deity. Rather, he means only the “transcendent origin” of that which is “given” or, more 
specifically, that which is outside of man’s control: the order of ‘being’—the reality—in 
which man happens to find himself. Insofar as man is not the transcendent origin of what 
is given—insofar as he did not create either the world or himself—that which is given 
(reality) will forever remain, of necessity, beyond his complete comprehension and 
control. Not so for gnostic thinkers, however. So that their attempts to create a new world 
“may seem to make sense,” they must interpret that which is outside of man’s control as 
being essentially under man’s control and thus obliterate the transcendent origin of that 
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which is “given.” They must “decapitate” being and in effect, “murder God”—something 
that Voegelin elsewhere identifies as constructing a “second reality”. 
As Voegelin defines them, “second realities” are fictions or dream worlds 
conjured up by the imagination that, ultimately, have no basis in reality. At the same 
time, however, they are not obviously dream worlds because they present themselves as 
nevertheless being rooted in fact or history (ie. in that which is material and empirical).505 
They therefore consist in “the ideal” masquerading as “the real”—or, for our purposes, 
democratic poetry masquerading as democratic history. They are absolute historical 
systems of the kind that democratic poets, by turning from the idealization of nature or 
space to the idealization of time or history—by turning, metaphorically, from Spinoza to 
Hegel—are liable to conjure up in order to give form and substance to “the immense 
grandeur” that democratic man, according to Tocqueville, can otherwise but “vaguely see 
at the end of the long course humanity must still cover.” 
To be sure, Tocqueville himself does not describe historians in democratic 
centuries as gnostic intellectuals much less accuse them of murdering God or 
constructing second realities. Unlike Voegelin, he never goes so far as to systematically 
diagnose their psychology as intellectuals. Still, given his own characterization of God 
and, in particular, the relationship between that characterization, on the one hand, and 
what he regards as the theoretical limits of man, on the other, it would be fair to say that 
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by claiming to know the future of “the real” (ie. by claiming knowledge of a sort that is 
beyond questioning), many of these historians are essentially doing what Voegelin, in the 
passage above, describes. 
Let us recall that in his discussion of democratic man’s aptitude and taste for 
general ideas, Tocqueville begins by comparing man to God. “God does not consider the 
human species in general. He sees at a single glance and separately all the beings who 
make up humanity, and he notices each of them with the similarities that bring each 
closer to the others and the differences that isolate each.”506 God, in short, sees everyone 
and everything. Nothing obscures His sight; nothing escapes His view. By contrast, man 
does consider the human species in general because unlike God man lacks the intellectual 
capacity to see at a glance everyone separately. His sight is, relatively speaking, limited. 
While he can no doubt see some of the beings who make up humanity, he can never see 
all of them. And of those he can see, he sees them only “superficially”.507 He notices their 
similarities but not so much their differences. He does not see them for who they really 
are. 
 So it follows that whereas God “does not need general ideas,” man cannot 
theorize—whether about politics or history—without them. God, explains Tocqueville, 
“never feels the necessity to encompass a very great number of analogous objects within 
the same form in order to think about them more comfortably.” This, however, is not the 
case with man. As Tocqueville goes on to elaborate:  
If the human mind undertook to examine and to judge individually all the particular cases 
that strike it, it would soon be lost amid the immensity of details and would no longer see 
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anything; in this extremity, it resorts to an imperfect, but necessary procedure that helps 
its weakness and proves it.508 
 
Alas, just as man cannot do without dogmatic beliefs, so he cannot do without general 
ideas: whereas the former spare him the theoretical burden of having to “examine 
everything by himself” (an intellectual task that, according to Tocqueville, not even 
philosophers are capable of carrying out), the latter spare him the theoretical burden of 
having to “judge individually all the particular cases” that strike his mind (an intellectual 
task that only God, according to Tocqueville, has the intellectual capacity to perform). In 
order to make sense of both himself and the world around him—in order to engage in that 
part of politics Tocqueville calls “fixed”—man has no choice but to generalize. He has no 
choice but to engage in reductionism.  
As Tocqueville therefore frames it, whereas God—by virtue of being God—can 
see the “whole” of “what is,” man—by virtue of the fact that he is not God—can at best 
see only a “part” of “what is”.509 In Books 5 and 6 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates defends 
the idea that philosophers, despite their reputations, are best equipped to rule because 
unlike “lovers of sights,” “lovers of hearing,” and “the practical men,” philosophers are 
“lovers of the sight of the truth”—that is, of “the whole” of “what is” as opposed to “what 
seems” or worse, “what is not.” Even so, Socrates never goes so far as to argue that 
philosophers, as lovers of wisdom, are themselves wise. To be sure, when compared to 
everyone else, philosophers are “awake.”510 But to be “awake” as opposed to “dreaming” 
is not to be omniscient—and this is Tocqueville’s point: what most men are to 
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philosophers, all men (including philosophers) are to God. As he writes in an editorial 
note in the previous chapter:  
There is no man in the world who has ever found, and it is nearly certain that none will 
ever be met who will find the central ending point for, I am not saying all the beams of 
general truth, which are united only in God alone, but even for all the beams of a 
particular truth. Men grasp fragments of truth, but never truth itself.511 
 
In Tocqueville’s view, there are certain limits attached to what human beings can know—
there are limits to what human reason can explain about the nature of reality, whether it 
be physical, social, or political. It may very well be the case that at some point, someone 
will find what “no man in the world” has hitherto been able to find: all the beams of a 
“particular truth.” As for all the beams of general truth, however, those are “united in 
God alone.” In effect, human beings can grasp only fragments of the truth, but never 
“truth itself.” This is simply a fact of human existence—part of the “givenness” of our 
nature as human beings.512 
 Yet, from the perspective of certain democratic historians, Tocqueville has it 
wrong. As children of the Enlightenment, they not only take for granted the notion that 
man is capable of grasping truth itself, but also, that he can grasp it precisely because of 
his ability to discern general causes and conceive of general ideas. 513 As discussed at 
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length in Chapter 2, unlike aristocratic historians who “ordinarily make all events depend 
on the particular will and the mood of certain men,” democratic historians “give great 
general causes to all the small particular facts.”514 In Tocqueville’s view, this stems in 
large part from the fact that they are too lazy to sift through a host of secondary causes 
that, in ages of equality become “more varied, more hidden, more complicated, less 
powerful, and consequently more difficult to disentangle.”515 But as he also points out, 
this tendency to attribute all particular facts to great general causes stems, in addition, 
from a much more pathological impulse on their part to demonstrate their absolute 
cognitive mastery over reality—to make a knowledge claim about the “whole” that, 
without identifying general causes and forming ideas, they simply would not be able to 
make. “It is not enough,” writes Tocqueville, “for them to show how facts happened; they 
like as well to reveal that it could not have happened otherwise.” They like to reveal how 
“each nation is invincibly tied, by its position, its origin, its antecedents, its nature, to a 
certain destiny that all its efforts cannot change.”516 Put another way, democratic 
historians like to interpret the past for sake of prophesizing the future. To do this 
persuasively, however, these historians must either willfully ignore or disingenuously 
subordinate to a great general cause all of the “secondary” causes that, as noted above, 
become more difficult to disentangle in ages of equality. They must, in short, engage in 
an intellectual swindle by casting the spirit of civilization, the climate, race (or as we saw 
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in the introduction, “economic relations”) as the prime mover of everything that “in the 
final analysis” happens in the world. As Tocqueville explains:  
M. de Lafayette said somewhere in his Mémoires that the exaggerated system of general 
causes brought marvelous consolations to mediocre public men. I add that it gives 
admirable consolations to mediocre historians. It always provides them with a few great 
reasons that promptly pull them through at the most difficult point in their book, and it 
favors the weakness or laziness of their minds, all the while honoring its depth.517 
 
Here, Tocqueville reveals that on account of their ambition to show not simply “how 
facts happened” but how facts “could not have happened otherwise,” historians in 
democratic centuries are liable to design “exaggerated” systems of general causes. On the 
one hand, these systems cater to their intellectual sloth. By providing them with a “few 
great reasons that promptly pull through at the most difficult point” in their books, these 
systems serve as a convenient means for cutting through the noise of history—through all 
the secondary causes that, especially in ages of equality, complicate rather than clarify 
what happens on the world stage. On the other hand, however, these systems cater to their 
intellectual hubris. They “honor the depths” as much they favor the “laziness” of their 
minds, and thus allow them to claim knowledge of a sort that given their intellectual 
limits as human beings, remains beyond their reach.518 
In his own way, therefore, Tocqueville also seems to recognize that rather than 
simply providing hope or a spiritual lift to their readers, democratic historians are 
ultimately engaged in something much more intellectually nefarious than meets the eye. 
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For by designing absolute historical systems that not only show how facts happened, but 
also, that bind individuals and even entire nations to a “certain destiny” they “cannot 
change,” what these historians are in effect doing is replacing God—a being who 
imagines nothing because He can see “everything”—with themselves: beings who, 
because they are human have no choice but to imagine everything they cannot fully see. 
Near the end of his chapter on poetry, Tocqueville reveals that the imagination is 
an intellectual faculty unique to man—a creature who, unlike the animals, is aware of his 
existence but who, unlike God, cannot make sense of it. As he explains: 
If man were completely unaware of himself, he would not be poetic; for what you have 
no idea about you cannot portray. If he saw himself clearly, his imagination would 
remain dormant and would have nothing to add to the picture. But man is revealed 
enough for him to see something of himself, and hidden enough for the rest to disappear 
into impenetrable shadows, into which he plunges constantly and always in vain, in order 
finally to understand himself.519 
 
In this passage, Tocqueville implicitly alludes to what, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
he eventually makes explicit: that in his view, man is part brute, part angel—between the 
animals and God. Whereas the animals are “unaware” and, as a result, have no idea of 
themselves to “portray,” God—as we have already noted above—is completely aware 
and, as a result, sees himself clearly. He has, as Tocqueville puts it, nothing else to “add 
to the picture.”520 Man, however, is not so fortunate. He finds himself in the altogether 
awkward position of being at once aware and unaware. He is aware in the sense that he, 
unlike the animals, has an idea of himself. But is he unaware in the sense that he, unlike 
God, cannot see himself clearly. Consequently, in order to make sense of what he (unlike 
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the animals) can see, man must imagine all of that which he, unlike God, remains blind 
to. He must “add” to an incomplete picture of himself by way of using his imagination; 
he must rely on his imagination, as Lawler observes, to complete what his reason 
discovers.521 
 From the foregoing, however, it is clear that by building absolute historical 
systems, democratic poets-turned-historians are doing something much more 
intellectually dishonest than simply adding, by way of using their imaginations, to an 
incomplete picture. To continue the metaphor, what democratic poets-turned-historians 
are in effect doing is cloaking what they have imagined in the guise of reason—their 
poetry in the guise of philosophical or scientific history—and thus further obfuscating 
what is already incomplete to begin with. “Man comes out of nothing, passes through 
time, and goes to disappear forever into the bosom of God,” writes Tocqueville. “You see 
him only for a moment wandering at the edge of the two abysses where he gets lost.”522  
Herein lies the purpose of the imagination: to help make sense of the mystery and often, 
misery or restlessness characteristic of man’s existence; to provide some kind of 
“understanding of the meaning of human existence in the given conditions of the world.” 
By creating exaggerated systems of general causes, however, democratic poets-turned-
historians are using their imaginations for an altogether different purpose. Rather than 
using it to help make sense of the mystery and often, misery or restlessness characteristic 
of man’s existence, they are instead using it to overcome that mystery—to distort what 
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reason discovers by way of collapsing the irreducibly complex nature of reality into 
exaggerated systems of general causes.  
Philosophy, explains Voegelin, “springs from the love of being; it is man’s loving 
endeavor to perceive the order of being and attune himself to it.”523 It is to interpret the 
world and, in particular, strive to understand what Socrates refers to as “the human 
things.” But it is also an activity that, given man’s theoretical limits, at best issues in the 
discovery of perennial questions about if not actual knowledge of such things. It is an 
activity for creatures who, unlike the gods, remain unwise but who unlike the animals, 
love or desire to know. Gnosis, on the other hand, “desires dominion over being”.524 It 
desires closure from the restlessness characteristic of man’s existence in general and, as 
we saw in Chapter 3, democratic man’s existence in particular. It desires actual 
knowledge of “the human things” so that perennial questions about them can be answered 
once and for all. So it follows that to abandon philosophy in favor of gnosis is to follow 
the modern way of Marx as opposed to the classical way of Socrates. It is to abandon 
philosophy for constructing an ideology so that man can enjoy the very closure from the 
irreducibly complex nature of reality that he so desires. It is, in other words, to set for 
oneself the very theoretical task that Hegel, in the Preface of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, explicitly sets for himself. As Hegel writes,  
The systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone be the true shape in 
which truth exists. To help bring philosophy nearer to the form of science—that goal 
where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge—that is 
what I have set before me.525 
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Here, Hegel professes his desire to transform philosophy (the love of knowledge) into 
actual knowledge (gnosis)—to attain and disclose to his readers something otherwise 
reserved to God (actual wisdom), and thus replace God with man and, more specifically, 
himself. But according to Voegelin, what Hegel has set for himself is an impossible task. 
In keeping with Tocqueville’s claim that human beings can grasp fragments of the truth 
but never the truth itself, Voegelin points out that “‘actual knowledge’ is reserved to God 
alone; finite man can only be the ‘lover of knowledge,’ not himself the one who 
knows.”526 What Hegel actually does, then, is not so much achieve actual knowing as he 
does design a system of exaggerated general causes so as to make reality seem or appear 
much less complex than actually it is. What he does is build an absolute historical system 
of the kind that, by literally reducing all of “Reality” to what he calls “Geist,” is “false 
beneath the air of [its] mathematical truth.”527  
TOCQUEVILLE’S CONFRONTATION WITH THE GNOSTIC ATTITUDE: ARTHUR DE 
GOBINEAU AND RACE AS THE “MASTER-KEY” TO HISTORY 
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At the very beginning of his essay “On Debate and Existence,” Voegelin 
describes a situation that “as political scientists, historians, or philosophers, we all have 
had occasion at one time or another” to find ourselves in: that of debating a gnostic 
thinker of the kind discussed above. As Voegelin elaborates, in this situation, we have all 
discovered… 
…that no agreement, or even an honest disagreement, could be reached, because the 
exchange of argument was disturbed by a profound difference of attitude with regard to 
all fundamental questions of human existence—with regard to the nature of man, to his 
place in the world, to his place in society and history, to his relation to God. Rational 
argument could not prevail because the partner to the discussion did not accept as binding 
for himself the matrix of reality in which specific questions concerning our existence as 
human beings are ultimately rooted; he has overlaid the reality of existence with another 
mode of existence that Robert Musil has called the Second Reality. The argument could 
not achieve results, it had to falter and peter out, as it became increasingly clear that not 
argument was pitched against argument, but that behind the appearance of rational debate 
there lurked the difference of two modes of existence, of existence in truth and existence 
in untruth.528 
 
Here, Voegelin explains why debating a gnostic thinker is a fruitless endeavor. In a 
situation such as this, there is no prospect for reason to prevail because there is no shared 
understanding of reality such that constructive debate (ie. dialectic) is possible. Whatever 
the “exchange” consists in, it is doomed to fail because there already exists an 
underlying, much more profound, disagreement between participants over fundamental 
questions related to human existence. As a result, even honest disagreement becomes 
untenable. Insofar as the “partner to the discussion” has overlaid reality with a second 
one of his own making, the gnostic thinker remains closed off to rational argumentation. 
In a situation such as this, the “universe of rational discourse,” according to Voegelin, 
“collapses.”529  
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 As Voegelin presents it, this is a situation that characterizes debate, in particular, 
with “communists”—“ideologists” on the political Left. Interestingly, however, in his 
own capacity as a political scientist and historian (if not a philosopher), Tocqueville 
found himself in just this situation with an ideologist on the political Right. Indeed, as his 
correspondence with Arthur de Gobineau illustrates, behind the appearance of what 
presents itself as a rational debate, there exists a much more profound and ultimately 
irreconcilable disagreement between the two over the very questions of human existence 
that Voegelin lists in the passage above.  
Comprised of 82 letters, this correspondence can be separated into three distinct 
periods: 1843 to 1844; 1849 to 1852; and 1853 to 1859.530 For our purposes, however, the 
second and third periods are the most important as it is during these periods where the 
exchange between Tocqueville and Gobineau not only takes a turn for the worse, but 
also, where it becomes increasingly clear that despite their friendship, they belong to two, 
fundamentally different modes of existence: one in uncertain truth and the other in certain 
untruth. 
In a letter dated October 11, 1853, Tocqueville tells Gobineau that “through an 
extraordinary coincidence” he has received a copy of the latter’s recently published Essai 
sur l'inégalité des races humaines—a democratic history in which Gobineau advances 
what can only be described, paradoxically, as a thoroughly anti-democratic argument. 
“Every assemblage of men, however ingenious the network of social relations that 
protects it,” begins Gobineau, “acquires on the very day of its birth, hidden among the 
                                               
530 Michael D. Biddiss, “Prophecy and Pragmatism: Gobineau’s Confrontation with Tocqueville,” The 
Historical Journal Vol. 13, No. 4. (1970), 614. 
 202 
elements of its life, the seed of an inevitable death.”531 What is that seed of an inevitable 
death? According to Gobineau, it is not so obvious. “The causes usually given for the fall 
of nations are not necessarily the real causes,” he argues.532 Causes like “fanaticism, 
luxury, or the corruption of morals” may very well seem to be responsible for the fall of 
nations. However, these causes are at best secondary, not primary. What is primary, 
rather, is the “adulteration” over time of a given race’s “blood.”533 What is primary is the 
“mixture” of races (miscegenation) and, in particular, the mixture of the “white race” 
with other, “inferior” races.534 For as Gobineau eventually concludes, “Such is the lesson 
of history. It shows us that all civilizations derive from the white race, that none can exist 
without its help, and that a society is great and brilliant only so far as it preserves the 
blood of the noble group that created it...”535 Simply put, history shows the complete 
opposite of what democratic historians like Mignet, Thierry, Guizot and even Tocqueville 
himself argue it shows.  It shows that inequality is more natural than equality and thus 
that aristocracy is more natural than democracy.536   
As mentioned above, however, despite the Essai’s fundamentally anti-democratic 
argument, as a historian Gobineau is, paradoxically, no less democratic than any other 
democratic historian properly so-called (whether it be Mignet, Thierry, Guizot, 
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Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, Hegel, or Marx).537 As Ceaser observes, “Gobineau was 
not in the camp of thinkers who rejected reason outright in favor of tradition or 
submission to Providence. Although conservative in his political position, Gobineau 
spoke as the originator of a new, more accurate, and more comprehensive form of 
science—a ‘science of history’ akin to the positivistic sciences of geology or 
medicine.”538 No, he does not affirm the modern idea of progress. On the contrary, he 
argues that progress is an illusion.539 However, unlike de Maistre’s more traditional 
theory of history—a theory that, as we saw in Chapter 2, does argue for submission to 
providence—Gobineau’s theory of history nevertheless promotes the same “extreme and 
dangerous form of democratic thought” that the theories of his progressive rivals 
promote.540 “Whereas de Maistre turned from science to religion (and to providential 
governance of history) as the ultimate guide for political life, Gobineau looks to a new 
kind of science predicated on a full understanding of the laws of history.”541 Thus, despite 
his politics Gobineau follows in the footsteps of Voltaire and Hegel as opposed to those 
of Augustine and Bossuet (more on this below). 
 Accordingly, the ensuing confrontation between Tocqueville and Gobineau over 
the latter’s Essai has, surprisingly enough, considerably less to do with the altogether 
                                               
537 Ceaser, Reconstructing America, 96. “In method and approach,” observes Ceaser, “Gobineau was far 
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540 Ceaser, Reconstructing America, 140. 
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disturbing normative implications of Gobineau’s argument than it does with theoretical 
status of that argument. Commonly referred to as “The Father of Racism,” a “direct line 
of influence can be drawn from Gobineau’s thought to the “thought of Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain, Oswald Spengler, Alfred Rosenberg, and Adolf Hitler.”542 Overall, 
however, Tocqueville is less troubled by his friend’s racism than by his friend’s 
intellectual hubris as a historian. Yes, Tocqueville takes issue with the fact that the Essai, 
insofar as it is overtly racist, is liable to justify and thereby perpetuate the existence of 
certain “evils.”543 But as it quickly becomes apparent, it is Gobineau’s own gnostic 
attitude—his own construction of an absolute historical system—that Tocqueville is 
particularly concerned with.  
At first, Tocqueville refrains from saying “too much” about Gobineau’s book—
only that he is “greatly prejudiced against what seems to be its principal idea” and that, 
given his own “pre-existent ideas” on race, Tocqueville feels as though he has “been 
drawn into battle.”544 What are those pre-existent ideas? In a letter dated May 15, 1852—
written nearly a year before he receives Gobineau’s Essai—Tocqueville reveals that he 
regards race as nothing more or less than another “general idea”: something that human 
beings, in their quest for truth, cannot help but form and rely on, but that at the same 
time, attests to the weakness of human reason as opposed to its strength. After having 
read, at Gobineau’s request, a chapter on the “unity of mankind” in Flourens’s Histoire 
des traveaux et des idées de Buffon, Tocqueville expresses his essential agreement with 
                                               
542 Ceaser, 88. 
543 As Tocqueville at one-point tells him, “Don’t you see know inherent in your doctrine are all of the evils 
produced by permanent inequality: pride, violence, the scorn of one’s fellow men, tyranny and abjection in 
every one of their forms?” 
544 Tocqueville to Gobineau, October 11, 1853, Correspondence, 224. 
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Flourens: not only is mankind unified but, to the extent that there is a “diversity of races” 
among human beings, this diversity exists largely—if not entirely—on account of “three 
secondary and external causes: of climate, of food, and of the manner of life.”545 
Consequently, while Tocqueville does not deny the existence of race, he also never grants 
it the theoretical status and corresponding explanatory power that Gobineau does. That 
race is a function not only of inheritable or inborn traits, but also, of environmental 
factors, means that as epistemologically useful as it may seem, it is an inherently slippery 
concept that, as such, cannot provide the human mind “with anything other than 
incomplete notions.” Race exists, but because it is neither wholly constructed (ie. 
inessential) nor wholly biological (ie. essential), it has much less value as an explanatory 
variable than Gobineau assumes.546 
  Not surprisingly, therefore, in a follow-up letter dated November 17, 1853, 
Tocqueville admits that while there is no doubt something to the idea of race—that is, at 
least insofar as there are “externally recognizable differences” among the different 
“human families”—this idea simply cannot do the theoretical work that Gobineau has it 
do. According to Gobineau, race is the motor of history precisely because “racial 
differences are permanent” (ie. essential).547 That they cannot be overcome means that ‘in 
the final analysis’ (to borrow Engels’ language), they are the determining factor in how 
                                               
545 Tocqueville to Gobineau, May 15, 1852, Correspondence, 221-222 (emphasis mine). 
546 For an excellent discussion on Tocqueville’s by comparison responsible use of the concept of race, see 
Edward Beasley, The Victorian Reinvention of Race: New Racisms and the Problem of Grouping in the 
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547 Knowing full well that unless he can prove this his entire theory of history would collapse, Gobineau 
devotes an entire chapter of the Essai to refuting what he characterizes as the “unitarian” position: namely, 
the position that racial differences are fluid (as opposed to permanent) because they are the products of 
external causes like habits, climate, and locality. 
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the different “human families” behave not only amongst themselves, but also towards one 
another. As a result, while it is not wrong to associate certain changes in the “constitution 
of races” with  “external causes” (climate, for instance), it is wrong to argue, he 
concludes, that external causes can “fully explain many vital divergences” between them 
that persist.548 That there is something about race which is “absolutely fixed, hereditary, 
and permanent, in spite of climate and lapse of time,” means that when it comes to 
understanding the historical process, race and not the climate, race and not mores, race 
and not class, is what matters.549 Only the “crossing of blood,” he insists, can 
scientifically account for the rise and fall of nations over time.550  
But for Tocqueville, what Gobineau argues concerning the causally definitive 
status of race is at best speculative. As he tells him: 
Surely among the different families which compose the human race there exist certain 
tendencies, certain proper aptitudes resulting from thousands of different causes. But that 
these tendencies, that these capacities should be insuperable has not only never been 
proved but no one will ever be able to prove it since to do so one would need to 
knowledge not only the past but also the future.551  
 
Again, Tocqueville takes no issue with the claim that “among the different families” of 
the human race, there exist certain tendencies, certain proper aptitudes…” Race in no 
uncertain terms exists. But for him, these tendencies and aptitudes are the result of 
“thousands of different causes,” not a single “great” one as Gobineau maintains. Human 
beings are not simply the blood in their veins, let alone “unequal” because of it. To prove 
that, Tocqueville points out, would require knowledge not only of the past but of the 
                                               
548 Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, 120. 
549 Gobineau, 125. 
550 Gobineau, 138. 
551 Tocqueville to Gobineau, November 17, 1853, Correspondence, 228. 
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future, as well. It would require knowledge, to put it another way, of the whole of human 
history, from its beginning to its very end.  
 To be sure, Gobineau claims to have such knowledge. With regard to the past, he 
states the following: “The thick mists, the profound darkness that from time immemorial 
veiled the beginnings of civilizations different from our own, now lift and dissolve under 
the sun of science.”552 So confident is he that it is now possible to know the “beginnings 
of civilizations” that he not only declares it possible “to reconstruct, with the aid of the 
most authentic materials, that which constitutes the personality of races and mainly 
determines their value,” but also, that it would be irresponsible to consult anything else. 
As he further elaborates: 
Since we have now an abundance of positive facts crowding upon us from all sides, rising 
from every sepulchre, and lying ready to every seeker's hand, we may no longer, like the 
theorists of the Revolution, form a collection of imaginary beings out of clouds, and 
amuse ourselves by moving these chimeras about like marionettes, in a political 
environment manufactured to suit them. The reality is now too pressing, too well known; 
and it forbids games like these, which are always unseasonable, and sometimes 
impious.553 
 
In this passage, Gobineau reveals that given the abundance of “positive facts” about the 
past now available, there is no longer any excuse to do what the “theorists of the 
Revolution” once did. These theorists, suggests Gobineau, were simply using their 
imaginations. They were not so much theorists as they were poets playing games: 
amusing themselves with their own fabrications. Gobineau, however, differs. Instead of 
forming a collection of imaginary beings out of clouds, he is conducting real science; he 
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553 Gobineau, xiii. 
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is responding to a “reality” which, in his view, is “now too pressing,” and “too well 
known.” 
 What is that reality? According to Gobineau, it is that the white race and 
therewith it, civilization, is dying. As mentioned above, for Gobineau the lesson of 
history is that “all civilizations derive from the white race, that none can exist without its 
help.” Yet, as an analysis of the “facts” apparently also reveals, insofar as the white race 
has failed to preserve its blood (has failed to keep itself “pure”), it is no longer in a 
position to preserve all of the civilizations that derive from it. As Gobineau, at length, 
explains: 
The white race originally possessed the monopoly of beauty, intelligence, and strength. 
By its union with other varieties, hybrids were created, which were beautiful without 
strength, strong without intelligence, or, if intelligent, both weak and ugly. Further, when 
the quantity of white blood was increased to an indefinite amount by successive 
infusions, and not by a single admixture, it no longer carried with it its natural 
advantages, and often merely increased the confusion already existing in the racial 
elements. Its strength, in fact, seemed to be its only remaining quality, and even its 
strength served only to promote disorder. The apparent anomaly is easily explained. Each 
stage of a perfect mixture produces a new type from diverse elements, and develops 
special faculties. As soon as further elements are added, the vast difficulty of 
harmonizing the whole creates a state of anarchy. The more this increases, the more do 
even the best and richest of the new contributions diminish in value, and by their mere 
presence add fuel to an evil which they cannot abate.554  
 
Consequently, Gobineau is convinced that however “bad” is the democratic “present,” 
the “future” will be “far worse.” In a passage that, as Voegelin describes it, is reminiscent 
of Nietzsche, Gobineau concludes his Essai by describing not the “ideal perfection” but 
the regrettable “end” towards which mankind is inevitably headed: 
The peoples—no, the human herds—will soon, overcome by gloomy narcolepsy, 
vegetate without feeling in their own nullity, like the buffalo chewing its cud in the 
stagnating puddles of the Pontine marshes. Perhaps they will think of themselves as the 
wisest, most erudite, and most capable beings that ever existed…Our descendants, 
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covered with shame, will have no difficulty finding some…reason by virtue of which 
they can bestow pity on us and to turn their barbarity into a badge of honor.555 
 
Lo and behold: just as Gobineau has actual knowledge of the past, so he apparently has 
accurate knowledge of the future, as well. To be sure, this is not a future that most other 
democratic historians—those theorists of the Revolution, as Gobineau refers to them—
describe. It is not some “immense grandeur” that consists, for instance, in the “perfection 
of the social order,” in the “positive realization and satisfaction of freedom,” or in “the 
abolition of all classes”.556 Rather, it is an immense catastrophe that consists in the 
reduction of mankind to a herd of buffalo chewing cud. Whereas most other democratic 
historians, as we have seen, come forward as secular prophets with “knowledge about the 
salvation of mankind,” Gobineau therefore does the mirror opposite: he comes forward as 
a secular prophet who proclaims his knowledge about the destruction of mankind. 
 And yet, as already alluded to above, from a purely theoretical perspective this is 
a distinction without a difference. Gobineau may very well think that his Essai differs 
from the “fabrications” of his progressive rivals. He might very well believe that his book 
contains nothing more or less than the historical equivalent of “geology, medicine, 
archaeology” (that it is nothing or more or less than “research,” “exposition,” and the 
“presentation of facts”). But as Tocqueville proceeds to reveal, insofar as the validity of 
what the Essai argues depends on its being epistemologically infallible—on Gobineau 
having unquestionably accurate knowledge of both the past and the future—it is in fact 
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no less a fabrication, no less a product of the imagination, than any other absolute 
historical system properly so-called. As Tocqueville writes, 
What, in this whole world, is more difficult to find than the place, the time, and the 
composite elements that produced men who by now possess no visible traces of their 
mixed origins? Those events took place in remote and barbaric times, leaving us nothing 
but vague myths or written fragments. 
Do you really believe that by tracing the destiny of peoples along these lines you can 
truly clarify history? And that our knowledge about humans becomes more certain as we 
abandon the practice followed since the beginning of time by the many great minds who 
have searched to find the cause of human events in the influence of certain men, of 
certain emotions, of certain thoughts, and of certain beliefs?557 
 
Near the beginning of Democracy in America, Tocqueville raises an important theoretical 
question concerning whether and to what extent it is possible to accurately locate in 
history what he calls the “point of departure” of nations and here, he does something 
similar. Is it possible, he asks Gobineau, to locate the point of departure of races? Is it 
possible to find “the place, the time, and the composite elements responsible for 
producing those who today, bear no resemblance to their ancestors”? For Tocqueville, the 
answer to this question is obvious: no, it is not. For the same reason that locating the 
point of departure of nations is for the most part now impossible, locating the point of 
departure of races is also now impossible: both remain shrouded in “vague myths” or, as 
he calls them in Democracy in America, “fables that hide the truth” (more on this in 
Chapter 5). 
In effect, Gobineau’s self-proclaimed “purely scientific theory” of history is from 
the point of view of Tocqueville hardly scientific at all. In fact, it is so unscientific that 
Julius Caesar, according to Tocqueville, would have devised something similar, “had he 
had the time.” As Tocqueville writes: 
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I am sure that Julius Caesar, had he had the time, would have willingly written a book to 
prove that the savages he had met in Britain did not belong to the same race as the 
Romans, and that the latter were destined thus by nature to rule the world while the 
former were destined to vegetate in one of its corners. Tu regere imperio populous, 
Romane, memento, said our old acquaintance Virgil.558 
 
Here, Tocqueville exposes the Essai for what it is: democratic poetry dressed up as 
scientific history. At first, he seems merely to suggest that the Essai amounts to nothing 
more or less than an exercise in confirmation bias—a book that Julius Caesar, given his 
own anecdotal evidence and corresponding racial prejudices, would have also written. 
But then, Tocqueville quotes a line from Virgil’s Aeneid which reads: “You, who are 
Roman, recall how to govern mankind with your power.”559 What is interesting about this 
line is not simply the fact that it foreshadows Gobineau’s own racial prejudices—his own 
belief that a certain race in particular is inherently superior to all other races—but that it 
appears in a passage in which Aeneas’s father, Anchises, prognosticates the future of 
Rome by showing his son how “Caesar Augustus, born of a god,” will one day establish a 
“golden age” among the Romans. The implication: Gobineau’s Essai is much less 
scientific, much less factual, much more poetic, and thus much more imaginary than 
meets the eye.560 It is like any other absolute system that is “false beneath the air” of its 
“mathematical truth”: a “second reality” of Gobineau’s own making.561  
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In the preface to his Essai, Gobineau admits—in remarkable keeping with 
Voegelin’s diagnosis of the gnostic attitude—that what initially prompted him to write it 
was a loss of meaning that resulted from the moral and political turmoil, the breakdown 
of institutions, civilizations, and ethnic cohesion, characteristic of his time.562 “The great 
events—the bloody wars, the revolutions, and the breaking up of laws—which have been 
rife for so many years in the States of Europe, are apt to turn men's minds to the study of 
political problems,” he begins. “Like everyone else, I have felt all the prickings of 
curiosity to which our restless modern world gives rise.” Unlike most everyone else, 
however, Gobineau’s response to these “prickings” was not simply to interpret social and 
political reality and, in so doing, “regain an understanding of the meaning of human 
existence in the given conditions of the world.” It was not simply to “perceive the order 
of being and attune himself to it.” Rather, it was to follow in the footsteps of his 
philosophical mentor, Hegel, and engage in an intellectual swindle by casting not “Geist” 
but race as the prime mover of everything that ‘in the final analysis’ happens on the 
world-stage. As Gobineau writes:  
…passing from one induction to another, I was gradually penetrated by the conviction 
that the racial question over-shadows all other problems of history, that it holds the key to 
them all, and that the inequality of the races from whose fusion a people is formed is 
enough to explain the whole course of its destiny.563 
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In a letter to Tocqueville dated November 29, 1856, Gobineau reveals that although now 
a devout Catholic, he used to be a “rationalist, a Hegelian, an atheist”— “never afraid to 
go to the very end of the road.”564 As evidenced by the above passage, however, despite 
his claim to be Catholic he is still very much a rationalist, a Hegelian, even if he no 
longer considers himself one. For despite claiming to have broken with Hegelianism, 
Gobineau’s definitive law of history nevertheless still parallels that of Hegel: “one 
common phenomenon, akin in his system to Hegel’s Spirit, ties together the whole story 
of mankind, giving it a beginning a middle, and presumably an end.” Just as class or 
“economic relations” or “class” take the place of Geist for Marx, so “Race takes the place 
of Geist” for Gobineau.565  
 Sadly, Gobineau’s conviction that race is the master-key to history is a conviction 
that, no matter what Tocqueville tells him, he simply will not relinquish. Indeed, not even 
by pointing out the blatant contradiction between Gobineau’s own professed Catholicism, 
on the one hand, and his racialism, on the other, can Tocqueville persuade his friend to 
rethink the flawed theoretical foundations on which his philosophy of history is 
predicated. In a letter dated July 30, 1856, Tocqueville tells Gobineau that “despite the 
pat on the back [he] gives to the Church,” the “very essence” of his doctrines are hostile 
to it: whereas the Church teaches that all men—regardless of their race—are created 
equal, the Essai teaches the exact opposite. But for Gobineau, there simply is no 
contradiction between what the Church teaches, on the one hand, and what the Essai 
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“demonstrates,” on the other. In a letter dated November 29, 1856, he responds that “if he 
ever thought,” like Tocqueville, that his Catholicism was “incompatible” with his 
“historical philosophy,” he would “immediately abandon” the latter.  
Of course, Gobineau never explains how his “historical philosophy” comports 
with his self-professed Catholicism. Instead, he leaves that to Tocqueville to figure out 
for himself.566 For our purposes, however, it is important simply to note the following: 
Gobineau’s refusal to acknowledge what from the perspective of Tocqueville is obvious 
is not just indicative of a stubborn unwillingness, on his part, to concede Tocqueville’s 
point (ie. of an emotional attachment to his own opinions). As Voegelin points out, that 
kind of stubbornness existed in antiquity as well and, although similar, thinkers like 
Gobineau are not simply the modern equivalent of a Thrasymachus or Callicles.567 
Rather, Gobineau’s refusal to acknowledge what from the perspective of Tocqueville is 
obvious is indicative of the fact that what presents itself as (and otherwise reads like) a 
rational exchange between him and Tocqueville is in fact a debate between Tocqueville 
and an ideologist, a gnostic intellectual who claims knowledge of a sort that is beyond 
critical reflection (ie. beyond questioning). For Gobineau, his exchange with Tocqueville 
is not just about winning argument. It is not just about shame and honor He is 
“mathematically certain about the correctitude of [his] propositions.”568 
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In a letter dated August 8, 1843—nearly a decade before he received a copy of the 
Essai —Tocqueville tells Gobineau that he wonders whether, despite having “a broad 
knowledge, high intelligence,” and “the best of manners,” the latter will nevertheless 
succumb—like so many from his generation—to “the contagious diseases” of the century 
which, in turn, will render these qualities “useless.”  “In this way,” he tells Gobineau, 
“you are interesting for what you could be, and also for what one fears you might 
become.”569 Fast forward 16 years and Tocqueville, it is safe to say, is no longer 
wondering. In a letter dated January 24, 1857, he resigns himself to the fact that insofar 
as at least 2 out of 3 of those qualities have apparently been rendered useless, to continue 
his debate with Gobineau would at best be a waste of time. As Tocqueville writes: 
I ask you to permit, my dear friend, to discuss your political theories no longer…I must 
admit that I am not very successful with you. Since I have known you, your temperament 
has always seemed independent…But, seriously, where can our political discussions lead 
us? We belong to two diametrically opposed orbits. Thus we cannot hope to convince 
each other. Now when one deals with grave questions and with new ideas one should not 
discuss them with one’s friends when one has no hope of persuading them. Each of us is 
perfectly logical in his own mode of thinking. You consider people today as if they were 
overgrown children, very degenerate and very ill-educated. And, consequently, it seems 
proper to you that they should be led with blinds, through noise, with a great clangor of 
bells, in nicely embroidered uniforms, which are often but liveries of servants. I too, 
believe that our contemporaries are been badly brought up and this is a prime cause of 
their miseries and of their weakness, but I believe that a better upbringing could repair the 
wrongs done by their miseducation; I believe that it is not permissible to renounce such 
an effort. I believe that that one could still achieve something with our contemporaries, as 
with all men, through an able appeal to their natural decency and common sense. In brief, 
I wish to treat them like human beings.570 
 
In an astonishing moment of clarity, Tocqueville tells Gobineau that there is no longer 
any point to discussing the latter’s Essai—that he no longer wants to discuss the latter’s 
“political theories.” Why? Because in keeping what Voegelin describes above, he has 
come to the realization that his exchange with Gobineau has, from the outset, been 
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“disturbed by a profound difference of attitude with regard to all fundamental questions 
of human existence.” Indeed, Tocqueville all but says as much when he writes that 
despite belonging to two diametrically opposed orbits, both he and Gobineau are 
perfectly logical in their own mode of thinking. In Gobineau’s orbit and corresponding 
mode of thinking, reality is relatively simple. It can be explained, in its entirety, by 
focusing on the determining influence of a single general cause (race), and thus by either 
omitting or disingenuously subordinating to it all of the secondary causes that in 
democratic centuries, remain more hidden and difficult to disentangle from one another. 
In Tocqueville’s orbit and corresponding mode of thinking, however, reality is never this 
simple because general causes, like general ideas, are proof only of the weakness of 
human reason in the world, never its strength. For him, race is not only an inherently 
flawed concept, but also, one general cause among thousands of other general and 
secondary causes that, in order to produce a theoretical ly valid—not to say complete—
account of historical change, need to be carefully analyzed and disentangled from one 
another. In effect, while Gobineau will never convince Tocqueville of the simplicity of 
the world and, more specifically, of the validity of his absolute historical system, 
Tocqueville will never convince Gobineau of the complexity of the world and, as a result, 
of the limits of human—and in particular, his own—reason. That they have no shared 
understanding of the nature of man, his place in the world, or his place in society and 
history, means that constructive debate between them is simply impossible. Their 
argument will never achieve results and, ultimately, never does. 
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FROM THE ECLIPSE REALITY TO THE ECLIPSE OF FREE WILL AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: TOCQUEVILLE ON THE “PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES” OF 
HISTORICAL DETERMINISM, PART 1 
 
In the introduction to his book Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, 
Isaiah Berlin responds to several critics who accuse him of conflating “fatalism” with 
“determinism” in his essay “Historical Inevitability.” According to Berlin, he has not 
conflated fatalism with determinism; he has merely pointed out that when it comes to the 
question of whether human beings have free will and, as a result, are morally responsible 
for their actions, fatalism and determinism are one in the same. As he defines it, “fatalism 
is the view that human decisions are mere by-products, epiphenomena, incapable of 
influencing events which take their inscrutable course independently of human wishes.” 
This is a view that, according to him, he has never “attributed” to any of his opponents; it 
is a view, he readily concedes, that is “implausible.”571 Determinism, on the other hand, 
is “the doctrine according to which men’s characters and ‘personality structures’ and the 
emotions, attitudes, choices, decisions and acts that flow from them do indeed play a full 
part in what occurs, but are themselves results of causes, psychical and physical, social 
and individual, which in turn are effects of other causes, and so on, in unbreakable 
sequence.”572 It is a doctrine that, rather than reduce human decisions to mere 
epiphenomena reduces them instead to effects of prior causes. It is a doctrine that in his 
view is entirely plausible. Still, according to Berlin, to distinguish between fatalism and 
determinism—that is, at least when it comes to the question of free will and moral 
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responsibility—is in actuality to make a distinction without a difference; in a lengthy 
passage in the Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant makes this abundantly clear:  
If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the 
natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, 
then it was impossible that it could have been left undone; how, then, can appraisal in 
accordance with the moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could have been 
omitted because the law says that it ought to have been omitted? That is, how can that 
man be called quite free at the same point of time and in regard to the same action in 
which and in regard to which he is nevertheless subject to an unavoidable natural 
necessity? It is a wretched subterfuge to seek to evade this by saying that the kind of 
determining grounds of his causality in accordance with natural law agrees with a 
comparative concept of freedom (according to which that is sometimes called a free 
effect, the determining natural ground of which lies within the acting being, e.g., that 
which a projectile accomplishes when it is in free motion, in which case one uses the 
word “freedom” because while it is in flight it is not impelled from without; or as we also 
call the motion of a clock a free motion because it moves the hands itself, which therefore 
do not need to be pushed externally; in the same way the actions of the human being, 
although they are necessary by their determining grounds which preceded them in time, 
are yet called free because the actions are caused from within, by representations 
produced by our own powers, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances 
and hence actions are produced at our own discretion). Some still let themselves be put 
off by this subterfuge and so think they have solved, with a little quibbling about words, 
that difficult problem on the solution of which millennia have worked in vain and which 
can therefore hardly be found so completely on the surface.573 
 
Here, Kant exposes the fallacy of what Berlin calls “soft determinism” and what many 
today refer to as “compatibilism”—a philosophical position initially advanced by Hobbes 
and Hume (but that remains popular to this day), which essentially holds that freedom 
and necessity are entirely compatible provided that by freedom is meant nothing other 
than the absence of external impediments.574 According to Kant, “some” people are 
perfectly happy to accept this “wretched subterfuge” of a doctrine. After all, it allows 
them to “think they have solved, with a little quibbling about words,” what so many 
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others have tried in vain to solve. As Kant also points out, however, this doctrine does not 
so much reconcile freedom with necessity as it does redefine freedom in such a way as to 
subordinate the former to the latter. It does not actually solve what is commonly referred 
to as the “free will problem;” it simply evades it by engaging in semantics. 
 With this, Berlin seems to agree. Although some people are happy to accept this 
“wretched subterfuge” of a doctrine, others are not, and he is one of them. As he 
explains: 
I have, in these essays, made no systematic attempt to discuss the problem of free will as 
such; my focus is on its relevance to the idea of causality in history. Here I can only 
restate my original thesis that it seems to me patently inconsistent to assert, on the one 
hand, that all events are wholly determined to be what they are by other events (whatever 
the status of this proposition), and, on the other, that men are free to choose between at 
least two possible courses of action - free not merely in the sense of being able to do what 
they choose to do (and because they choose to do it), but in the sense of not being 
determined to choose what they choose by causes outside their control. If it is held that 
every act of will or choice is fully determined by its respective antecedents, then (despite 
all that has been said against this) it still seems to me that this belief is incompatible with 
the notion of choice held by ordinary men, and by philosophers when they are not 
consciously defending a determinist position.575 
 
Here, Berlin restates the central argument of his essay “Historical Inevitability”: that it is 
“patently inconsistent to assert on the one hand, that events are wholly determined to be 
what they are by other events” (whether those events be psychological, physiological, 
social or individual in nature), and to believe “on the other hand, that men are free not 
merely in the sense of being able to do what they choose to do (and because they choose 
to do it), but in the sense of not being determined to choose what they choose by causes 
outside their control.” Again, commonly referred to as the “free will” problem, this is a 
problem that, as Berlin observes, has plagued the human mind for “millennia.” It is a 
problem that from a purely philosophical standpoint is essentially insoluble because 
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whatever solution one advances, it will necessarily fail to adequately reconcile what, on 
the one hand, most human beings in most times and places take for granted in their 
ordinary discourse (freedom of choice understood in the Kantian or “libertarian” sense), 
and what, on the other hand, nevertheless presents itself to the human mind as being 
entirely determined by antecedent causes (the material world in human beings are part of 
and inhabit).576 Consequently, in Berlin’s view even the softest of soft determinists fail to 
solve the free will problem; for as soon as one asserts that history, like nature, is 
determined, it no longer makes any sense to think of human beings as self-legislating, 
autonomous ends-in-themselves. 
So it follows that for Berlin it does not matter whether a given philosophy of 
history is “teleological, metaphysical, mechanistic, religious, aesthetic or scientific” in 
orientation. It does not matter if it is that of Augustine, Bossuet, Turgot, Condorcet, 
Saint-Simon, Comte, Hegel, Marx or as he later points out, Gobineau.577 That all are, “in 
one sense or another, forms of determinism,” means that common to all is the following 
“implication”:  
that the individual’s freedom of choice…is ultimately an illusion, that the notion that 
human beings could have chosen otherwise than they did usually rests upon ignorance of 
facts, with the consequence that any assertion that they should have acted thus or thus, 
might have avoided this or that, and deserve (and not merely elicit or respond to) praise 
or blame, approval or condemnation, rests upon the presupposition that some area, at any 
rate, of their lives is not determined by laws, whether metaphysical or theological or 
expressing the generalized probabilities of the sciences.578  
 
As Berlin here explains, in his view the philosophy of history, whatever its form, is 
essentially antithetical to the inextricably connected notions of free will and moral 
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responsibility. For as he points out, to start from the premise that history is governed by 
laws, “whether metaphysical or theological or expressing the generalized probabilities of 
the sciences,” is also to start from the premise that conventional opinions regarding the 
theoretical status of free will and moral responsibility are products of ignorance as 
opposed to knowledge. Put another way, to start from the premise that history is governed 
by ineluctable laws (whether natural or divine) is to assume that human beings are for the 
most part simply confused about their agency. They may think of themselves as being 
“free to choose” and thus deserving of either praise or blame for their actions. But 
because what they “choose” is, in actuality, no less determined by historical “laws” than 
the material world is by gravity, they are no more deserving of either praise or blame than 
a “stone” falling to the ground.579 
Now, Berlin readily admits that in writing “Historical Inevitability,” it was never 
his intention to either refute determinism or prove that free will is more than just an 
illusion (ie. that the “liberty of the will,” as Mill calls it, is as real as both ordinary men 
and certain philosophers believe it to be).580 He recognizes full well that just as he could 
never definitely prove the existence of the latter, he could never definitely refute the often 
taken-for-granted theoretical infallibility of the former. But for Berlin, this does not really 
matter. What matters for him is what, coincidentally enough, matters for Tocqueville: the 
connection between the presumed infallibility determinism, on the one hand, and its 
“practical consequences” on the other; the connection between absolute historical 
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systems, on the one hand, and their effect on the moral and political psychology of those 
who treat them as gospel truth, on the other. 
As discussed at length in Chapter 2, historians in democratic centuries exhibit 
certain methodological tendencies that, taken together, make them especially prone to 
eliminate the phenomenon of accident from human affairs—to make history, in its 
entirety, a function of necessity. These include focusing on the influence of general 
causes over and against the influence of individuals; creating historical systems; and 
finally, furnishing those systems with a single “motor” or “superior force”—what 
Tocqueville identifies as either an “inflexible providence” or “blind fatality”—that 
dominates entire societies without their knowing it. As Tocqueville later reveals, 
however, precisely because these tendencies make them prone to eliminate the 
phenomenon of accident of chance from human affairs—precisely because they make 
them prone to attribute everything to “necessity”—democratic historians are liable to 
teach a “doctrine of fatality” (of historical inevitability, as Berlin calls it) which, if not 
explicitly then at the very least implicitly denies the existence of free will and therewith 
it, moral responsibility. As Tocqueville explains: 
It seems, while reading the historians of aristocratic ages and particularly those of antiquity, 
that, in order to become master of his fate and govern his fellows, man has only to know how 
to control himself. You would say, while surveying the histories written in our time, that man 
can do nothing, either for himself or around him. The historians of antiquity taught how to 
command; those of our days scarcely teach anything except how to obey. In their writings, 
the author often appears great, but humanity is always small. 
If this doctrine of fatality, which is so attractive to those who write history in democratic 
times, were to spread from writers to readers and thereby infiltrate the citizen en masse and 
take hold of the public mind, it would soon paralyze the new societies and reduce Christians 
to Turks. 
I will say, moreover, that such a doctrine is particularly dangerous in this period in which 
we live; our contemporaries are all too inclined to doubt free will…581 
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By contrasting “Christians” with “Turks,” Tocqueville is almost certainly cribbing 
Montesquieu who, in Volume Two, Book XXIV of the Spirit of the Laws explains that in 
his view “a moderate Government is most agreeable to the Christian Religion, and a 
despotic Government to the Mahometan” (more on this below). For now, however, it is 
important simply to note that in this passage, Tocqueville reveals the reason for including 
a chapter on historians in democratic centuries in Democracy in America in the first 
place: yes, their methodological tendencies differ from those of their aristocratic 
counterparts. The problem, however, lies not simply in this difference, but also, in how 
this difference is liable to affect the moral and political psychology of those who read 
history. Additionally problematic is how this difference relates to the “public mind.”  
By virtue of their tendency to focus on the influence of individuals to the 
exclusion of general causes, aristocratic historians teach what might be called a “doctrine 
of virtue”—a doctrine which holds that because man has free will, he is capable of doing 
much for both himself and for what is “around him.” It is a doctrine that Machiavelli not 
only calls to our attention but himself teaches when, in Chapters 14 and 25 of the Prince, 
he advises us to “read histories and consider in them the actions of excellent men” so that 
we might ourselves become, like these excellent men, better equipped to deal with the 
vagaries of “fortune.”582 By contrast, because democratic historians deny that fortune 
exists (because they believe that everything is governed by some necessity) they teach a 
“doctrine of fatality”: a doctrine which holds that man “can do nothing, either for himself 
or around him.” It is a doctrine that Machiavelli explicitly rejects when at the beginning 
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of Chapter 25 of the Prince, he declares that those who believe “the opinion that worldly 
things are so governed by fortune and by God…” are only half right—that, for the sake of 
preserving “free will,” it is better to believe that “that fortune is arbiter of only half of our 
actions…”583  
 Of course, where Tocqueville employs the language of providence and fate, 
Machiavelli employs the language of fortune and God. But when it comes to the question 
of the existence of “free will”—of human freedom understood in the Kantian or 
“libertarian” sense of the term—this distinction comes into view again, as being a 
distinction without a difference. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 2, whether one calls it 
providence, chance, necessity, fate, or Jupiter, the fact remains: unless one (like 
Machiavelli above) specifically carves out or affirms the existence of a realm of human 
life that is not totally determined by natural or theological laws, then the notion that 
human beings are “free to choose” and by extension, responsible for their actions, 
remains at best an edifying myth. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, in his correspondence with Gobineau, Tocqueville is 
quick to criticize him not only for claiming to know what no human being, no matter how 
perceptive, could possibly know, but also, for failing to recognize that precisely by 
claiming to know what no human being could possibly know, he is inadvertently teaching 
his readers a doctrine of fatality of the kind that Tocqueville discusses in Democracy in 
America. “Your doctrine,” he writes in his letter of November 17, 1853, is… 
…rather a sort of fatalism, of predestination if you wish but, at any rate, very different 
from that of St. Augustine, from the Jansenists, and from the Calvinists (the very last are 
closest to your doctrines), since you tie predestination and matter closely together. You 
continually speak about races regenerating and degenerating, losing or acquiring through 
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the infusion of new blood social capacities which they have not previously had. (I think 
these are your own words). I must frankly say that, to me, this sort of predestination is a 
close relative to the purest materialism.584 
 
As Tocqueville here explains, despite presenting itself as “scientific,” Gobineau’s 
philosophy of history is nevertheless somehow reminiscent of the theological concept of 
predestination—and for good reason: like his progressive rivals (and according to 
Voegelin, Calvin before them), Gobineau does not so much disavow this concept as he 
does immanentize it.585 At the beginning of the Essai, Gobineau rejects the orthodox 
position on providence thereby appearing to separate his philosophy of history from the 
theological concept of predestination. Although he concedes that the ancients, for all of 
their faults, managed to discover “one fundamental axiom” to which “we must adhere”—
namely, that the “finger of God” conducts “the world”—he is also quick to point out that 
the wisdom of the ancients “tells us nothing definite as to the ways in which the Divine 
Will moves in order to compass the death οf peoples; it is, on the contrary, driven to 
consider these ways as essentially mysterious.”586 As fundamental as this “axiom” may 
be, then, it is a dead-end when it comes to making sense of the chaos characteristic of 
history. This is something which can only be done by taking the following, emphatically 
modern view: that the “heavy hand of God” operates according “to rule and 
foreknowledge, by virtue of fixed edicts, inscribed in the code of the universe by the side 
of other laws which, in their rigid severity, govern organic and inorganic nature 
alike.”587 Accordingly, in his search for the motor of  history, Gobineau begins from the 
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same premise that any other democratic historian begins: that the heavy hand of God is 
knowable by means of human reason alone; that by doing in the realm of history what has 
already been done in the realm of natural philosophy, we can demystify that which for the 
“ancients” remained mysterious. Yet, as Tocqueville here brings to light, that Gobineau 
rejects the orthodox position on providence does not mean that his philosophy of history 
is any less fatalistic or necessitarian than the most fatalistic or necessitarian forms of 
predestination (and hence the most fatalistic of theodicies). Rather, it is just as 
‘necessitarian’ because like them it is predicated on a claim to knowledge (gnosis) that 
Gobineau, like any other gnostic thinker whose goal is to demonstrate his absolute 
cognitive mastery over reality, simply cannot substantiate. 
Immediately after telling Gobineau that his doctrine is a “sort of fatalism,” 
Tocqueville distinguishes between its theoretical status, on the one hand, and what he 
calls its “practical consequences,” on the other. As he explains: 
Whether the element of fatality should be introduced into the material order of things, or 
whether God willed to make different kinds of men so that He imposed special burdens 
of race on some, withholding from them a capacity for certain feelings, for certain 
thoughts, for certain habits, for certain qualities—all this has nothing to do with my own 
concern with the practical consequences of these philosophical doctrines. The 
consequence of both theories is that of a vast limitation, if not the complete abolition, of 
human freedom. 
Thus I confess that after having read your book I remain, as before, opposed in the 
extreme to your doctrines. I believe that they are probably quite false, I know that they 
are certainly very pernicious.588 
 
In this passage, Tocqueville seems to suggest that regardless of whether Gobineau’s 
doctrine is from a purely theoretical perspective, worthy of consideration, what matters 
are its “practical consequences.” Even if the “element of fatality” should, he explains, 
apply to the various races that makeup mankind, the fact remains: insofar as this element 
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of fatality would vastly limit, if not completely abolish, human freedom, he remains 
opposed to it. He therefore echoes a point he makes in Democracy in America when he 
writes that “even if” it was to be discovered that a single, “general fact” controlled the 
wills of “all individuals,” this would not save “human freedom.”589  
To be sure, this concern with “practical consequences,” regardless of the truth, 
has led some scholars (in keeping with none other than Gobineau himself) to argue that 
Tocqueville is, in his heart of hearts, a moralist—a man concerned primarily, if not 
exclusively, with what is useful rather than what is true, practice rather than theory (more 
on this in Chapter 5).590 Still, it is important to recognize that for Tocqueville, practical 
consequences, whether pernicious or benevolent, are not so much separate from as they 
are inextricably connected to the “philosophical merits of an idea” (ie. to its theoretical 
status). Let us recall that in his speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 
1852, Tocqueville admonishes those who “recognize in politics nothing but practice.” 
According to him, they are “barbarians”—too obtuse to recognize that it is not political 
men, but rather, those who take the “least part in public affairs,” those who concern 
themselves with the most “abstract science,” who are the real movers and shakers of 
history. For as Tocqueville explains, these men “do everywhere and always, though more 
secretly and slowly,” what they did in 1789: give birth, not only to the “general ideas 
from which then emerge the particular facts in whose midst men of politics busy 
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themselves,” but also, “the laws” that political men “believe” they are responsible for 
inventing.591 Consequently, for Tocqueville, the practical consequences of Gobineau’s 
doctrine, like the practical consequences of determinism in general, stem precisely from 
its presumptive status as a theoretical lys infallible (ie. absolute) system.  
As discussed above, for Tocqueville there are certain limits to what human beings 
can know. Not only has no human being ever grasped the “truth itself,” no human being, 
in his view, ever will. Human beings can be lovers of wisdom, but they cannot 
themselves be wise. And yet, as we have seen, democratic historians for whom showing 
how facts happened is “not enough” are in effect claiming to be wise nonetheless. As a 
result, in Tocqueville’s view these historians are not just propagating “certain untruth” at 
the expense of pursuing “uncertain truth,” but inasmuch as they are, propagating 
totalitarian doctrines that pose a real threat to the preservation of liberty and human 
dignity in a democratic age. Indeed, as he explains: 
…every man who presents a complete and absolute system, by the sole fact that his 
system is complete and absolute, is almost certainly in a state of error or falsehood, 
and…every man who wants to impose such a system on his fellows by force must ipso 
facto and without preliminary examination of his ideas be considered as a tyrant and an 
enemy of the human species.592  
 
Here, Toccuqueville reveals that the theoretical hubris characteristic of democratic 
historians like Gobineau is much more dangerous than meets the eye—that their 
pathological desire to claim absolute cognitive mastery over reality can have very real, 
very practical consequences. It is not simply that these historians are “almost certainly in 
a state of error or falsehood;” it is that precisely by being in this state, they pose a 
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significant threat to the human species. Yes, they teach a doctrine of fatality which denies 
the existence of free will and moral responsibility. However, their teaching of this 
doctrine is actually the product of their theoretical overreach, not incidental to it. It is not 
simply, then, that Gobineau’s theory of historical inevitability, regardless of whether it is 
true or untrue, happens to have pernicious, practical consequences. It is that Gobineau’s 
theory of historical inevitability has “pernicious” practical consequences precisely 
because it is “probably quite false.”  
In his reflections on materialism in Democracy in America, Tocqueville admits 
that while there are many things he finds offensive about the materialists, it is their 
“pride” that revolts him most. “When they believe that they have sufficiently established 
that men are only brutes,” he writes, “they appear as proud as if they demonstrated that 
men are gods.” At first, this may seem like a contradiction. How can they establish that 
men are brutes while simultaneously demonstrating that men are gods? If we refer back 
to what Tocqueville says about the nature of man in his discussion of poetry, however, 
what at first might seem like a contradiction not only comes into view as being 
consistent, but applicable to democratic historians, as well.  
As we saw above, near the end of his chapter on poetry Tocqueville argues that 
man is unique in that unlike either the animals or God, he must rely on his imagination to 
complete a picture of himself that would otherwise remain incomplete. From the 
perspective of materialists, however, Tocqueville has it wrong. In their view, there is no 
picture for man to complete because as it turns out, man is no different from the animals 
after all. Accordingly, just as God can see himself clearly, so too can man. He need only 
relinquish the illusion that he somehow differs from the brutes to begin with. He need 
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only become clear-sighted about the fact that his existence in space is no less determined 
than any other beast who has “deliberation.”593 
With this, democratic historians essentially agree—albeit as it relates to man’s 
existence in time as opposed to his existence in space. They too agree that Tocqueville’s 
characterization of man as a being who, given his theoretical limits, must rely on his 
imagination to complete a picture of himself that would otherwise remain incomplete, is 
wrong. They too believe that contrary to what Tocqueville posits, man can see himself 
clearly. The only difference is that whereas materialists challenge Tocqueville’s 
characterization of man by arguing that human beings are no different from brutes to 
begin with, democratic historians challenge it by arguing that otherwise free, morally 
responsible human beings are in fact no different than “earthquakes, sunsets, oceans, [or] 
mountains; we may admire or fear them, welcome or curse them, but to denounce or 
extol their acts is (ultimately) as sensible as addressing sermons to a tree.”594 As a result, 
whereas for materialists, man need only become clear-sighted about the fact that his 
existence in space is no less determined than that of any other beast who has 
“deliberation,” for democratic historians, man need only become clear-sighted about the 
fact that his existence in time is no less determined by what Tocqueville calls “general 
and eternal laws” than his existence in space. He need only relinquish the illusion that 
history, no less than nature, is also determined.   
It is ultimately for this reason, then, that “in their writings,” democratic historians 
appear “great” but humanity always appears “small.” For just as the materialist, on 
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account of his theoretical ambition to see man as God sees himself, must eclipse reality 
by replacing it with an absolute system that in effect reduces human beings to brutes, so 
the democratic historian, on account of his ambition not just to recount “how facts 
happened, but how they could not have happened otherwise,” must eclipse reality by 
replacing it with an absolute system that reduces otherwise free, morally responsible 
human beings to the playthings of a superior force. Either way, human beings are not 
what they intuitively feel or perceive themselves to be. Despite feeling free, they are not 
the authors of their actions and therefore despite feeling responsible, they are not actually 
deserving of either praise or blame for what they do. Kant, it turns out, has it backwards: 
human beings are not so much autonomous self-legislating “ends in themselves” as they 
are the means to the end of history.595 
FROM THE ECLIPSE OF FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ECLIPSE OF 
LIBERTY AND HUMAN DIGNITY: TOCQUEVILLE ON THE “PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES” 
OF HISTORICAL DETERMINISM, PART 2 
 
As noted above, in explaining why democratic historians are liable to teach a 
“doctrine of fatality” that, if not explicitly, then at the very least implicitly denies the 
existence of free will and therewith it, moral responsibility, Tocqueville makes a rather 
peculiar and, by today’s standards, obviously politically incorrect statement concerning 
what he fears will happen if such a doctrine “were to spread from writers to readers” and 
“take hold of the public mind.” According to Tocqueville, if such a doctrine were ever to 
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infiltrate the “citizenry en masse,” it would “soon paralyze the new societies and reduce 
Christians to Turks.”596  
Naturally, this statement might incline readers to conclude what some scholars 
already do: that Tocqueville, like so many French intellectuals during the 18th and 19th 
century, is an Orientalist; that he regards the despotic, predominantly Muslim East as 
being inherently inferior to the free, predominantly Christian West.597 Important to keep 
in mind, however, is that as politically incorrect—as “Orientalist”—as this statement may 
today read, its purpose is not so much to extol Christianity and denigrate Islam for their 
relative compatibility and incompatibility with liberty and human dignity, respectively. 
Rather, its purpose is to bring to light something that is perhaps best articulated by Isaiah 
Berlin who, in the midst of responding to his aforementioned critics, also happens to 
write the following: 
There are remedies that breed new diseases, whether or not they cure those to which they 
are applied. To frighten human beings by suggesting to them that they are in the grip of 
impersonal forces over which they have little or no control is to breed myths, ostensibly 
in order to kill other figments—the notion of supernatural forces, or of all-powerful 
individuals, or of the invisible hand. It is to invent entities, to propagate faith in 
unalterable patterns of events for which the empirical evidence is, to say the least 
insufficient, and which by relieving individuals of the burdens of personal responsibility 
breeds irrational passivity in some, and no less irrational fanatical activity in others; for 
nothing is more inspiring than the certainty that the stars in their courses are fighting for 
one's cause, that ‘History’, or ‘social forces’, or ‘the wave of the future’ are with one, 
bearing one aloft and forward.598 
 
Here, Berlin reveals what might be called the practical consequences of the practical 
consequences of historical determinism—that is, the practical consequences of designing 
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absolute historical systems that, if not explicitly then at the very least implicitly deny the 
existence of free will and therewith it, moral responsibility. At first, systems such as 
these—regardless of their theoretical status—might be said to have a salutary effect on 
the “public mind.” For like determinism more generally, they may very well serve to 
moderate the moralism of human beings whose first impulse is to exact revenge on others 
for having either trespassed against them or transgressed a law, whether civil or divine. 
Accordingly, systems such as these may very well be said to remedy what Thomas 
Hobbes’s own gnostic construction is by his own admission designed to remedy: the old 
disease of spiritedness (thymos)—the pride and corresponding “rage” of men like 
Achilles. Yet as Berlin here points out, there is nevertheless such a thing as remedies that 
breed new diseases and absolute historical systems—whatever salutary effect they might 
have on some—are case in point. By “relieving individuals of the burdens of personal 
responsibility” these systems, he observes, are not just liable to moderate the irrational 
moralism of otherwise vainglorious human beings, but also to transform otherwise 
moderate human beings into irrationally passive or, paradoxically, irrationally fanatical 
ones—which is essentially what Tocqueville means when he says that if a doctrine of 
fatality were ever to infiltrate the “citizenry en masse,” it would “soon paralyze the new 
societies and reduce Christians to Turks.” 
In an editorial note to this passage, Tocqueville reveals that by the term “Turks” 
he is referring to specifically to a religious dogma that Montesquieu—the third thinker 
with whom he apparently lived a little “every day”—briefly discusses in The Spirit of the 
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Laws.599 In Book 24, Montesquieu analyzes the relationship between a nation’s laws and 
its religion and in Chapter 14, observes that “when religion establishes the dogma of the 
necessity of human actions,” it is liable to breed what he calls “laziness of soul.” As an 
example, one need only consider “the Mohammedan dogma of predestination”: because 
this dogma, explains Montesquieu, posits that whatever happens in the world has been 
“decreed by god,” it encourages human beings to “rest”—to remain idle because que sera 
sera: whatever will be will be.600 It encourages human beings to behave as the Turks, for 
instance, behave when it comes to fighting the spread of disease.601 On the other hand 
and, as Montesquieu later intimates, for the very same reason that this dogma is liable to 
breed “laziness of soul” it is, paradoxically, also liable to breed what might alternatively 
be called “zealousness of soul.” For according to Montesquieu, just as the Mohammedan 
dogma of predestination encourages the Turks to remain irrationally passive when it 
comes to fighting the spread of disease, so it encourages them to become irrationally 
fanatical when it comes to fighting their idolatrous enemies.602 Whereas in the case of the 
former, this dogma encourages them to conceive of themselves as the collateral damage 
of a natural phenomenon (a plague) that God, whether they like it or not, has set in 
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motion, in the case the of the latter, it encourages them to conceive of themselves as the 
dispensable means of an imperial project that God, whether they like it or not, has 
summoned them to undertake.603  
Now, given Montesquieu’s single example of the “Mohammedan dogma of 
predestination,” his brief discussion of “the dogma of the necessity of human actions” 
might also incline readers to conclude that, like Tocqueville, he too is an Orientalist—
that he too regards the despotic, predominantly Muslim East as being inherently inferior 
to the free, predominantly Christian West. Yet, just as Tocqueville is not the Orientalist 
that some scholars consider him to be, neither is Montesquieu. To be sure, because he in 
no uncertain terms looks to the East and, more specifically, to Islam, to identify certain 
pathologies inimical to the preservation of liberty and human dignity, he is not without 
good reason exposed to the indictment. Yet, to write him off as an Orientalist would not 
only be to overlook the obvious fact that he is often as critical of the West as he is of the 
East, but also, to overlook the less obvious fact that upon turning his attention, however 
brief, to the “dogma of the necessity of human actions,” he implicitly alludes to what he 
elsewhere makes explicit: that Christians, no less than Muslims are susceptible to 
believing in this dogma because Christians, no less than Turks, are susceptible to 
embracing a certain mode or way of thinking about causality in the world that Abrahamic 
religions in general have a tendency to foster.604 
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 236 
What is that mode of thinking? It is none other than the one that Machiavelli, in 
Chapter 25 of the Prince, refers to when, as we saw above, he declares that those of the 
opinion “that worldly things are so governed by fortune and by God…” are only half 
right; that, for the sake of preserving “free will,” it is better to believe that “that fortune is 
arbiter of only half of our actions…” In this chapter, Machiavelli makes an implied attack 
on what Montesquieu identifies as the “Mohammedan dogma of predestination,” on the 
one hand, and what Tocqueville, in his correspondence with Gobineau, identifies as the 
Calvinist dogma of predestination, on the other: forms of predestination which so abolish 
free will that those who subscribe to them, whether it be the Turks or the Calvinists, 
Muslims or Christians, no longer conceive of themselves as anything other than either the 
collateral damage or the dispensable means of a  “superior force” beyond their control. 
If we recall, in his letter of November 17, 1853, Tocqueville alludes to several 
different forms of predestination—some of which, he seems to suggest, are more 
compatible with free will than others. To begin, there is the predestination of Saint 
Augustine—a form of predestination that as we saw in Chapter 2, implicitly comes to the 
fore in Augustine’s confrontation with Cicero over the Stoic doctrine of fate in Book 5 of 
the City of God. This is a form of predestination that presents itself as being entirely 
compatible with free will, if only because according to Augustine, Cicero has it wrong: 
“our wills are themselves included in the order of causes which is certain to God and 
contained within His foreknowledge.”605 Then there is the predestination of the 
                                               
Turks today in their civil wars regard first victory as a judgment of god who decides;” he writes, “so in 
their individual business the German peoples took the outcome of combat as a mandate of providence, ever 
mindful to punish the criminal or the usurper” (552).  
605 Augustine, City of God, 201–2. 
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“Jansenists”—a predestination that, in a letter to François de Corcelle in 1856, 
Tocqueville says is already too close “to the fatalism of the Ancients or the Muslims’ 
belief in predestination.”606 It is a predestination that preserves little if any space for free 
will. Finally, there is the predestination of the Calvinists—a form of predestination that, 
like that of Gobineau’s fatalism, has been immanentized and is therefore a “close 
relative” of the “purest materialism.” It is a predestination that, in keeping with the 
fatalism of the Muslims, denies the existence of free will altogether.  
Of course, whether any of these forms of predestination is actually compatible 
with free will, as Tocqueville seems to think, is a question that we shall revisit in Chapter 
5. For now, however, we need only take note of the following: that insofar as Machiavelli 
is concerned with those who believe that “worldly things” are governed entirely by either 
fortune or God, he is referring specifically to a form of predestination that, in keeping 
with what Tocqueville and Montesquieu identify as the predestination of the Calvinists 
and Muslims, respectively, denies the existence of free will altogether, as well. 
 To be sure, the title of the chapter itself refers only to “how much fortune can do 
in human affairs…”; it refers only to the extent to which chance as opposed to God can 
be said to govern history. Still, as the chapter’s first two sentences indicate, Machiavelli 
is at least as concerned with the power of the latter as he is with the power of the former 
(and thus with the extent to which an inflexible providence as opposed to a blind fatality 
might said to govern history, as well). “It is not unknown to me,” he begins, “that many 
have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by fortune and by 
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God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence, indeed that they have no remedy 
at all…”607 The chapter’s first sentence therefore serves to qualify its title: not only does 
it reveal that by “human things” Machiavelli actually means “worldly things,” but also, 
that by “fortune” Machiavelli apparently also means “God”—the creator of all things, 
both human and non-human.608 Then comes the second sentence, in which Machiavelli 
tells us that while many have “held” this opinion, he is nevertheless concerned, in 
particular, with those who hold it “in our times”.609 According to Machiavelli, by “our 
times” he means times characterized by a “great variability of things…beyond every 
human conjecture.”610 But given what he writes at the very beginning of the Discourses 
on Livy, one cannot help but wonder whether by “our times” Machiavelli also means 
times characterized by modern as opposed to ancient things, and thus times characterized 
specifically by Christian as opposed ancient cosmological beliefs.611 If so, then just as the 
first sentence of this chapter serves to qualify its title, so the second sentence of this 
chapter, it might be argued, serves to qualify its first: insofar as it reveals that Machiavelli 
is concerned in particular with what men in modern times believe, it also reveals that 
Machiavelli is as much concerned with the supposed omnipotence of a deity to whom 
men now daily pray (God) as he is with the supposed omnipotence of a deity to whom 
men—at least for the most part—no longer do (Fortune). What he therefore presents as a 
fundamental disagreement between him and the humanists over the power fortune in 
human affairs might also or at the same time be interpreted as an implied attack on the 
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religious “dogma of the necessity of human actions” as identified by Montesquieu in The 
Spirit of the Laws: an attack on the notion that an “inflexible providence” as opposed to a 
“blind fatality” governs the world. 
 As discussed above, in Democracy in America Tocqueville makes it clear that 
inasmuch as this dogma—whether it is explicitly established by religion or implicitly 
propagated by democratic historians—denies the existence of free will and moral 
responsibility, he considers it to be politically dangerous: liable to reduce “Christians to 
Turks.” Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that at the very end of Democracy in 
America, he calls doctrines which hold that peoples are “never masters of 
themselves…false and cowardly”.612 Interestingly, however, it is in his correspondence 
with Gobineau and the Ancien Regime and the Revolution, not in Democracy in America, 
that he provides the most compelling evidence to prove just how politically dangerous 
these doctrines can actually be. In a letter dated January 8, 1856, he writes the following: 
I continue having divided feelings about your work; I dislike the book, and I like the 
author; and I have trouble, at times, in balancing such opposite sentiments. What I 
disapprove of in the book I told you before: it is less the work itself than its tendency, 
which I consider dangerous. If we were to suffer from excessive enthusiasm and self-
confidence, as did our ancestors of 1789, I would consider your book a salutary cold 
shower. But we have disgracefully become the extreme opposite. We have no regard for 
anything, beginning with ourselves; we have no faith in anything, including ourselves. A 
book which tries to prove that men in this world are merely obeying their physical 
constitutions and that their will power can do almost nothing to influence their destinies 
is like opium given to a patient whose blood has already weakened.613 
 
This passage is important for two reasons, the first of which has to do with what it 
explicitly conveys: why, in a letter written to Gobineau three years prior, Tocqueville was 
so quick to disapprove of the Essai in the first place. According to Tocqueville, what he 
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disapproves of is the Essai’s thesis—a thesis that to him, seems “the most dangerous one 
for our times.”614 For just as the dogma of the necessity of human actions, according to 
Montesquieu, promotes a certain “laziness of soul,” so the Essai’s thesis (that individuals 
are nothing more or less than the blood in their veins), explains Tocqueville, promotes the 
“spiritual lassitude” of their already “weakening contemporaries.” Insofar as it is a thesis 
that not only subordinates but binds, in its entirety, mind to matter, it is a thesis that, 
should it ever infiltrate the citizenry en masse, will make people all the more passive.615 It 
is a thesis that threatens to do to entire societies what physicians who are “greatly 
mistaken in their prognostications,” according to Tocqueville, do to their patients: 
“uselessly frighten and discourage them”.616  
 The second reason that this passage is important is because of what it implicitly 
alludes to: that for the same reason the dogma of the necessity of human actions breeds 
irrational passivity in some, it breeds no less irrational fanatical activity in others; the 
“excessive enthusiasm and confidence” of Tocqueville’s revolutionary ancestors prove as 
much. In the same letter in which Tocqueville explains why he was so quick to 
disapprove of Gobineau’s thesis in the first place, he also expands on the comparison 
between their “ancestors of 1789” and their already “weakening contemporaries,” 
introduced in the passage above. According to him,   
The last century had an exaggerated and somewhat childish trust in the control which 
men and peoples were supposed to have of their own destinies. It was the error of those 
times; a noble error, after all; it may have led to many follies, but is also produced great 
things, compared to which we shall seem quite small in the eyes of posterity. The weary 
aftermath of revolutions, the weakening of passions, the miscarriage of so many generous 
ideas and of so many great hopes have no led us to the opposite extreme. After having 
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felt ourselves capable of transforming ourselves, we now feel incapable of reforming 
ourselves; after having had excessive pride, we have now fallen into excessive self-pity; 
we thought we could do everything and now we think we can do nothing.617 
 
At first, Tocqueville appears to be comparing and contrasting the moral and political 
psychologies of those who read aristocratic versus democratic history, respectively. For 
as we saw above, whereas aristocratic history teaches people “how to command,” 
democratic history teaches people “scarcely anything except how to obey.” It would 
therefore make sense, upon reading this passage, to assume that when speaking of the 
“childish trust in the control that men and peoples were supposed to have over their own 
destinies,” Tocqueville is referring, in particular, to a mindset characteristic of aristocratic 
man—a man for whom the influence of individuals who know “how to command” 
determines what happens on the world-stage. To assume this, however, would be 
mistaken. Interestingly, this passage has nothing to do with the psychology of aristocratic 
man. Rather, it has to do with the psychology of a generation of human beings who, 
despite their pride, nevertheless also believed in the dogma of the necessity of human 
actions, discussed above. 
 In On Revolution, Hannah Arendt documents the captivating influence of this 
dogma over the minds of Tocqueville’s revolutionary “ancestors” by recounting a famous 
exchange between Louis XVI and the Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt at the very 
outset of the French revolution: 
The date was the night of the fourteenth of July 1789, in Paris, when Louis XVI heard 
from the Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt of the fall of the Bastille, the liberation of a 
few prisoners, and the defection of the royal troops before a popular attack. The famous 
dialogue that took place between the king and his messenger is very short and very 
revealing. The king, we are told, exclaimed, 'C'est une revolte', and Liancourt corrected 
him: 'Non, Sire, c'est une revolution.' Here we hear the word still, and politically for the 
last time, in the sense of the old metaphor which carries its meaning from the skies down 
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to the earth; but here, for the first time perhaps, the emphasis has entirely shifted from the 
lawfulness of a rotating, cyclical movement to its irresistibility. The motion is still seen in 
the image of the movements of the stars, but what is stressed now is that it is beyond 
human power to arrest it, and hence it is a law unto itself. The king, when he declared the 
storming of the Bastille was a revolt, asserted his power and the various means at his 
disposal to deal with conspiracy and defiance of authority; Liancourt replied that what 
had happened there was irrevocable and beyond the power of a king.618  
 
If we recall, at the very beginning of the Democracy in America, Tocqueville observes 
that while there is a great revolution taking place among us, it has essentially evoked two 
responses: some people, he writes, regard it as “new and, taking it for an accident, still 
hope to be able to stop it”; others view it is “irresistible, because it seems to them the 
most continuous, oldest and most permanent fact known in history.”619 Here, Arendt 
makes a similar observation—albeit in the context of the “fall of the Bastille” in 
particular as opposed to the arrival of democracy in general. As Arendt explains, from the 
perspective of Louis XVI, the fall of the Bastille was an accident, a function of chance—
something that by exercising his power as a king, could not only be resisted but stopped. 
But from the perspective of Liancourt, the fall of the Bastille was irresistible—a function 
of necessity. Important to recognize, then, is that what Tocqueville calls the “excessive 
enthusiasm and self-confidence” of his ancestors had, ironically enough, less to do with 
some kind of aristocratic belief, on their part, in the power of individuals to control their 
own fate than it did with a wholly democratic conviction, on their part, in the 
insurmountable power of ‘history’ to dethrone kings. Their fanatical activity stemmed 
precisely from their belief in the dogma of the necessity of human actions.  
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Herein lies the paradox not only of the French revolutionaries, but also, of all 
revolutionaries, according to Arendt, since the French Revolution: although “drunk” on 
the “wine of freedom” in the “abstract,” they clearly no longer believe that they 
themselves are “free agents.”620 Essential to any understanding of revolution in the 
modern age, explains Arendt, is the “idea of freedom” combined with the experience of 
an entirely “new beginning”—a total or complete break from the past.621 Also essential, 
however, is the paradoxical “notion of irresistibility, the fact that the revolving motion of 
the stars follows a preordained path and is removed from all influence of human 
power.”622 Prior to revolutions in the modern age, the notion of irresistibility referred to a 
“backward revolving movement”—a cyclical movement of the kind that Machiavelli 
describes when in Book 3 of the Discourses he writes of the need for “mixed bodies” 
such as “sects and republics” to periodically renew themselves.623 As evidenced by the 
above passage, however, by the time of the French Revolution, the notion of 
irresistibility, like the concept of time more generally, had already undergone a 
fundamental transformation. No longer indicative of a backward revolving or cyclical 
movement, this notion was now indicative of the irresistibility of a Christian or 
“rectilinear” one—the irresistibility of a movement that, as we saw in Chapter 2, “the 
nineteenth century soon was to conceptualize into the idea of historical necessity…”624 
Consequently, characteristic of the psychology of modern revolutionaries is the 
contradictory belief that although fighting for freedom, they are themselves the 
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determined agents—the dispensable means—of a historical process which is ultimately, 
beyond their control (ie. removed from all influence of human power). Indeed, the 
various “metaphors” they employ to justify their fanatical behavior—that history follows 
certain irresistible “streams and currents,” that it follows certain “ineluctable laws,” 
whether historical or natural—prove as much.  
In On the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt demonstrates how, by employing 
these metaphors, modern revolutionaries essentially render themselves, like God, 
infallible; for whereas on the one hand, such metaphors serve to implicitly justify doing 
anything and everything—whether it be manning guillotines, liquidating kulaks, or 
building gas chambers—that might be said to “speed up” what is already fated to happen; 
on the other hand, such metaphors serve to implicitly absolve anyone and everyone of 
any blame for simply taking it upon themselves to perform what Marx, as we have seen, 
calls “the task of their times.” Arendt provides two examples to illustrate the point: 
Hitler’s announcement to the German Reichstag in January, 1939, and Stalin’s “great 
speech before the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1930. Whereas in the 
former, Hitler reveals his intention to “kill the Jews of Europe,” in the latter, Stalin 
reveals his intention to liquidate what he calls “dying classes.”625 Yet as Arendt points 
out, insofar as in both instances otherwise entirely political intentions are presented as 
“prophecies”—as the “correct interpretation of the essentially reliable forces of history or 
nature”—in both instances “the same objective is accomplished: the liquidation is fitted 
into a historical process in which man only does or suffers what, according to immutable 
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laws, is bound to happen anyway. As soon as the execution of the victims has been 
carried out, the ‘prophecy’ becomes a retrospective alibi: nothing happened but what had 
already been predicted.”626  
In the Ancien Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville is clearly trying to come to 
terms with how the “propaganda effect of infallibility,” as Arendt calls it (or 
“vanguardism” as it also sometimes called), manifested itself in the behavior of the 
French revolutionaries.627 Well before Arendt, Tocqueville had already recognized that 
there was something altogether novel about the French Revolution. Near the beginning of 
the Ancien Regime, he notes how despite being irreligious, it nevertheless proceeded in 
an unusually violent and, paradoxically, “religious” manner. As he writes: 
Since [the Revolution] appeared to aim at the regeneration of the human race even more 
than at the reform of France, it kindled a passion that not even the most violent political 
revolutions had ever aroused before. It inspired proselytism and propaganda and therefore 
came to resemble a religious revolution, which was what contemporaries found so 
frightening about it. Or, rather, it itself became a new kind of religion – an imperfect 
religion, to be sure, without God, cult, or afterlife – yet a religion that, like Islam, 
inundated the earth with its soldiers, apostles, and martyrs.628  
 
At first, Tocqueville’s comparison of the French Revolution to Islam and the French 
revolutionaries themselves to “martyrs” may seem odd. After all, unlike Islam the French 
Revolution was in no uncertain terms a secular undertaking; its “martyrs” were 
“godless.” Upon reflection, however, this comparison makes much more sense than 
meets the eye. For like religious “martyrs,” the French revolutionaries also behaved in 
such a way that, as we have seen, believers in the dogma of the necessity of human 
actions are liable to behave. No, they did not conceive of themselves as “blind 
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instruments in the hands of God” (to use Tocqueville’s own formulation). Again, their 
“religion” was godless. But as Tocqueville proceeds to reveal, while they had no doubt 
turned their backs on the idea that providence was pulling the proverbial strings, they 
remained convinced that something else—some other “superior force”—was. As 
Tocqueville goes on to write: 
If the French who made the Revolution were more unbelieving than we are, they retained 
at least one admirable belief that we do not share: they believed in themselves. They did 
not doubt the perfectibility or power of man. They clamored eagerly for man’s glory and 
had faith in his virtue. They bolstered their own strength with that proud confidence that 
often leads to error but without which a people is capable only of servitude. They had no 
doubt that they had been summoned to transform society and regenerate the human 
race.629  
 
What is interesting about this passage is the paradox at the heart of it, which essentially 
parallels the paradox articulated by Arendt in On Revolution, above. Despite their 
apparent unbelief, the French who made the Revolution did not become paralyzed by 
doubt—and for good reason. As we saw in the previous chapter, while human beings can 
turn their backs on God, they cannot extirpate from their souls that which makes them 
human to begin with: their taste for the infinite and love of what is immortal. Insofar as 
this taste and love will forever remain in their souls, it is only a matter of time before 
their otherwise religious longings reassert themselves, whether it be in overtly religious 
or seemingly irreligious ways. Rather than become paralyzed by doubt, then, the French 
Revolutionaries simply substituted an overtly religious belief in the infinite and immortal 
nature of God with a seemingly secular, irreligious one in the perfectibility or power of 
man: in the indefinite and thus immortal nature of progress.630 In effect, while the 
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behavior of those who made the Revolution might at first appear aristocratic, their 
behavior is much more democratic than meets the eye. For just as religious martyrs 
believe that they have been summoned by God to carry out his plan, so the French 
Revolutionaries believed that they had been summoned by progress “to transform society 
and regenerate the human race.” They did not so much conceive of themselves as the 
unwitting agents of providence as they did the witting agents progress—believers in 
democratic history as opposed to revelation.  
THE PERSISTENT DANGER OF DEMOCRATIC HISTORY: ON THE PRACTICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF FRANCIS FUKUYAMA’S THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 
 
In Part 2, Chapter 1 of the Recollections, Tocqueville observes that although he is 
now able to “sit back” and “contemplate the causes” that led to the Revolution of 1848, 
on the day that the Revolution broke out he had other things on his mind: “namely, the 
events themselves” and “what would follow.”631 According to Tocqueville, the “events 
themselves” were depressing. This was the “second revolution” that he had witnessed in 
seventeen years and while both distressed him, this one distressed him far more. As it 
transpired, he became increasingly convinced that after having spent “the best years” of 
his youth living in a “society that seemed to be recovering its prosperity and grandeur as 
it regained its liberty,” its prosperity, grandeur and worst of all, its liberty, would soon be 
gone.632 As for “what would follow” the Revolution, however, he simply could not say. 
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631 Tocqueville, Recollections, 47. 
632 Tocqueville, 47. 
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He knew that whatever was to come, it would not satisfy him. But what, exactly, it would 
be—what fate would be in store for his “nephews”—remained, at least in his view, a 
mystery; for as he goes on to write: 
I rehearsed in my mind the history of the past sixty years and smiled bitterly at the 
illusions we nursed at the end of each phase of our long revolution; at the theories that 
thrived on those illusions; at the learned daydreams of our historians; and at the many 
ingenious but erroneous systems with which we attempted to explain a present that we 
still perceived only dimly and to predict a future that we could not perceive at all.  
The constitutional monarchy succeeded the Ancien Regime. The Republic succeeded 
the monarchy. The Empire succeeded the Republic. The Restoration succeeded the 
Empire. Then came the July Monarchy. After each of these successive transformations 
people said that the French Revolution, having completed what they presumptuously 
called its work, was over. They said it and believed it. Alas! I had myself hoped it was 
true during the Restoration and again after the government of the Restoration fell. And 
now the French Revolution has begun anew, for it remains the same revolution as before. 
The farther we go, the more obscure its end becomes. Will we—as prophets as unreliable 
perhaps as their predecessors assure us we will—achieve a social transformation more 
complete and more profound than our forefathers foresaw and desired, or than we 
ourselves can yet conceive? Or must we end simply in intermittent anarchy, that chronic 
and incurable malady that old nations know so well? I cannot say and have no idea when 
this long journey will end. I am tired of mistaking deceptive mists for the shore and often 
wonder whether the terra firma for which we have been searching actually exists, or 
whether our destiny is not rather to ply the seas forever.633 
 
Here, Tocqueville not only reveals just how chaotic history can be, but also (and for our 
purposes, more importantly) just how anxious about the future—just how desperate for 
solid ground—human beings can become as a result. As evidenced by the past 60 years, 
history has a way of making fools out of historians who, whether for genuinely 
philanthropic or self-aggrandizing reasons or both, take it upon themselves to design 
ingenious systems that attempt to predict the future and, in so doing, provide the very 
“terra firma” that human beings, when confronted by the chaos characteristic of history, 
find themselves looking for. History has a way, in other words, of exposing these 
historians for what they are: democratic poets constructing products of the imagination—
                                               
633 Tocqueville, 47–48. 
 249 
learned daydreams or “second realities” designed specifically to make sense of the chaos 
characteristic of history to which human beings are tragically subjected. No wonder 
Tocqueville refrains from trying to predict what will follow the Revolution of 1848. 
Given all of the historical events he has thus far witnessed, he simply cannot say where 
‘History,’ so to speak, is going, let alone how or even if, it might end. This is something 
that only God could possibly know.  
 And yet, it is not that simple. For as Tocqueville also reveals, just as history has a 
way of making fools out of historians who, by designing “ingenious” historical systems 
effectively take it upon themselves to provide human beings with the solid ground they so 
desire, so these very historians have a way of destroying the very solid ground that their 
systems are otherwise designed to provide.  
In Part 2, Chapter 2 of the Recollections, Tocqueville discusses “the socialist 
character” of the Revolution of 1848 and at first, tells us that it is not his intent to 
“discover” what gave it that character. “It has not been the intent of these Recollections,” 
he writes, to discover what gave the February revolution its socialist character.”634 
Nevertheless, as Tocqueville proceeds to explain, what gave it its socialist character is 
upon reflection obvious: the pervasive influence of what he calls the “monstrous and 
grotesque designs” of “innovators.”  
To what “designs” and to which “innovators” is Tocqueville referring? 
Unfortunately, he does not say—that is, at least not in the Recollections. Indeed, all he 
says in the Recollections is that although these designs “may be judged to be 
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ludicrous…nothing is worthier of the serious attention of philosophers and statesmen 
than the canvas on which they worked.” This is a canvas comprised of the restlessness 
characteristic of democratic man, on the one hand, and the “inevitable agitation of desires 
and thoughts” that such restlessness breeds, on the other.635 Luckily for us, however, in a 
letter to his friend M. de Corcelle, Tocqueville does happen to reveal which design gave 
the Revolution of 1848 its “socialist character.” Writing in 1854 from Germany, 
Tocqueville tells de Corcelle that like France, Germany is “politically diseased”—and for 
essentially the same reason: it, too, has become taken by the monstrous and grotesque 
designs of innovators—and by the design of one innovator in particular. As Tocqueville 
writes: 
You are, of course, aware of the part played by philosophy during the last fifty years in 
Germany, and especially by the school of Hegel. He was protected, as, no doubt, you 
know, by the ruling powers, because his doctrines asserted that, in a political sense, all 
established facts ought to be submitted to as legitimate; and that the very circumstance of 
their existence was sufficient to make obedience to them a duty. This doctrine gave rise at 
length to the anti-Christian and anti-spiritual schools, which have been endeavoring to 
pervert Germany for the last twenty years, especially for the last ten; and finally to the 
socialist philosophy, which had so great a share in producing the confusion of 1848. 
Hegel exacted submission to the ancient established powers of his own time; which he 
held to be legitimate, not only from existence, but from their origin. His scholars wished 
to establish powers of another kind, which, as soon as they existed, became therefore, 
according to their views, equally legitimate and binding. This did not suit the official 
protectors of Hegel. Yet from this Pandora’s box have escaped all sorts of moral diseases 
from which the people is still suffering.636  
 
This letter is important for two reasons. First, it reveals the identity of one of the 
“monstrous and grotesque” designs to which Tocqueville anonymously refers in his 
Recollections: that of Gobineau’s philosophical mentor, Hegel, whose theory of historical 
inevitability, as we have seen, also heavily influenced Marx. Indeed, if we recall, despite 
                                               
635 Tocqueville, 54 (emphasis mine). 
636 Alexis de Tocqueville, “Tocqueville to Corcelle, July 22, 1854,” in Memoir, Letters, and Remains of 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Vol. 2 (MacMillan and Co., 1861), 270-271. 
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being on the political Left, Marx no less than Gobineau inherited from Hegel the notion 
that one common phenomenon (in his case economic relations or class) “ties together the 
whole story of mankind, giving it a beginning, a middle, and presumably an end.” This 
brings us to the second reason why this passage is important. In it, Tocqueville unwitting 
describes what Karl Löwith calls “the schism of the Hegelian school into right and left 
wings…,” into “old” and “young” Hegelians, respectively—a schism that accounts not 
only for the behavior of the French Revolutionaries in 1848, but that also happens to 
account for the behavior of modern revolutionaries in general.637  
As Löwith observes, this schism was “made possible by the basic ambiguity of 
Hegel’s dialectical Aufhebungen (“suspensions”), which could be interpreted 
conservatively and revolutionarily with equal ease.”638 On the one hand, these 
suspensions could be interpreted conservatively because, insofar Hegel’s theory of 
historical inevitability—like any theory of historical inevitability—conflates what “is” 
with what “ought” to be, it serves to preserve the status-quo: deny the “rationality or 
grounds of all political opposition.”639 On the other hand, however, these suspensions 
could be interpreted revolutionarily because, insofar as Hegel’s theory of historical 
inevitability—again, like any theory historical inevitability—holds that the historical 
process consists in an irresistible movement, over time, towards a nebulous “end,” it at 
the very same time serves to “perpetually negate” the very status-quo that it otherwise 
serves to preserve.640 The end result is this: whereas the conservative interpretation of 
                                               
637 Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought (Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 70. 
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639 Zuckert, “Political Sociology Versus Speculative Philosophy,” 123. 
640 Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, 70. 
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these suspensions conflates virtue with obedience (irrational passivity), the revolutionary 
interpretation of these suspensions conflates virtue with terror (irrational fanatical 
activity). Put another way, whereas the conservative interpretation of these suspensions 
promotes the ascension of democratic despotism, the revolutionary interpretation of these 
suspensions promotes “permanent revolution.” Either way, then, the preservation of 
liberty and human dignity becomes untenable. Equality in servitude or unending chaos 
come into view as the only viable alternatives.641  
As much as reflecting on the history of the past 60 years made Tocqueville smile 
“bitterly” at the learned daydreams of historians, then, it was the learned daydreams of 
one democratic historian in particular that gave rise to the behavior of the revolutionaries 
in 1848—all of which brings us back to the main argument of this chapter: that by 
creating absolute historical systems which are “false beneath the air of their mathematical 
truth,” democratic historians are not just being theoretically reckless. They are as a direct 
result being politically reckless, as well. As a recent example, one need only consider 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man.  
  As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, in Liberal Democracy and Political 
Science James Ceaser explains why until recently, democratic leaders have tended to 
eschew theories of historical inevitability. For the better part of the 20th century, these 
leaders were constantly reminded of the fact that theories of historical inevitability lay at 
                                               
641 Insofar as it is the goal of democratic despotism, according to Tocqueville, to make the “use of free will 
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the heart of both fascism and communism and thus at the heart of regimes that not only in 
theory opposed but also in practice actively sought to undermine liberal democracy. By 
virtue of what it meant to hold political office during these decades, this was a fact that 
democratic leaders simply could not ignore. Consequently, in defining themselves against 
either fascism or communism, democratic leaders essentially defined themselves against 
the idea of historical inevitability.642 Granted, they too believed in progress. But their 
belief in progress remained tempered by a sober recognition of the limits of politics in a 
liberal as opposed to communist or fascist society. It remained tempered by what the 
preservation of human liberty and dignity requires: moderation.   
Then came the sudden of collapse of communism—an event which, far from 
discrediting the idea of historical inevitability (as one might expect), actually had the 
unanticipated consequence of strengthening it. No, democratic leaders did not suddenly 
begin reading Marx. But what they did start to wonder is whether Fukuyama (an author 
with whom many of these leaders, whether on their own or through the intellectual ether 
of the time, became familiar) was onto something when he posited that liberal democracy 
itself was the final form human government; that the idea of historical inevitability 
should have been applied to liberal democracy, all along.  
For his part, Francis Fukuyama would most likely disagree with how I, following 
Ceaser, have characterized his argument. In America at the Crossroads, he rebukes those 
who “misread” him as arguing for the inevitability of liberal democracy. As he explains:  
Many people interpret my book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) as arguing 
in favor of…a universal hunger for liberty in all people that will inevitably lead them to 
liberal democracy, and that we are living in the midst of an accelerating, transnational 
movement in favor of liberal democracy. This is a misreading of the argument…I never 
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posited a strong version of modernization theory, with rigid stages of development or 
economically determined outcomes. Contingency, leadership, and ideas always played a 
complicating role, which made major setbacks possible if not likely.643 
 
Apparently aware of the fact that by advancing a “strong version of modernization 
theory” he would leave no room in history for accident and statesmanship (for a realm of 
human life that, as already articulated above, is not totally determined by a “superior 
force” or “general and eternal laws”), here Fukuyama assures us that, lest one conclude 
otherwise, he never has. On the contrary, all he has done is re-affirm the apparently 
benign idea that “Economic modernization, when successful, tends to drive demands for 
political participation by creating a middle class with property to protect, higher levels of 
education, and greater concern for their recognition as individuals…” 
Nevertheless, the fact remains: whether he has been misread or not, Fukuyama 
can for obvious reasons be credibly accused of at least having revived (if not himself 
originally advanced) a theory of historical inevitability that, like Gobineau’s on the 
political Right and like Marx’s on the political Left, has had very real practical 
consequences as well. Indeed, in the very same book in which he rebukes those who 
“misread” his argument, he all but concedes just this.  
Quoting Ken Jowitt, Fukuyama makes a point of distinguishing between his own 
“views” and those officials in the Bush administration who, prior to 9/11, read his 
argument correctly but who following 9/11, nevertheless changed their minds as to what 
kind of foreign policy agenda it apparently condoned. As Jowitt writes: 
Initially, if implicitly, the Bush administration subscribed to the ‘end of history’ thesis 
that the ‘rest’ of the world would more or less naturally become like the West in general 
and the United States in particular. September 11 changed that. In its aftermath, the Bush 
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administration has concluded that Fukuyama's historical timetable is too laissez-faire and 
not nearly attentive enough to the levers of historical change. History, the Bush 
administration has concluded, needs deliberate organization, leadership, and direction. In 
this irony of ironies, the Bush administration's identification of regime change as critical 
to its anti-terrorist policy and integral to its desire for a democratic capitalist world has 
led to an active ‘Leninist’ foreign policy in place of Fukuyama's passive ‘Marxist’ social 
teleology.644 
 
Jowitt’s characterization of the Bush administration’s foreign policy as ‘Leninist’ may 
seem odd. Unlike George W. Bush, Lenin was in no uncertain terms a man of the 
political Left. Upon reflection, however, where these men stand on the political spectrum 
simply does not matter. What matters is that insofar as the former’s administration was 
comprised of individuals who, rather like Lenin, also subscribed to a theory of historical 
inevitability (ie. had also become captivated by democratic history), it was an 
administration that prior to 9/11 had a an unusually passive—essentially anti-Wilsonian—
foreign policy agenda but that following 9/11 had an unusually active, “Leninist” one.645 
It was an administration, in short, that went from following the quiet way of Nicias to the 
loud way of Alcibiades, overnight.646  
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According to Fukuyama, Jowitt’s differentiation between his own “passive 
‘Marxist’ social teleology,” on the one hand, and the Bush administration’s “Leninist” 
foreign policy, on the other, could not be more apt. As Fukuyama goes on to write: 
I did not like the original version of Leninism and was skeptical when the Bush 
administration turned Leninist. Democracy in my view is likely to expand universally in 
the long run. But whether the rapid and relatively peaceful transition to democracy and 
free markets…can be quickly replicated in other parts of the world, or promoted through 
the application of power by outsiders at any given point in history, is open to doubt.647  
 
Still, merely by calling attention to the difference between his own “passive ‘Marxist’ 
social teleology,” on the one hand, and the Bush administration’s “Leninist” foreign 
policy, on the other, Fukuyama implicitly concedes that The End of History and the Last 
Man, no less than Hegel’s “monstrous design,” also apparently encouraged otherwise 
free, morally responsible human beings to view themselves not self-legislating ends in 
themselves, but rather, as either the decelerants or accelerants of a historical process, 
beyond their control. From Hegel’s “Pandora’s box have escaped all sorts of moral 
diseases from which the people is still suffering,” indeed.  
 As we saw at very beginning of this chapter, in his letter to Borgius, Engels 
makes an argument initially advanced by Kant in his Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose: that although “Individual men and even entire nations…are 
pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are 
unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature.” As Kant presents 
it, this is something that men “little imagine” and that, even if they were aware of it, 
“would scarcely arouse their interest.” 648 But as we have seen, even if Kant is right about 
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individuals and nations being “unwittingly guided,” he is obviously wrong about their 
“little imagining” that this is the case. Despite what Kant suggests, theories of historical 
inevitability like those of Hegel, Marx, Gobineau, and Fukuyama, are not simply the 
equivalent of long-term weather forecasts.649 They are not simply passive predictions 
about the future that, in time, will either prove true or false. Rather, they are in 
themselves political actions because inasmuch as they are concerned with predicting the 
future of human things, they influence not only how human beings perceive themselves 
as actors in the world, but as a direct result, perceive and act towards one another, as 
well. This especially true in a democratic age where, given his psychological makeup, 
democratic man is already naturally inclined to embrace absolute systems. The question 
that remains that we shall return to, then, is whether Tocqueville—himself a historian 
who at one point refers to human beings as “blind instruments in the hands of God”—is 
also guilty of creating a Pandora’s Box. Indeed, to return to the question animating this 
study: does Tocqueville differ from the very democratic historians he criticizes? If so, 
how? 
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Chapter 5: Making History Safe for Democracy: Tocqueville’s 
“Profoundly Ambiguous” Theory of History, Reconsidered 
 
 
Turned wrong way round, the relentless unforeseen was what we schoolchildren studied 
as ‘History,’ harmless history, where everything unexpected in its own time is chronicled 
on the page as inevitable. The terror of the unforeseen is what the science of history 
hides, turning a disaster into an epic.650 
 
-Philip Roth, The Plot Against America 
 
…I believe that many important historical facts can be explained only by accidental 
circumstances, while many others remain inexplicable, and finally, that chance—or, 
rather, that skein of secondary causes that we call chance because we cannot untangle 
them—plays a major part in everything that takes places on the world stage. But I also 
firmly believe that chance accomplishes nothing for which the groundwork has not been 
laid in advance. Prior facts, the nature of institutions, the cast of people’s minds, and the 
state of mores are the materials out of which chance improvises the effects we find so 
surprising and terrible to behold.651 
 
- Tocqueville, Recollections 
 
 
As evidenced by their correspondence, despite their friendship Tocqueville had 
little respect for Gobineau’s opus magnum and for two, inextricably connected reasons. 
First, whereas Gobineau was “mathematically certain” about the “correctitude” of his 
historical system, Tocqueville recognized that because human beings are not God—that 
because they cannot know “the whole”—Gobineau’s system was in fact “probably quite 
false” or, as he refers to such systems in his Recollections, “false beneath the air of its 
mathematical truth.” To be sure, Tocqueville admits that just as Gobineau cannot 
definitely prove that his system is true, Tocqueville cannot definitely prove that it is false. 
But again, for Tocqueville this does not really matter. What matters is that insofar as 
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Gobineau, in a way like “the materialists,” claims to have discovered the “master-key” to 
understanding social and political reality as a whole, the burden of proof is on him. 
Second, whereas Gobineau remained convinced that because his method was 
“purely scientific,” his Essai was inconsequential, Tocqueville recognized that insofar as 
the Essai dealt with human things it was not only consequential, but also dangerously so. 
For unlike Gobineau, he understood that by claiming to have uncovered the master-key to 
understanding social and political reality as a whole, Gobineau was not just propagating 
“certain untruth” at the expense of pursuing “uncertain truth,” but in so doing, 
propagating a totalitarian or theoretically infallible doctrine that, whether he intended it to 
or not, would serve only to undermine the preservation of liberty and human dignity in a 
democratic age. In sum, whereas Gobineau thought of his Essai as the historical 
equivalent of “geology, medicine, [and] archeology,” Tocqueville recognized that insofar 
as human beings are more than mere matter—that is, not simply the blood in their 
veins—the Essai was the intellectual equivalent of poison.  
And yet, what is interesting about Tocqueville’s correspondence with Gobineau is 
not only what it reveals about the danger of Gobineau’s Essai and therewith it, 
democratic history in general, but also what it does not reveal about Gobineau’s 
apparently low regard for Tocqueville as an intellectual. As the first few letters of their 
correspondence indicate, initially Tocqueville had wanted to collaborate with Gobineau 
on a book project, the purpose of which would be to analyze the “new moral concepts 
and social habits developing in Europe during the dissolution of the old aristocratic order 
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and with the new growth of democracy.”652 But for some reason, this book was never 
written. According to Michael Biddiss, “it has been suggested by some that the project 
failed because Gobineau did not succeed in procuring enough usable material,” but it is 
difficult to know whether this was in fact the case.653 What we do know is that regardless 
of whether he was able to procure enough usable material, over the years Gobineau 
seems to have lost interest in the project and not only because he lost interest in the topic. 
In a letter written to Comte de Circourt in 1868 (nearly a decade after Tocqueville’s 
death), Gobineau tells de Circourt that he, too, is “very struck” by the distorting effect 
that August Comte’s “detestable and absurd philosophical theory” has had on the 
thinking of so many of his contemporaries.654 Such a theory, he observes, is hardly the 
product of a “serious and informed mind,” and yet it influences how “men of affairs” 
think, without their even realizing it. As an example, one need only consider Tocqueville: 
“I will tell you,” writes Gobineau, “but between us, of course, that I consider one of 
[Comte’s] involuntary but powerful apostles, M de Tocqueville. He was not a 
philosopher from any point of view…Of natural and immutable predispositions, he 
wanted to know nothing, and Beaumont was the same.”655 
To be sure, coming from a man who himself was not a philosopher—nay, who 
embraced gnosis over philosophy—this is hardly a slight. Gobineau may well have 
thought that from no point of view was Tocqueville a philosopher, but neither was 
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Gobineau and Tocqueville recognized as much. In a letter written to the very Beaumont 
mentioned by Gobineau above, Tocqueville goes so far as to call Gobineau’s philosophy 
of history a “theory more appropriate for a horse dealer than a statesman,” and says that 
he “does not believe any of it.”656 Furthermore, the notion that Tocqueville was somehow 
an “involuntary” apostle of Comte is confusing, to say the least. If anything, Gobineau 
was the unwitting follower of Comte—a democratic historian who well before Gobineau, 
advanced a uni-causal, all encompassing, theory of history of his own.657 Nevertheless, 
what is important about Gobineau’s criticism of Tocqueville is not so much what it 
reveals about why their book project failed but what it implies about a certain view of 
science that democratic historians like Gobineau subscribe to and that, as we shall see, 
Tocqueville deliberately rejects. 
The view of science to which I am referring is a view that Jon Elster, in the 
Introduction to Alexis de Tocqueville: The First Social Scientist, describes when he writes 
the following: 
Most social scientists, if they have read Tocqueville, probably do not think he is up to 
their standards. They may applaud his ambition, but deny that it was matched by any 
actual achievements. I do not have any hard evidence to prove this statement, but a long 
acquaintance with the social sciences tells me that he is much less of a household name 
than Marx, Durkheim, or Weber…The reason, I suspect, is that for contemporary social 
science what counts as ‘an achievement’ is determined by a certain view of science as 
resting on lawlike theories and aiming at sharp predictions.658 
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As we have seen, this view of science as resting on lawlike theories and aiming at sharp 
predictions is a view that not only “most social scientists,” as Elster here suggests, 
subscribe to, but also, that democratic historians like Gobineau and Marx as self-
proclaimed scientific historians essentially take for granted. It is a view of science that 
when applied to human behavior converts the contingent into the necessary—that is, 
eliminates the phenomenon of accident from human affairs altogether—and thus results 
in the historical equivalent of materialism: what Karl Popper calls historicism or what I, 
in the previous chapter, refer to as historical determinism.659 It is a view of science that, 
when applied to social and political reality, holds out the promise of being able to 
prophesize or predict the future—a promise that, as we have seen, given not only the 
expectations of their democratic readers, but also, their gnostic desire to systematize 
history, democratic historians are, in particular, wont to keep. 
Accordingly, it is a view of science that Tocqueville never or, at the very least, 
never fully appears to embrace, thereby placing him in tension with how most social 
scientists, in keeping with Gobineau, understand what “counts” as an intellectual 
achievement. As James Ceaser observes, “Although Gobineau rarely cites Tocqueville in 
his published work, he clearly intended the Essai as a response to Democracy in America, 
which he considered an unphilosophical and unsystematic work.”660 Something similar, 
however, might be said of the social scientists to whom Elster is referring above. 
According to Elster, they too rarely reference Tocqueville and for a similar reason: just as 
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Gobineau clearly intended the Essai as a response to the “unsystematic” and 
“unphilosophical” Democracy in America, so social scientists clearly intend their 
enterprise as a response to what Hobbes initially claimed was “rather a dream than a 
science” anyways.661 For them as for Gobineau, the unsystematic must of necessity be 
unscientific and vice versa.  
So it follows that when it comes to making sense of Tocqueville’s own, 
“profoundly ambiguous” theory of history—his own conception of the ‘historical 
process’—scholars have for the most part tended to do one of two things: either interpret 
it as being wholly consistent with a view of science that, like Gobineau’s, rests on lawlike 
theories and aims at sharp predictions; or alternatively, interpret it as a clever use of 
rhetoric, on Tocqueville’s part, “to resolve the main political conflict of his own 
time…the conflict that arises from the question of whether society may be most justly 
ruled by the few or the many.”662 
To briefly return to the Introduction: insofar as scholarly interpretations of 
Tocqueville’s theory of history have, for the most part, focused on locating “something 
equivalent to a philosophy of history” in his thought, they have for the most part failed to 
adequately take into account Tocqueville’s concern for “practice.” Lest one forget, 
“Tocqueville writes with full consciousness of the requirements of political practice; his 
first consideration is always the effect his thought will have on society.”663 As he makes 
explicit in both Democracy in America and The Ancien Regime, he is writing not just for 
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philosophers, but also, for statesmen.664 Accordingly, scholars who assume that 
Tocqueville’s theory of history, despite being “profoundly ambiguous,” is nevertheless 
wholly consistent with a view of science that rests on lawlike theories and aiming at sharp 
predictions, unwittingly turn him into a democratic historian of the very kind he 
criticizes. For them, Tocqueville is much closer to Marx than he is, for instance, to 
Aristotle, because for Tocqueville as for Marx, history, like nature, is rational. 
At the same time, however, Zetterbaum arguably reflects the mirror opposite of 
these scholars. According to him, Tocqueville’s chapter on the “distinguishing features”  
or methodological tendencies of historians in democratic centuries offers “the closest 
approximation to a satisfactory explanation” for how, in accordance with Tocqueville’s 
profoundly ambiguous theory of history, men are at once “free and not free.”665 Even so, 
however, Zetterbaum discusses these “distinguishing features” only insofar as they relate 
to the main argument of his book: that Tocqueville, far from actually exhibiting these 
distinguishing features himself, only appears to exhibit them—that is, exhibits them for 
rhetorical purposes only. Yes, Zetterbaum readily acknowledges the contradiction 
between what Tocqueville accuses other democratic historians of doing, on the one hand, 
and what Tocqueville himself appears to do, on the other. But because Tocqueville, in 
Zetterbaum’s view, is merely pretending to be a democratic historian, not only is there no 
contradiction between what Tocqueville himself does and what he accuses others of 
doing, but also there is no reason to discuss why Tocqueville exhibits these same 
“distinguishing features,” any further. For Zetterbaum, Tocqueville is much closer to 
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Aristotle than he is to Marx, because for Zetterbaum, Tocqueville’s apparent historicism 
is as much a “salutary myth” for stubborn French aristocrats as Aristotle’s theory of 
moral virtue, it might be argued, is a salutary teaching for less than philosophic 
gentlemen.  
In what follows, therefore, my aim is to demonstrate that contrary to how scholars 
have typically interpreted Tocqueville’s theory of history, because Tocqueville is neither 
a social scientist who subscribes to a “view of science as resting on lawlike theories 
aiming at sharp predictions” nor simply a “statesman writing for statesmen,” his theory of 
history is neither a “philosophy of history” properly so-called nor simply rhetorical. To 
begin, I discuss Tocqueville’s claim (which he makes most forcefully in Democracy in 
America) that the “democratic revolution taking place among us” is “irresistible” or 
“inevitable.” More specifically, I try to situate that claim within the context of when he 
was writing in order to show how, like the Restoration liberals before him, he too turned 
to writing Democracy in America and later, The Ancien Regime, for more than just 
political reasons. Next, I discuss why despite agreeing with the Restoration liberals that it 
was indeed imperative to take up the intellectual enterprise of trying to provide society, in 
the wake of having suffered a spiritual crisis, with a new “ideological synthesis,” 
Tocqueville avoids falling into what he calls the “mania of the century” while doing so. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, at the very end of Democracy in America Tocqueville raises the 
question of whether he himself might be guilty of advancing a philosophy of history that, 
whether intentionally or not, vastly limits if not destroys human freedom by way of 
making entire peoples obedient to some “insurmountable and unintelligent force,” of 
making them obedient to what he elsewhere calls “general and eternal laws.” But as I 
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argue in this chapter, given Tocqueville’s understanding of the relationship between what 
he calls the “cultivation of theory,” on the one hand, and the “cultivation of practice,” on 
the other, his theory of history remains much less systematic, much more political, and 
thus much more hospitable to—if not perfectly compatible with—the idea of human 
freedom than those of his contemporaries. As I ultimately argue, therefore, because 
Tocqueville is a historian for whom history is neither a “tale told by an idiot” (the 
function entirely of chance) nor a tale told by a prophet (the function entirely of 
necessity), his theory of history remains, like Montesquieu’s before him, a profoundly 
ambiguous one that is much safer for democracy than those of the democratic historians 
he criticizes. These other theories of history, Tocqueville tells us, are both “false and 
cowardly.” Insofar as his own theory remains profoundly ambiguous, however, it remains 
once truer and more ennobling.  
TOCQUEVILLE, THE RESTORATION LIBERALS, AND SPIRITUAL CRISIS 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, although many French liberals turned to writing history 
during the Bourbon restoration, they did so not just for political reasons. To be sure, they 
had a political purpose. The genre of history, they realized, could be used as a vehicle not 
only for defending, but also for selling the Revolution. But however partisan these 
historians no doubt were, as intellectuals politics was not their sole concern—and neither 
was it Tocqueville’s. 
Like the Restoration liberals, Tocqueville also argued for the inevitability or 
“necessity” of the Revolution because, like them, he too found it politically expedient. 
Just after publishing Volume 1 of Democracy in America, he penned a letter to Eugène 
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Stoffels in which he discusses the “political goal of the work” and, in so doing, reveals 
just this. As he writes: 
Here is the political goal of the work: 
I wanted to show what a democratic people was in our day, and through this rigorously 
exact picture, I intended to produce a double effect on the minds of the men of my time. 
To those who have worked out an ideal democracy, a glowing dream, that they believe 
can easily be realized, I undertook to show that they had covered the picture with false 
colors; that the democratic government they advocate, if it furnishes real benefits to the 
men who sustain it, does not have the elevated characteristics that their imagination gives 
it; that this government, moreover, can be maintained only by means of certain conditions 
of enlightenment, of private morality, of beliefs that we do not have, and which it is 
necessary to work to obtain before drawing from them the political consequences. 
To men for whom the word democracy is synonymous with upheaval, anarchy, 
spoliation, murders, I tried to show that democracy could manage to govern society while 
respecting fortunes, recognizing rights, securing liberty, honoring beliefs; that if 
democratic government developed less than some other governments certain beautiful 
faculties of the human soul, it had beautiful and grand sides; and that perhaps, after all, 
the will of God was to diffuse a mediocre happiness on the totality of men and not to 
concentrate a large amount of felicity on some and allow only a small number to 
approach perfection. I intended to demonstrate to them that, whatever their opinion might 
be in this regard, there was no longer time to deliberate; that society was every day 
proceeding and dragging them along with it toward equality of conditions; that it only 
remained to choose between evils henceforth inevitable; that the question was not 
knowing if one could obtain aristocracy or democracy, but if one would have a 
democratic society proceeding without poetry and without grandeur, but with order and 
morality, or a democratic society disordered and depraved delivered over to frenzied 
furors, or bent under a yoke heavier than all those that have weighed on men since the fall 
of the Roman Empire 
I wanted to diminish the ardor of the former, and, without discouraging them, show 
them the only road to take. 
I sought to diminish the terrors of the latter and to bend their will to the idea of an 
inevitable future, so that, the ones having less ardor and the others offering less 
resistance, society could advance more peacefully toward the necessary fulfillment of its 
destiny. There is the mother-idea of the work, the idea which links all the others in a 
single web…666 
 
In this letter, Tocqueville reveals that the “political goal” of Democracy in America was 
to produce a “double effect on the minds of the men” his time. On the one hand, he 
wanted to convince partisans of democracy that the victory of democracy over aristocracy 
was much more problematic than they realized; that the arrival of democracy did not 
                                               
666 “Tocqueville to Eugène Stoffels, February 21, 1835,” in Alexis de Tocqueville: Selected Letters on 
Politics and Society, ed. and trans. by Roger Boesche and James Toupin (University of California Press, 
1985), 98-99 (emphasis Tocqueville’s). 
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amount to the realization of an ideal or a “glowing dream” as they assumed, but rather, to 
the arrival of something much less “elevated” and that, as a result, would prove itself 
much more difficult to maintain than they originally thought. On the other hand, 
however, Tocqueville wanted to convince partisans of the ancien regime that while 
democracy may lack the “elevated characteristics” of aristocracy, what it lacked in terms 
of elevated characteristics it made up for in terms of what it furnished, not just for a few 
but for the totality of men: happiness. As he goes on to reveal, however, key to producing 
this double effect on the minds of the men of his time was arguing, like the Restoration 
liberals before him, that the Revolution was inevitable; that the ancien regime had been 
destroyed and was never coming back; that democracy was the only way forward; that if 
the partisans of the old order could not bring themselves to accept what had happened 
(and was happening), God would do it for them.  
According to Zetterbaum, therefore, what Tocqueville writes in this letter 
definitively proves that his inevitability thesis—his assertion in both Democracy in 
America and the Ancien Regime that democracy is “beyond the reach of man’s 
powers”—is a rhetorical smoke screen, a “salutary myth” designed, again, “to resolve the 
main political conflict of his own time…”667 If we recall, at the beginning Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville turns his attention to this conflict directly when he writes that, 
although everyone acknowledges that a “democratic revolution is taking place,” not 
everyone “judges” it in the same way. “Some consider it as something new and, taking it 
for an accident, they hope still to be able to stop it; while others judge it irresistible, 
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because it seems to them the most continuous, oldest and most permanent fact known in 
history.”668 Put simply, while some people view this revolution as contingent or a product 
of chance, others view it as determined or a function of necessity. But according to 
Tocqueville, while not everyone judges this revolution in the same way, everyone should. 
The tendency of events clearly demonstrates that, contrary to those who consider it new 
and an accident, those who consider it is the most continuous, oldest and most permanent 
fact known in history are correct. As he explains: 
It isn’t necessary for God himself to speak in order for us to discover sure signs of his 
will; it is enough to examine the regular march of nature and the continuous tendency of 
events; I know, without the Creator raising his voice, that the stars in space follow the 
curves traced by his fingers.    
If long observations and sincere meditations led men of today to recognize that the 
gradual and progressive development of equality is at once the past and the future of their 
history, this discovery alone would give this development the sacred character of the will 
of God. To want to stop democracy would then seem to be struggling against God 
himself, and it would only remain for nations to accommodate themselves to the social 
state that Providence imposes on them.669 
 
What is noteworthy about this passage is the extent to which it suggests that Tocqueville 
is—like the Restoration liberals before him—also playing a political game. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, whereas Thierry argued that “the continued elevation of the Third Estate” is 
“the predominant fact” and “law” of French history, and that “this law of Providence has 
been accomplished more than once without the knowledge of those who were the agents 
of it,” Guizot argued that “European civilization has entered, if we may so speak, into the 
eternal truth, into the plan of Providence; it progresses according to the intentions of 
God.” Here, Tocqueville takes a page directly out of their playbook, with which was well 
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acquainted.670 Like them, he appeals to the religious sentiments of his more conservative, 
de Maistrian readers, but without actually affirming the doctrine of Providence. Rather, 
he subverts that doctrine by subordinating the will of God to an empirical test, the 
seemingly indisputable results of which confirm that democracy, whether one likes it or 
not, is here to stay. Resisting democracy, he can therefore argue, would “seem to be 
struggling against God himself,” even if it is not. Resisting democracy, he can imply, 
would seem to be impious.671 
Still, while Zetterbaum is right to observe that by subordinating the will of God to 
an empirical test, Tocqueville is using the inevitability of democracy to advance a 
political goal—to resolve the main political conflict of his time—he is nonetheless wrong 
to therefore conclude that for Tocqueville, the inevitability of democracy is simply a 
“salutary myth.” On the contrary—and, again, in keeping with the Restoration liberals—
Tocqueville’s invocation of historical necessity is actually sincere, even if his cloaking it 
in the doctrine of Providence is not.672 For as he reveals in a letter to Louis de Kergorlay 
written one month before his letter to Stoffels, when it comes to the transition from 
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aristocracy to democracy, the French—along with millions of other men and women who 
have been pushed by God for centuries—really do have no choice. As he writes: 
I am as deeply convinced as one can be of anything in this world that we are being 
carried away irresistibly by our laws and our mores toward an almost complete equality 
of conditions. Once conditions are equal, I confess that I no longer see any intermediaries 
between a democratic government (and by this word I do not mean a republic, but a state 
of society in which everyone more or less would take part in public affairs) and the 
government of one person ruling without any control. I do not for an instant doubt that 
with time we will arrive at either one or the other. 
Now, I do not want the latter; if an absolute government were ever to establish itself in a 
country that is democratic in its social state and demoralized as France is, one cannot 
conceive what the limits of the tyranny would be; we have already seen fine specimens of 
this regime under 
Bonaparte and if Louis Philippe were free, he would enable us to see much more perfect 
ones still. Therefore only the first choice remains. I hardly like it any better than the 
latter, but nevertheless I do prefer it to the latter, and besides, if I fail in attaining the 
former, I am certain that the other will always be there. Thus, of two evils I choose the 
lesser. 
But isn't it very difficult to establish a democratic government among us? Of course. 
So, if I had the choice, I would not attempt it. Is it impossible to succeed? I doubt this 
greatly because independent of the political reasons I do not have time to elaborate, I 
cannot believe that God has been pushing two or three million men for several centuries 
toward equality of conditions in order to have them end in the despotism of Tiberius and 
Claudius. This would not truly be the problem. 
Why [God] is carrying us along this way toward democracy, I do not know; but embarked 
on a vessel I did not construct, I look for the means to reach the nearest port. Is it 
perilous to attempt such an enterprise? Show me something that would be more perilous 
than staying still and a route that would be less dangerous to follow, and I will confess 
that I am wrong. In our day, society seems to me in the same situation as a man who is 
wounded in the arm; gangrene has set in and it is spreading. He is doubtless very upset 
about amputating the arm, and the operation may be fatal, but is it not better to live one-
armed than to die with two?673 
 
Zetterbaum never discusses this letter and perhaps for good reason: insofar as it reveals 
that democracy, according to Tocqueville, really is beyond the reach of man’s powers—
that democracy has in fact been foisted upon humanity (if not by “God” then by their own 
“laws and mores”), it casts doubt on the argument that his inevitability thesis is simply a 
“salutary myth,” as Zetterbaum maintains. Nay, it refutes that argument because it reveals 
that just as the Restoration liberals, despite having a partisan agenda, also sincerely 
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believed that the Revolution was more than just an “accident” (ie. that it was 
“irresistible” or “necessary”), so too did Tocqueville.674 Furthermore, in this letter 
Tocqueville reveals that despite what Zetterbaum argues, he is actually much less 
convinced of the relative “justice” of democracy than he elsewhere lets on—whether it be 
in his letter to Stoffels above or in Democracy in America itself. In his letter to Stoffels, 
Tocqueville alludes to what at the very end of Democracy in America he makes much 
more explicit: that “It is natural to believe that what most satisfies the sight of [God] and 
preserver of men, is not the singular prosperity of a few, but the greatest well-being of 
all;” that “Equality is perhaps less elevated; but it is more just, and its justice makes its 
grandeur and its beauty.”675 In his letter to de Kergorlay, however, democracy’s justice, 
its grandeur and its beauty, is nowhere to be found. To be sure, he freely admits that on 
the one hand he “cannot believe that God has been pushing two or three million men for 
several centuries toward equality of conditions in order to have them end in the despotism 
of Tiberius and Claudius.” But as he also tells de Kergorlay, he does not actually know 
why this is happening. As far as he can tell democracy is to society what “gangrene” is to 
a “wounded man:” something that has set in, is irreversible, and that demands medical 
attention before it is too late. Where, one might ask, is the justice in that? 
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Herein lies not only the reason why Tocqueville considers democracy to be such a 
“problem,” as Zetterbaum refers to it, but also, why upon seeing it come into being, it 
produced a “religious terror” in his soul. In the first chapter of The Ancien Regime, 
Tocqueville observes that “in any number of writers” during the period of the 
Revolution—whether it be de Maistre who regarded the Revolution a divine punishment 
or Guizot who argued that it was God’s beneficent plan to remake the world—“we find 
something of the religious terror that Salvianus experienced at the sight of the 
barbarians.”676 As evidenced by the Introduction to Democracy in America, however, the 
terror that afflicted de Maistre and the Restoration liberals afflicted Tocqueville, just as 
much. “The entire book that you are about to read,” he writes, “has been written under 
the impression of a sort of religious terror produced in the soul of the author by the sight 
of this irresistible revolution that has marched for so many centuries over all obstacles, 
and that we still see today advancing amid the ruins that it has made.”677 Of course, 
unlike the Restoration liberals, Tocqueville never interprets this “irresistible revolution” 
as evidence of the fact that history is progressive; as we shall see below, when it comes to 
the idea of progress, he and the Restoration liberals part ways. For now, however, it is 
important simply to recognize that insofar as he, too, sincerely believed that democracy 
was inevitable, he too found himself consumed by the sort of religious terror that spiritual 
crises, as we saw in Chapter 2, are wont to produce in the souls of those who experience 
them. 
                                               
676 Tocqueville, The Ancien Regime and the Revolution, 13. 
677 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 14. 
 274 
Accordingly, just as de Maistre and the Restoration liberals were, in addition to 
using history for partisan purposes, also motivated by a more profound, all too human 
desire to find meaning in what had happened—to know the significance of the 
Revolution and what it meant not only for France, but for the whole of Europe and even 
mankind moving forward—so too was Tocqueville. He “accepted 1789 as a definitive 
point of rupture within French history. By the same token he accepted, along with his 
liberal or Doctrinaire predecessors, the sense that he too belonged to an obscure 
transitional generation.” Consequently, he also adopted their “objectives.”678 He 
understood that because the Revolution had destroyed everything in its path, it was the 
responsibility of men like him to rebuild: to adopt the intellectual enterprise of providing 
society with a new “ideological synthesis.”679 Again, “The hope of 1789 was followed by 
division, civil war, the Terror, the despotism of Napoleon and finally defeat at Waterloo. 
The old centers of spiritual, political and moral authority were destroyed but no stable 
new order emerged.”680 Although born in 1805, Tocqueville was not immune from 
suffering both the political and psychological effects of any of this. The past was too 
recent; the future still too unpredictable. He makes this clear when, in the Introduction to 
Democracy in America, he writes that he can “find nothing that deserves to excite more 
distress and more pity than what is happening before our eyes; it seems that today we 
have broken the natural bond that unites opinions to tastes and actions to beliefs…”681 In 
addition using the inevitability thesis to “resolve the main political conflict of his time,” 
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therefore, he also turned to writing Democracy in America and later, The Ancien Regime, 
in order to make sense of these events and help construct this much needed “new order.”  
And yet, while Tocqueville thought it was imperative that he, too, take up this 
intellectual enterprise, he did not, like so many of his contemporaries, succumb to what 
he calls the “mania of the century” while doing so. As we saw in Chapter 1, in editorial 
note at the very end of Democracy in America Tocqueville expresses his fear that he too 
might be guilty of having fallen into this mania—that is, of having advanced a 
philosophy of history that destroys human freedom by making entire peoples obedient to 
what he calls “general and eternal laws.” However, as we shall see below, given his 
understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and, in particular, the limits 
that the latter necessarily imposes on the cultivating the former, his theory of history 
remains much less systematic, much more ambiguous, and thus much more hospitable 
to—if not perfectly compatible with—human freedom as a result. 
HISTORY UNDERSTOOD AS A “MORAL SCIENCE:” TOCQUEVILLE AND GOBINEAU ON 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
At one point in their correspondence, Gobineau informs Tocqueville that he has 
“with great interest” been keeping tabs on the impact of his book in a number of 
countries, including both Germany and America. Whereas in a letter dated March 20, 
1856, he writes that people in Germany are “very interested” in the Essai, in a letter dated 
May 1, 1856, he reports that people in America are “taking it really seriously.”682 As it 
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turns out, however, those who are “very interested” in the Essai are interested for an 
altogether different reason than those who are “taking it really seriously.” In Germany, he 
tells Tocqueville, people are interested in the Essai because of their love for theory. 
Insofar as it is a country where the people “are more concerned with intrinsic truths” than 
with effects, it is a country where a book like the Essai is bound to be read and discussed 
because what it purports to reveal about the nature of social and political reality, and thus 
regardless of whether its practical consequences are pernicious.683 Much like the French, 
the Germans are a people who subordinate practice to theory. Alternatively, in America 
people are taking the Essai seriously because of their love, paradoxically, for practice. 
Insofar as America is a country where people are more concerned with effects than with 
intrinsic truths, it is a country where a book like the Essai is bound to be read and 
discussed precisely because of its practical consequences, and thus regardless of whether 
what it purports to reveal about the nature of social and political reality is actually true. 
And as Gobineau himself confirms, unlike the Germans, the American read it for 
precisely this reason: “That very practical nation,” he tells Tocqueville, “succeeded in 
fashioning from a purely scientific theory a political weapon which the contending parties 
now hurl at one another.”684 The Essai’s American translator, he observes, appears to 
have translated only that part of the Essai which establishes the “superiority of the 
American Anglo-Saxons…”685 Unlike the Germans, the Americans subordinate theory to 
practice. 
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For his part, Gobineau could not care less that his Essai is being used as a 
political weapon. This does not “disturb” him because, as far as he is concerned, this is 
simply the cost of doing business: of choosing methods that are “exclusively scientific”; 
of discounting “all considerations of popularity”; of working in a field that is “obviously 
independent of the consent of the majority”’; of having written a book, in short, for an 
essentially German as opposed to American audience.686 In his view, he is but a physician 
diagnosing a patient. Just as he is not a “murderer,” neither is the “doctor who announces 
the coming of an end;” for just as a doctor’s diagnosis is nothing more or less than a 
statement of fact, so the Essai, he argues, is “devoid” of both “morality” and “anti-
morality.”687 Inasmuch as the Essai is no different than “geology, medicine, archeology,” 
he need not worry about either being  accused of “murder” or worse, “slipping from the 
truth where one least ought to slip.” 688 Again, as far as Gobineau is concerned, he is 
“mathematically certain about the correctitude of [his] propositions.”689  
But for Tocqueville, Gobineau is overlooking the fact that for the same reason the 
genre of history is not (and never will be) the equivalent of natural philosophy, 
Gobineau’s methods are not (and never can be) “purely scientific”—that is, at least not in 
the way that he wants them to be. To the extent that what he is studying does not “stand 
in relation to laws of social science as stones to do laws of geology” means that the more 
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his method is ‘German’ the less accurate or true his philosophy or theory of history will 
actually be.690 Insofar as human beings are not simply the blood in their veins (ie. 
reducible to mere matter) history—like social science in general—can never be, strictly 
speaking, devoid of either “morality” or “anti-morality.” Like political science, history is 
and will always remain a moral science. In these fields, fact and value are not as 
separable as Gobineau would have us (and Tocqueville) believe.  
In fact, they are not separable at all; as the example of Gobineau himself 
illustrates, the indifference towards practical consequences—the “moral obtuseness” 
necessary for “scientific analysis” common to modern social science, as Leo Strauss calls 
it—is itself the product of a moral preference.691 In a letter dated October 15, 1854, 
Gobineau tells Tocqueville that while he regrets no longer living in “very intellectual 
times,” his “work is little disturbed it.” If anything, this “condition” has served only to 
clarify the choice that lies before him: he can either give up (throw himself into the 
“lake” of enfeebled minds that surround him); or soldier on (“go ahead…without the least 
concern for what is called public opinion”). For Gobineau, this choice is simple: “I am 
resolved,” he tells Tocqueville, “to stick to the latter…”692 Important to recognize, 
however, is that as simple as this choice appears to Gobineau, making it is hardly 
necessary—and therein lies the problem. According to Gobineau’s view of social science, 
he need not be “resolved” to stick to anything, let alone to conducting science or pursuing 
the truth at the expense of “discounting all considerations of popularity.” In accordance 
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his view of social science, throwing oneself into a lake of enfeebled minds would be as 
respectable, as noble, as soldiering on. And yet, Gobineau tells Tocqueville that he is 
resolved to soldier on, nonetheless. The question that remains then is why. Why does 
Gobineau choose to continue his work in a world where such work, along with humanity 
itself, is apparently fated to disappear? 
At first, the answer seems clear: like any other social scientist, he has a moral 
preference for the truth. In actuality, however, the answer is his moral preference for 
aristocracy—not just the truth as he claims. In his essay “What Is Political Philosophy?,” 
Strauss remarks that he has “never met any scientific social scientist who apart from 
being dedicated to truth and integrity was not also wholeheartedly devoted to 
democracy.”693 But that is only because he never met a social scientist like Gobineau—a 
social scientist who, as we saw in the previous chapter, apart from being dedicated to 
truth and integrity was also wholeheartedly devoted to aristocracy. Like Strauss’s social 
scientists, Gobineau is not as ethically neutral as he claims; for like social science in 
general, his Essai is not nearly as devoid of morality and anti-morality as he insists. In the 
Preface of the Essai, he basically admits as much when he tells us that despite 
“recognizing that both strong and weak races exist, I preferred to examine the former.”694 
Gobineau’s preference is hardly arbitrary. As a man who prided himself on “carrying the 
blood of Ottar Jarl, a Viking pirate who raided the coast of Normandy,” it is not like his 
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“heart or his mind is torn between alternatives which in themselves are equally 
attractive.”695 
Like the ‘German’ resolve of his progressive rivals, then, the ‘German’ resolve of 
Gobineau also stems from an unstated, all too ‘American’ concern. What does not 
“disturb” Gobineau because he is devoted to discovering “intrinsic truths” in fact does 
not disturb him because he is in his heart of hearts an aristocrat: a partisan of inequality. 
The “evils” that, according to Tocqueville, his Essai is liable to perpetuate are in his view 
hardly evils at all.696 On the contrary, they are goods that his Essai is meant to implicitly 
defend, despite being fated to disappear. Perhaps this is why despite his historical 
determinism, Tocqueville recognized in Gobineau a desire not just to interpret the 
world—not just to do what “philosophers” have hitherto done—but to actually change 
it.697  
 Still, rather than accuse Gobineau of cloaking his all too ‘American’ concern for 
aristocracy in a purely ‘German’ method, Tocqueville opts instead to simply criticize him 
for embracing a wholly ‘German’ method to begin with. In a letter dated December 20, 
1853, Tocqueville already tells him that, although greatly interested in the Essai, “by 
studying German” he has “not yet become enough of a German to be captivated so much 
by the novelty or philosophical merits of an idea as to overlook its moral or political 
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effects.”698 Not surprisingly, therefore, in response to Gobineau’s claim to be a “doctor,” 
Tocqueville writes the following: 
In your penultimate letter you compare yourself to a physician who announces to his 
patient that he mortally ill. You ask: what is immoral in that? My answer is that even 
though this act in itself may not be immoral, its consequences assuredly are most 
immoral and pernicious. If one of these mornings my doctor were to say to me: ‘My dear 
sir, I have the honor to announce that you are mortally ill and, inasmuch as all of your 
vital organs are affected, I must add that there is absolutely no chance for you to recover,’ 
my first temptation would be to knock that doctor down. Thereafter I should think I 
would have no choice but either to pull the covers over myself and wait for the 
announced end or, if I possessed the temper which animated the circle of Boccaccio 
during the Florentine plague, to think of nothing else but to sample all the possible 
pleasures before this inevitable end, to burn, as they say, the candle at both ends. Or 
again, I could profit from this doctor’s sentence by preparing myself for eternal life. But 
societies do not have eternal lives. Thus your doctor will certainly not number me among 
his clients. I must add that physicians, like philosophers, are often greatly mistaken in 
their prognostications. I have seen more than one person condemned by physicians who 
nevertheless became quite well subsequently and who angrily criticized the doctor for 
having uselessly frightened and discouraged him.699  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Tocqueville’s concern for the “practical 
consequences” of ideas has a way of making him look like a moralist and, to a significant 
extent, this passage seems only to further confirm that at the end of the day, a moralist is 
what he is. Even though the activity of the philosopher in itself may not be immoral, he 
argues, that activity can have very immoral and pernicious consequences, nonetheless. 
Accordingly, whereas Gobineau—in keeping with the Germans—subordinates practice to 
theory, effect to truth, Tocqueville—in keeping with the Americans—appears to do the 
opposite. Practical consequences and not the truth, it would seem, are his primary if not 
exclusive concern. But again, important to recognize is that while Tocqueville, unlike 
Gobineau, is obviously concerned about the practical consequences of ideas, this does not 
mean that he is by implication unconcerned with their philosophical merits (ie. that for 
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him, the truth simply does not matter). What it means, rather, is that when it comes to 
analyzing social and political reality—when it comes to studying a realm of reality that 
for whatever reason, consists of beings who neither appear to be nor conceive of 
themselves as wholly determined by “general and eternal laws”—the philosophical merits 
of a given idea are discernable only by taking into account its practical consequences. 
Lest Gobineau forget, although human affairs are much more indeterminate than, for 
instance, human biology, even physicians err. In effect, even they cannot afford to ignore 
the potentially pernicious, practical consequences associated with practicing their art. Just 
as prudent philosophers must always beware the city, so prudent physicians must always 
beware their patients—especially if it turns out that they are, like Gobineau, “slipping 
from the truth where one least ought to slip.”700 
Unlike Gobineau, therefore, Tocqueville simply rejects the view, characteristic of 
modern social science in general, that all forms of knowledge are equal—that the 
relationship between truth and science is as straightforward as Gobineau claims. “In 
Tocqueville’s view, Gobineau wrongly conflates all forms of knowledge into one mold, 
equating truth in social science with, for example, in geology.”701 But again, insofar as 
human beings are not the equivalent of rocks, a book like the Essai can never be, in 
Tocqueville’s view, the equivalent of a morally obtuse geological study. Just as “political 
science is a moral science, because the outcome of history changes as a result of human 
actions freely made,” so too is the science of history.702 For Tocqueville, this is obvious. 
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In a letter dated November 17, 1853, he tells Gobineau that “after, for some time, one has 
observed the way in which public affairs are conducted,” one cannot help but conclude 
that the “same causes which make for success in private life” make for success in public 
life, as well. “Do you think you can avoid the impression,” he asks Gobineau, 
…that courage, energy, honesty, farsightedness, and common sense are the real reasons 
behind the prosperity of empires as well as behind the prosperity of private families; and 
that, in one word, the destiny of men, whether of individuals or nations, depends on what 
they want them to be?703 
 
As we shall see below, despite what Tocqueville here argues, the destinies of individuals 
and nations do not only, in his view, depend on what men want them to be. But at the 
same time, they do not only depend on the determining influence of a single great cause 
(race), either, and this is Tocqueville’s point. When it comes to interpreting historical 
change, the moral qualities of human beings—qualities that are reducible neither, for 
instance, to the “similitude of the passions” nor to the unsimilitude of the races—
matter.704 Such qualities not only affect but can often change the course of events thereby 
making history, like politics in general, much more contingent upon what men “want” 
than Gobineau is willing to acknowledge. Unlike the natural sciences, the science of 
history must therefore take the moral qualities of human beings into account. 
TOCQUEVILLE’S METHOD: NEITHER ‘GERMAN’ NOR ‘AMERICAN’ 
Of course, from the perspective of Gobineau, Tocqueville’s rejection of the view 
that all forms of knowledge, whether historical or geological, are equal is tantamount to 
an admission, on his part, that when it comes to analyzing social and political reality, 
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politics and history, the only thing which truly matters is practice—that the truth, in short, 
is important only insofar as it is effectual. Important to recognize, however, is that just as 
Tocqueville never became, by studying German, “enough of a German to be captivated 
so much by the novelty or philosophical merits of an idea as to overlook its moral or 
political effects,” neither did he, by studying American democracy, become enough of an 
American to be captivated so much by the moral or political effects of an idea as to 
overlook its philosophical merits.  
In Part 1, Volume 2, of Democracy in America, Tocqueville divides “science”—
by which he means not just natural science, but also social or political science—into three 
parts.705 The first part of science “contains the most theoretical principles, the most 
abstract notions, the ones whose application is unknown or very distant.”706 As a result, it 
is a part of science cultivated by those who regard the pursuit of truth, whether about 
nature or social and political phenomena, as an end in itself and, as such, for the rare few 
who, like Gobineau, regard that pursuit as being above the fray of practice. It is a part of 
                                               
705 In an excised passage from this chapter, Tocqueville provides an “example” in order illustrate his 
broader thought. That example—which clearly confirms that by “science” he does not simply mean natural 
philosophy or science, is worth quoting in full. As Tocqueville writes: 
“An example would make my thought easier to grasp: I would choose the science that I know best which 
is that of the laws. The distinctions that I have just indicated are found in the science of laws and I believe, 
without being able to assert it in so positive a way, that you should see at least the trace of those 
distinctions in all of the laws and principally in those that are called exact, because of the rigorous manner 
in which they proceed.  
There is a science of laws whose object is lofty, speculative, general. The former works hard to find the 
rules by which human societies exist and to determine the laws that various peoples must impose on 
themselves in order to reach the goal that they propose for themselves.  
There is a science of laws that, taking hold of a particular body of laws, or even of the higher portion of a 
body of laws, demonstrates what general principles dominate there and shows the economy that reigns and 
the overall view that is revealed.  
There is a last one that enters into the administrative or judicial detail of the processes by which the 
legislator wanted to have his plans carried out, learns how political assemblies or the courts interpreted 
their will, and that teaches the art of making good the rights of each citizen with the aid of the laws” (777). 
706 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 777. 
 285 
science for those who, like the Germans in general, are concerned exclusively with the 
philosophical merits of an idea and thus who subordinate practice to theory, effect to 
truth. The second part of science, argues Tocqueville, is “made up of general truths that, 
though still pure theory, lead nevertheless by a direct and short path to application.”707 It 
is a part of science cultivated by those for whom the pursuit of truth is neither an end in 
itself nor simply a means to an end because insofar as the cultivation of theory 
necessarily requires taking into account the practical consequences of ideas, the pursuit of 
truth cannot be absolutely separated from application. It is a part of science that, as we 
shall see, Tocqueville himself cultivates—a political scientist and historian for whom, 
unlike Gobineau, the pursuit of truth is never above the fray practice. Finally, the third 
part of science is concerned solely with the “processes of application and the means of 
execution fulfilled.”708 It is a part of science that as the mirror opposite of the first part, is 
cultivated by those who regard the pursuit of truth solely as a means to an end. It is for 
those who, like the Americans in general, conflate what is true with what is useful or 
effectual and thus who subordinate theory to practice, science to pragmatism.  
Now, according to Tocqueville each of these parts of science can be “cultivated 
separately…”709 But as he proceeds to argue, none can “prosper for long” when 
“separated absolutely from the other two”—and for the following reason: whereas when 
separated absolutely from the cultivation of practice, the cultivation of theory is liable to 
degenerate into the construction of “probably quite false” absolute systems, when 
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separated absolutely from the cultivation of theory, the cultivation of practice is liable to 
stall completely and degenerate into barbarism. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, when separated from any concern for practical 
consequences, the cultivation of theory—especially as it relates to social and political 
phenomena—is liable to run amok; Gobineau’s Essai is the case in point. Yet, as 
intimated above, Gobineau’s Essai is hardly the only example of a book that illustrates 
what Tocqueville is getting at. One need only read Book 5 of Plato’s Republic in order to 
recognize that theorizing without a concern for what is “possible,” never mind what is 
“best,” can be a dangerous activity, whether it entails the creation of a “probably quite 
false” absolute system or not.710 True, it may be that in times of equality philosophers 
find it no longer necessary “to envelop their opinions in veils of allegory.”711 But this 
does not mean that cultivating theory should be done without a view to practice 
whatsoever; for according to Tocqueville, just as the cultivation of good practice depends 
on remaining open to general ideas introduced by theory, so the cultivation of good 
theory depends on paying heed to limits imposed by practice. 
 Not surprisingly, therefore, in The Ancien Regime Tocqueville takes to task those 
men for whom, prior to the Revolution, cultivating theory without a view to actual 
practice became a “defining occupation.”712 Lest one assume that, because these men had 
no authority and fulfilled no public function, they too were simply the social equivalent 
of physicists—scientists focused exclusively on pursuing the truth for its own sake—
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Tocqueville here reveals that contrary to their “German counterparts,” politics was in fact 
their primary concern.713 Still, that these men were actually interested in politics did not 
mean that they, unlike their German counterparts, had anymore awareness of, let alone 
respect for, the important relationship between the cultivation of theory, on the one hand, 
and practical consequences, on the other. On the contrary, just as their German 
counterparts were content to focus solely on the novelty or philosophical merits of an 
idea, so too were they; for as Tocqueville goes on to explain, despite taking an avid 
interest in politics, none of these men actually had any appreciation for the realities of 
“practical life.” As Tocqueville writes: 
The situation of these writers fostered in them a taste for abstract, general theories of 
government, theories in which they trusted blindly. Living as they did almost totally 
removed from practical life, they had no experience that might have tempered their 
natural passions. Nothing warned them of the obstacles that existing realities might pose 
to even the most desirable reforms. They had no idea of the perils that invariably 
accompany even the most necessary revolutions. Indeed, they had no premonition of 
them because the complete absence of political liberty ensured that they not only failed to 
grasp the world of affairs but actually failed to see it. They had nothing to do with that 
world and were incapable of recognizing what others did within it. Hence, they lacked 
even that superficial instruction that the sight of a free society and word of what is said 
by free men impart to those least involved in government.714  
 
As Tocqueville here reveals, although they had a keen interest in the world of affairs, in 
practical life, none of these writers actually had any real or in-depth understanding of it. 
How could they? According to Tocqueville, “the complete absence of political liberty” in 
pre-Revolutionary France made it so hardly anyone did. Consequently, upon turning to 
the cultivation of theory, they cultivated it without even a “superficial” appreciation for 
the realities of the practical life—which is also to say that they did not really “cultivate” 
theory at all.  
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Again, as we saw in the previous chapter, insofar as cultivating theory depends on 
forming general ideas, it in part depends on employing the imagination. It depends on 
imagining that which man, unlike God, cannot fully “see”: the whole of reality and, in 
particular, man’s place in it. Yet, according to Tocqueville, forming general ideas alone is 
not enough. In addition to imagining that which man, unlike God, cannot fully see, 
cultivating theory requires constantly testing those ideas against “particular facts,” and 
then revising the former in accordance with the latter.  Let us recall that as necessary for 
cultivating theory as general ideas are, they do not attest to the strength of human 
intelligence but its “insufficiency.” Because nothing in nature, argues Tocqueville, is 
“exactly the same”; because there are no “identical facts”; because “no rules” apply 
“indiscriminately and in the same way to several matters at once”; general ideas are at 
best only ever useful approximations of the truth.715 They are “means by the aid of which 
men advance toward truth, but without ever finding it.”716 As a result, for Tocqueville 
cultivating theory depends not just on forming general ideas, but also and more 
importantly, on knowing how to form general ideas. 
 In an editorial note to his prolonged discussion on “the aptitude and taste for 
general ideas” in Democracy in America, Tocqueville observes that the “the man who 
puts forth general ideas is exposed to two great dangers from the perspective of 
criticism.”717 The first is a danger “common to all those put forth ideas, which is that they 
are false and it is noticed.” The second, however, is a danger that is less common, which 
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is that these ideas allow for “particular cases to escape.”718 According to Tocqueville, the 
more an idea is general, the more particular cases escape it, the more outliers there are. 
Hence, whereas the existence of a “very great number of particular cases opposed to a 
general idea would prove that the idea is false,” the existence of a few prove that, 
however true a general idea may be, it still falls short of being completely true.719 In order 
to form general ideas that are truer than they are false, then, one must learn how to 
insulate them from these two “great dangers.” One must learn the art of weighing their 
generality, on the one hand, against the number of particular cases (facts) that escape 
them, on the other.  
But herein lies the problem: the writers to whom Tocqueville is referring above 
never learned, let alone mastered, this art because in keeping with their German 
counterparts, they never developed any appreciation for the realities of practical life. 
Immediately following his prolonged discussion on the aptitude and taste for general 
ideas in Democracy in America, Tocqueville explains why the French, like the Germans, 
exhibit such an inordinate passion for general ideas, especially when it comes to politics. 
Unlike the Americans and the English, the French and the Germans, he observes, were 
never able to “run public affairs by themselves.”720 They were never able to immerse 
themselves in the realities of practical life. As a result, unlike the English and the 
Americans, they never learned to “rectify” their general ideas “by experience.”721 “In 
England,” writes Tocqueville, “those who wrote about government mingled with those 
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who governed, so that the latter introduced new ideas in practice while the former revised 
and pared down theories with the help of facts.”722 Similarly, in America, those who 
wrote the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist Papers, and the Constitution, were 
themselves those who governed. In both England and America, then, the cultivation of 
theory and the cultivation of practice prospered because whereas theory was cultivated 
with a view to the limits imposed by practice, practice was cultivated with a view to 
general ideas introduced by theory. Insofar as in these countries, the cultivation of theory 
was never separated absolutely from the cultivation of practice, in these countries, theory 
never became untethered from social and political reality as it did in France. As 
Tocqueville writes: 
…in France the political world remained divided, as it were, into two separate provinces 
with no commerce between them. One administered while the other established the 
abstract principles that should have formed the basis of all administration. One took 
specific measures, as routine required; the other proclaimed general laws without ever 
thinking about the means to apply them. One took charge of public affairs, the other of 
people’s minds. 
On top of the real society, whose constitution remained traditional, confused, and 
haphazard, and in which laws were still diverse and contradictory, ranks clearly defined, 
conditions fixed, and tax burdens unequal, an imaginary society was constructed piece by 
piece, in which everything seemed simple and coherent, uniform, equitable, and shaped 
by reason. 
Gradually, the imagination of the multitude deserted the former and retreated into the 
latter. People lost interest in what was in order to dream about what might be, and in their 
minds they lived in the ideal city that the writers had constructed.723 
 
Here, Tocqueville shows what happens when the cultivation of theory is “separated 
absolutely” from the cultivation of practice: the imagination takes over and reality is 
eclipsed; the real gives way to the ideal; absolute systems in which literally nothing is left 
to chance because “everything” is made to seem “simple, coherent, and uniform,” are 
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born. The cultivation of theory, in short, degenerates into system building of the kind that 
democratic historians, as we have seen, are liable to engage in. 
And yet, just as cultivating theory without a view to actual practice is liable to 
degenerate into the construction of “probably quite false” absolute systems, so the 
cultivation of practice without a view to theory is, according to Tocqueville, liable to 
result in the degeneration of civilization into barbarism. At the end of his chapter on the 
“application of the sciences” in Democracy in America, Tocqueville argues that, despite 
what many people now believe, it is entirely possible that what happened to Roman 
civilization could happen to civilization again.724 The only difference is that this time it 
will happen, not as a result of being physically destroyed by barbarians, but rather, of 
cultivating practice in the same way that the Germans tend to cultivate theory. 
As an example, one need only consider China. When the Europeans arrived in 
China, observes Tocqueville, they found a nation in which the cultivation of theory—in 
both its more and less applicable forms—had vanished. To be sure, like any other people, 
the Chinese had certain “methods;” they had certain ways of conducting their affairs. But 
as Tocqueville points out, while following the path of their fathers, “they had forgotten 
the reasons that guided the latter… 
…They were forced to imitate their fathers always and in all things, in order not to throw 
them- selves into impenetrable shadows, if they diverged for an instant from the road that 
the latter had marked. The source of human knowledge had nearly dried up; and although 
the river still flowed, it could no longer swell its waves or change its course.725 
 
In effect, whereas in France, the cultivation of theory devolved into the construction of 
imaginary systems that, in time, made “change” or revolution inevitable, in China, the 
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human imagination (and therewith it, the cultivation of theory) practically disappeared 
which, in time, made “change” literally impossible, preservation perpetual.726 There, 
revolutions were “very rare, and war was so to speak unknown.” It became a society 
where “tranquility without happiness, industry without progress, stability without 
strength, [and] physical order without public morality” reigned. It became, according to 
Tocqueville, barbaric.727 
Accordingly, just as Tocqueville takes to task those men for whom, prior to the 
Revolution, cultivating theory without a view to actual practice became a “defining 
occupation,” so he cautions against becoming too much like the Americans—a people for 
whom the cultivation of practice without a view to theory is essentially habitual. To be 
sure, when it comes to explaining why there is “no country in the civilized world” where 
“there less interest in philosophy than in the United States,” Tocqueville paints a 
complicated and, to a certain extent, contradictory, picture. On the one hand, he argues 
that although the Americans are democratic, their example does not necessarily prove 
that democratic peoples are liable to abandon, as did the Chinese, cultivating theory 
altogether. On the contrary, all it proves is that when it comes to cultivating or rather, not 
cultivating theory, the Americans are outliers: if not for their “proximity to Europe,” he 
writes, they too would “fall into barbarism; a thousand particular causes, of which I have 
been able to show only the principal ones, had to concentrate the American mind in a 
singular way in the concern for purely material things…”728 On the other hand, however, 
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Tocqueville admits that “if the democratic social-state and democratic institutions do not 
stop the development of the human mind, it is at least incontestable that they lead it in 
one direction rather than another;” the philosophical method of the Americans or 
democratic man all but makes this inevitable.729 Insofar as this method fosters in human 
beings a taste for the material, the empirical, and the useful, it focuses the human mind 
almost exclusively on the realities of practical life. True, this method prevents people 
from getting “lost in utopias”—that is, at least insofar as utopias present themselves as 
such and do not cloak themselves, like the ones constructed by democratic historians, in 
“the real.” However, by focusing the mind almost entirely on the realities of practical life, 
this method also causes people to doubt, if not deny, the existence of truth understood as 
something that is distinct from effects, altogether. It is no coincidence that pragmatism, a 
philosophy which essentially holds that what is “true” is what “works,” was founded in 
America.730 The philosophical method of democratic man causes the mind to conflate 
what is true with what is useful which, as Tocqueville’s reflections on the utility of 
religion illustrate, are not always the same.731  
Despite how Gobineau interprets Tocqueville’s concern for practical 
consequences, then, in his own method Tocqueville is in fact no more ‘American’ than he 
                                               
729 Tocqueville, 776. 
730 For an analysis of the origins of pragmatism, see Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A 
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is ‘German’ because, insofar as he is neither a “social scientist” of the kind that Gobineau 
aspires to be, nor simply a “moralist,” but rather, a political philosopher, he is in a sense 
both. In his Speech Given to the Annual Public Meeting of the Academy of Moral and 
Political Sciences in 1852, Tocqueville takes up the question of whether a “science of 
politics” can even be said to exist; for according to “political men,” it does not: “There is 
something rather puerile, they have said, in imagining that there is a particular art that 
teaches one to govern. The field of politics is too varied and volatile to permit one to 
place there the foundations of science.”732 Himself a political man, Tocqueville certainly 
understands where these “political men” are coming from. Inasmuch as they remain 
immersed in practical life, all they see are the particular facts that escape the general 
ideas on which theory is predicated; all they see is the contingent. Moreover, like 
Machiavelli before them, they rightly observe that anyone who tries to govern with the 
“aid of theories and maxims formed while studying philosophy and history” would in all 
likelihood fail.733 To do this would be to embrace a form of dogmatism at the expense of 
ignoring what governing effectively requires: pragmatism. Even so, however, 
Tocqueville is convinced that while these men are no doubt correct to observe that 
practice differs from theory—that the art of governing differs from political science—
they are wrong to therefore conclude that “political science” is either “chimerical” or 
“vain.” For as he eventually tells his audience, “barbarians are the only people who 
recognize nothing but practice in politics.”734 The truth, however, is that there is more to 
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politics than meets the practical eye. As the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and even 
Machiavelli himself illustrate, when it comes to human affairs, there is an important 
connection between theory and practice, truth and effect, such that the former is never 
totally removed from the latter and vice versa, and hence regardless of what certain men 
of thought, on the one hand, and men of action, on the other, might otherwise claim.  
But alas, herein lies the reason for so much of the confusion surrounding not only 
the methodological contours of Tocqueville’s “new science of politics,” but also, his 
“profoundly ambiguous” theory of history, as well. Although Tocqueville, unlike most 
men of action, clearly believes that political science is possible, like Plato, Aristotle, and 
even Machiavelli himself, he never provides a systematic explanation of his own. In the 
Introduction to Democracy in America, he famously declares that a “new science of 
politics is needed for a world entirely new.” But as Harvey Mansfield observes, although 
that declaration… 
…could hardly be more prominent, as an implied promise it is disappointing because 
Tocqueville never delivers the new political science. More cautiously, one could say that 
he never directly tells his readers what that political science is, what is wrong with the 
existing political science, and why political science is needed. Nonetheless, there is good 
reason to think that the new political science is in that book, and elsewhere in 
Tocqueville’s writings, and that he left it implicit and scattered rather than explain it 
systematically, also for good reason.735 
 
That Tocqueville never delivers on his implied promise to provide a systematic 
explanation of his new science of politics continues to foment debate over his method as 
a “social scientist,” just as his “profoundly ambiguous” theory of history continues to 
foment debate over his method as a historian.736 But just as Tocqueville’s failure to 
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deliver on this implied promise to provide a systematic explanation of his new science of 
politics does not mean that he has no political science, so his failure to systematically 
elaborate a philosophically coherent theory of historical change does not mean that he 
does not have a theory of history. For the same reason he leaves his political science 
“implicit and scattered,” he leaves his theory of history implicit and scattered, as well. To 
do otherwise would be to analyze historical change in a way that prioritizes the “logic of 
ideas” at the expense of ignoring their practical consequences, and thus writing about 
history in a way that not only runs the risk of ignoring the irreducibly complex nature of 
social and political reality, but as a direct result, that endangers the preservation of liberty 
and human dignity in a democratic age. To do otherwise, in sum, would be to embrace an 
approach to analyzing social and political phenomena that given the inextricable 
relationship between the philosophical merits of ideas, on the one hand, and their 
practical consequences, on the other, Tocqueville deliberately rejects.737   
What, then, is Tocqueville’s approach to analyzing social and political 
phenomena? What is his method? Essentially, it is what Pierre Manent and Catherine 
Zuckert, among others, identify as “political sociology,” an approach to analyzing social 
and political phenomena that strives to combine—if not fully reconcile—two otherwise 
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opposed traditions: sociology, on the one hand, and politics, on the other.738 According to 
Manent, although these two traditions can, with success, be combined, they nevertheless 
tend in opposite directions. Whereas the overwhelming tendency of sociology is to 
identify “causal necessities” (general causes, as Tocqueville refers to them) and thus 
subordinate the political to the pre-political (to climate, geography, race, economics 
relations, the spirit of civilization), the overwhelming tendency of politics is to affirm the 
causal influence of human agency and thus subordinate the pre-political to the 
political.739 Simply put, whereas the former tends towards Marx and is therefore 
‘German,’ the latter tends towards Aristotle and is therefore much more ‘American.’ As 
we shall see next, however, insofar as Tocqueville follows neither in the methodological 
footsteps of the Restoration liberals (who, if we recall, Engels identifies as being 
instrumental in the development of the Marxist conception of history), nor the 
methodological footsteps of Aristotle (a philosopher for whom “the most authoritative 
and most architectonic [art]…appears to be the political one”), but rather, in the 
methodological in the footsteps of Montesquieu, Tocqueville’s theory of history, like his 
approach to analyzing social and political reality more generally, tends towards neither 
because it paradoxically, tends towards both.740 
IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MONTESQUIEU: TOCQUEVILLE ON CAUSALITY IN HISTORY 
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In a letter written to de Kergorlay in 1850, Tocqueville expresses his desire to 
write a new book that would eventually become The Ancien Regime—his final major 
work and the closest thing to a history he actually wrote.741 Before he discusses “the 
subject” of this book, however, he briefly reflects on why he has never been in a better 
position to write it. If spending the last ten years in politics has taught him anything, he 
explains, it is that his “real worth” lies “primarily in works of the mind.” “I am better in 
thought than in action,” he tells de Kergorlay, “and if any trace of my passage in this 
world is to remain, it will be in the form of what I have written rather than the memory of 
what I have done.”742 Still, as he goes on to observe, although his “real worth” lies in 
producing “works of the mind,” that worth has paradoxically less to with his inability to 
put ideas into practice than it does with his ability to cultivate theory with a view to the 
latter. While the last ten years have no doubt been a political failure, they have 
nonetheless given him “a more practical sense of details without depriving [his] mind of 
the habit of contemplating the affairs of men in the aggregate.”743 As a result, he is 
confident that whatever his failings in politics, he is in a “better position now than when 
[he] wrote Democracy in America to treat an important topic in political literature.”744 
The only questions that remain are what that important topic will be, and how it should 
be treated.  
                                               
741 I say “the closest thing to a history” because in the very first sentence of The Ancien Regime, 
Tocqueville goes out of his way to tell his readers that “This book is not a history of the French Revolution, 
which has been recounted too brilliantly for me to contemplate doing it again. It is rather a study of that 
Revolution” (1).  
742 Tocqueville, Recollections, 255. 
743 Tocqueville, 255. 
744 Tocqueville, 255. 
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As for the answer to the first question, Tocqueville tells de Kergorlay that he 
wants to write on the very topic that another democratic historian and colleague of his, 
Adolphe Thiers, wrote on his twenty-one volume History of the Consulate and the 
Empire: “the long drama of the French Revolution;” “the vast stretch of time that extends 
from 1789 to the present.”745 In a conversation with William Nassau Senior four months 
earlier, Tocqueville had already expressed his disappointment with Theirs’ History. “Its 
negative defect,” he thought, was “its inadequate appreciation of the causes, intrinsic and 
extrinsic, which united to form Napoleon.”  “Few histories,” he told his friend, “give to 
these two sets of causes their due, or their relative weight. Some attribute too much to the 
circumstances in which their hero is placed, others to the accidents of his character”—and 
Thiers’ History was apparently no different. 746 Because Thiers failed to give these two 
sets of causes their relative weight, he failed to sufficiently explain how it was that 
Napoleon was able to do what he did and why it was that he chose to do it.747 
Consequently, Tocqueville not only thought that “The History of the Empire and the 
Consulate [was] still to be written,” but also, that he should be the one to write it. His 
sharpened sense details combined with his ability to contemplate the affairs of men in the 
aggregate made him uniquely qualified to do just that. 
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As for the answer to the second question, then, Tocqueville tells de Kergorlay that 
unlike Thiers, he will treat this subject not by writing a history of the Revolution in the 
“strict sense,” but rather, by writing a book that comprises “a set of reflections and 
judgments about that history.”748 He would of course “record the facts and trace their 
sequence,” but his “main purpose would not be to recount them.” His main purpose, 
rather, would be to “explain the most important facts and expose their various causes and 
consequences.” His main purpose would be to do what over a hundred years earlier, 
Montesquieu had done in his Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the 
Romans and Their Decline: combine “history in the narrow sense” with what Tocqueville 
calls “historical philosophy,” recount the particular so as to identify and make 
judgements about the general.749   
Now, it is important to recognize that although Tocqueville singles out 
Montesquieu’s Considerations as his model, Montesquieu was not the only historian who 
influenced his approach to analyzing historical change. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 
and, as alluded to above, he also admired Guizot, whose lectures on the history of 
civilization in Europe he began attending in 1828 in Paris.750 Upon beginning his legal 
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career in1824, Tocqueville asked a former teacher of his, M. Mougin, for some advice 
and was told, among other things, to study history: “the most necessary and the most 
difficult” of studies.751 But it was not until 1828 when he began attending Guizot’s 
lectures on the history of civilization in Europe that he began to take this most necessary 
and difficult of studies seriously. While attending these lectures, he apparently became 
“enamored” with Guizot’s analytical method—a method that, similar to Montesquieu’s, 
was also much more “philosophical” than “narrow.”752 
 Still, for all of his admiration of Guizot, Tocqueville was nonetheless critical of 
certain aspects of his method and, in particular, of his teleology as a historian.753 In a 
letter to Beaumont dated October 5, 1828, Tocqueville offers his “reflections on English 
history” and, in so doing, implicitly criticizes both Guizot’s method and his teleology.754 
As far as Guizot’s method was concerned, Tocqueville thought it placed too much 
emphasis on the determining influence of general causes and decisive events. “Historians 
have a passion for decisive events,” he writes. “One must admit that they are very 
convenient. An event like that makes an excellent starting point; your purposes set once 
for all, you have only to give a straightforward, frank, account of the ensuing 
consequences. What could be better? But unfortunately this world’s affairs do not always 
go like that.”755 In effect, while Tocqueville thought that Guizot’s work was “truly 
prodigious,” he also “thought that Guizot did not give enough amplitude to the decisive, 
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even if accidental, interventions of important leaders in revolutionary times, and, indeed, 
in earlier periods.”756 As for Guizot’s teleology, Tocqueville found this just as troubling. 
Later on his letter to Beaumont, he observes that “There are many people, both among 
those who have studied English history and those who have not, who suppose that the 
English constitution has passed through various regular, successive stages until it has 
reached the point where it now is. According to them it is a fruit which every age has 
helped to ripen.” But as goes to write, “That is not my view and I shall be very surprised 
if it is yours when you have read all English history carefully. No doubt you will agree 
with me that there comes a moment when the forward movement is not only stopped but 
gives way to a most marked retrogression.”757  
Despite also believing that the Revolution was inevitable, then, Tocqueville never 
interpreted its inevitability as evidence of the fact that history was progressive. As we 
saw above, like the Restoration liberals, Tocqueville also subjects the doctrine of 
Providence to an empirical test and thus also strips God’s will of its hidden or mysterious 
nature. At the same time, however, he never goes so far as to replace Providence with 
progress which, as we saw in Chapter 2, both Guizot and Thierry do. Why? Because 
Tocqueville apparently recognized that to do so would be to informally embrace a 
doctrine of fatality or historical determinism that made it impossible to interpret the past 
as anything other than wholly necessitated. For Guizot, “political authority had to pass 
through a despotic phase in order to achieve social and national unity.”758 In keeping with 
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“Saint-Simon, he alluded to the general course of events or suggested that despotism, like 
anarchy, in the end served the cause of progress.”759 But for Tocqueville, interpreting 
history as a series of successive stages—each following the next—rendered otherwise 
regrettable, condemnable, events like the Terror as not only necessary, but also, just.760  It 
conflated the “ought” with the “is,” what should have been with what was, and therefore 
did precisely what Hegel’s monstrous system, as we saw in the previous chapter, did: at 
once condoned tyranny and revolution. According to Crăiuțu, rather than view Guizot as 
a historical determinist, “It would be more accurate to argue that in Guizot’s writings, the 
ideas of progress and necessity were more an expression of providentialism than 
determinism.”761 But as Tocqueville himself recognized, upon embracing the idea of 
progress one necessarily slips into historical determinism because the idea of historical 
progress, unlike the idea of providence, cannot be defended on the basis of faith alone. It 
stands or falls on the idea that history is governed by a law akin to the law of gravity: a 
law which guarantees the movement of history towards an “immense grandeur at the end 
of the long course humanity must still cover.”762 To embrace the modern idea of progress, 
therefore, is necessarily to embrace historical determinism, whether one is cognizant of it 
or not.  
While developing his own theory of history, therefore, Tocqueville turned away 
from Guizot and towards Montesquieu—a philosopher who, although no less 
instrumental in the development of the philosophy of history than Voltaire,  never 
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embraced the idea of progress and so never tried to identify in history, “some 
transcendent purpose beyond the actual facts.” As J.B. Bury explains:  
Montesquieu was not among the apostles of the idea of Progress. It never secured any 
hold upon his mind. But he had grown in the same intellectual climate in which that idea 
was produced; he had been nurtured both on the dissolving, dialectic of Bayle, and on the 
Cartesian enunciation of natural law. And his work contributed to the service, not of the 
doctrine of the past, but of the doctrine of the future.  
For he attempted to extend Cartesian theory to social facts. He laid down that political, 
like physical, phenomena are subject to general laws. He had already conceived this, his 
most striking and important idea, when he wrote the Considerations on the Greatness and 
Decadence of the Romans (1734), in which he attempted to apply it: 
‘It is not Fortune who governs the world, as we see from the history of Romans. There 
are general causes, moral or physical, which operate in every monarchy, raise it, maintain 
it, or overthrow it; all that occurs is subject to these causes; and if a particular cause, like 
the accidental result of a battle, has ruined a state, there was a general cause which made 
the downfall of this state ensue from a single battle. In a word, the principal movement 
draws with it all the particular occurrences.’763 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, by updating/replacing Bossuet’s Discours with his Essai, 
Voltaire in effect replaced of the doctrine of Providence with the doctrine of progress, the 
theology of history with the first “philosophy of history.” As Bury here points out, 
however, Voltaire was not the only one to discredit Bossuet’s treatment of history; 
Montesquieu did the same. For just as his theory of historical causality precludes the idea 
that fortune governs the world, so it “dispenses with Providence, design, and final 
causes.”764 Still, as Bury also observes, unlike Voltaire Montesquieu never became an 
apostle of the idea of progress. While he therefore replaces providence with general 
causes, he does not replace it with a law of history akin to the law of gravity: a single 
“superior force.” To do would be to embrace a form of the same “dogma of the necessity 
of human actions” that, as we saw in the previous chapter, he criticizes. Accordingly, 
despite also advancing the idea that political, like physical, phenomena were subject to 
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impersonal forces (whether it be the climate, geography, the nature of institutions, or 
mores), Montesquieu never applied that idea in such a way as to also—whether wittingly 
or unwittingly—advance the notion that history was progressive.  He applied that idea in 
such a way as to advance the notion that history “passed through various regular, 
successive stages, only to reach the point where it now is.” On the contrary, all he did 
was posit the notion that because particular or secondary causes, “like the accidental 
result of a battle,” are subject to more general ones (whether moral or physical), history is 
not so much governed by fortune as it is by “principal movements” which draw with 
them “all the particular occurrences.”  
While he therefore rejects the idea that history is a product of chance, 
Montesquieu does not go so far as to eliminate the phenomenon of accident from social 
and political reality altogether—and neither did Tocqueville.765 As we saw in Chapter 2, 
included in Tocqueville’s chapter on historians in democratic centuries is a lengthy 
editorial note in he which tells us that “there are two ideas in this chapter which must not 
be confused,” both of which have to do with the question of what, exactly, qualifies as an 
“accident.”766 On the one hand, he explains, an accident is the influence that a powerful 
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individual, “like Napoleon,” can exert over the “destiny of a people.”767 That such an 
individual’s influence is never, strictly speaking, necessary or fated means that at a 
fundamental level it remains undetermined ie. a function of chance as opposed to 
necessity. On the other hand, however, an accident can also be something that, according 
Tocqueville, is “due” completely to “chance,” such as a “plague” or “the loss of a battle;” 
for just as the spread of a plague is, at the end of day, beyond the control of any one 
doctor so the loss of a battle is beyond the control of any one field commander. Yet, for 
Tocqueville as for Montesquieu, that which is “accidental”—whether it be a plague or the 
actions of a statesman—does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it occurs within the context 
of “principle movements” created by a concatenation of general causes that by working 
together just so happen to make certain events like the fall of Rome or the Revolution, 
inevitable. For as Tocqueville writes in his Recollections: 
…I believe that many important historical facts can be explained only by accidental 
circumstances, while many others remain inexplicable, and finally, that chance—or, 
rather, that skein of secondary causes that we call chance because we cannot untangle 
them—plays a major part in everything that takes places on the world stage. But I also 
firmly believe that chance accomplishes nothing for which the groundwork has not been 
laid in advance. Prior facts, the nature of institutions, the cast of people’s minds, and the 
state of mores are the materials out of which chance improvises the effects we find so 
surprising and terrible to behold.768 
 
This is the most direct and comprehensive statement that Tocqueville makes regarding 
his own theory of history, and it clearly conveys his methodological indebtedness to 
Montesquieu. Unlike democratic historians for whom showing how facts happened is 
“not enough,” Tocqueville, as we can see, refuses to eliminate the phenomenon of chance 
from social and political reality altogether. He believes that “many historical facts can be 
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explained by only accidental circumstances, while others remain inexplicable.” Yet, by 
accidental circumstances, it turns out, he does not simply mean effects without causes: 
that which Aristotle declares an absurdity. For him, chance is a “skein of secondary 
causes that we call chance because we cannot untangle them.” Chance is that part of 
reality which man, because he is not God, necessarily remains blind to but can imagine 
nonetheless. While it therefore plays a major part in everything that takes place on the 
world stage, it does not govern that stage any more than fortune, according to 
Montesquieu, governs the world. For Tocqueville as for Montesquieu, chance 
“accomplishes nothing for which the groundwork has not been laid in advance.” For 
Tocqueville as for Montesquieu, there are general causes—some physical, others moral—
that chance understood as an unintelligible “skein of secondary causes” nevertheless 
operates in tandem with. General causes make up a canvas of necessity on which 
chance—a causal category under which Tocqueville places the influence of individuals—
then paints the scene of history. 
TOCQUEVILLE AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION 
Now, whether this understanding causality of history does not itself fall prey to a 
form, however soft, of historical determinism is another question. For to define chance as 
a “skein of secondary causes that we call chance because we cannot untangle them” is 
essentially to affirm the idea that what appears accidental is just that: an appearance. In 
other words, it is essentially to argue that chance is not so much a nebulous phenomenon, 
the existence of which refutes the Enlightenment assumption that history, like nature, is 
rational, as it is a stand-in-word for that which human reason, given its limits, cannot 
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fully explain but potentially could. Despite claiming that his theory of history is 
“perfectly compatible” with human freedom, therefore, Tocqueville’s theory of history 
nevertheless succumbs to the same problem that any theory of history which strives to 
make historical change intelligible succumbs to: the fundamentally theological problem 
of free will and predestination. 
In the very first sentence of his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose, Kant raises this problem in the same way that Tocqueville does, as we have 
seen, in his correspondence with Gobineau. No, he does not speak of free will in religious 
terms; for he does not speak of free will in relation to God’s omnipotence and 
omniscience. Instead, he writes that “Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one 
may form in terms of metaphysics, the will’s manifestations in the world of phenomena, 
i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other 
natural event.”769 Nevertheless, the problem is essentially the same and for the following 
the reason: as applied to human actions, the idea of necessity—that natural laws 
determine human behavior as they do every other natural event—does to free will 
precisely what the theological concept of predestination does to free will, as well: 
abolishes it. 
Of course, to argue that human actions are as much a function of necessity or 
natural laws as is every other natural event is not necessarily to abolish human freedom. 
As we have seen, so long as by “freedom” is meant nothing other than what Hobbes, for 
instance, means by it, “necessity” and “liberty” can be reconciled. Yet, insofar as this is 
                                               
769 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant: Political Writings, 41. 
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not what Kant means by freedom, in the very first sentence of his Idea for a Universal 
History he in effect undermines a key premise on which his entire moral philosophy is 
predicated.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, in his Critique of Practical Reason Kant takes 
to task those who, by embracing the “wretched subterfuge” of compatibilism, “think they 
have solved” the problem of free will. They think, he argues, that “with a little quibbling 
about words” they have solved a problem which has plagued the human mind for 
millennia. For Kant, however, they have not so much solved this problem as they have 
rendered human freedom subordinate to necessity, and thus deprived human beings of 
their inherent dignity as rational as opposed to purely instinctual beings. For Kant, 
“compatibilists” like Hobbes or Hume are nothing other than soft-determinists who, in 
keeping with the “hard” ones, also deny what makes a human being human to begin with. 
Still, as the first sentence of his Idea for a Universal History reveals, when it 
comes to expounding his philosophy of history, Kant is ironically enough no different. If 
we recall, in his letter to Borgius, Engels parrots an argument about the nature of the 
historical process initially advanced by Kant. In keeping with the latter, he argues that 
despite pursuing their own aims and interests, a “necessity” still reigns which makes it so 
all men, regardless of time and place, contribute to the execution of a “concerted plan” 
nonetheless. But if this the case—if a necessity still reigns which makes it so that all men, 
regardless of their individual actions, contribute to the execution of a concerted plan 
nonetheless—then human beings simply cannot be said to be free in the way that Kant, in 
his Critique of Practical Reason, maintains.  
 310 
Upon reflection, therefore, whereas in his moral philosophy Kant argues that 
human beings are never to be treated as means but only as “ends-in-themselves,” in his 
philosophy of history he in effect reduces entire generations of human beings to the 
“means” of a historical process that, over time, will issue in the establishment of a 
“perfect” constitution. “What remains disconcerting about all this,” he therefore admits… 
is firstly, that the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the 
sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further stage from which they can raise 
still higher the structure intended by nature; and secondly, that only the later generations 
will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a whole series of their 
forefathers (admittedly, without any conscious intention) had worked without themselves 
being able to share in the happiness they were preparing.770 
 
As Kant here reveals, the establishment of what he elsewhere calls a “kingdom of ends” 
(his version of the “immense grandeur” or “ideal perfection” that awaits humanity at the 
end of the long course it must still cover) has essentially nothing to do with individual 
human beings choosing, by their own volition, to live in accordance with a “categorical 
imperative.” Rather, it has to do with the “unconscious” work done by generations of less 
than moral Machiavellian operators who will never themselves be able to share in the 
happiness they are unwittingly preparing for their Kantian descendants to enjoy. Simply 
put, despite the fact that it is our duty as rational beings to live by the moral law, there is, 
paradoxically, no role for moral persons to play in bringing about what nature, regardless 
of our intentions, guarantees. Moral persons are therefore left in the altogether awkward 
position of having to resist or moderate “the spread of amoral commercialization, the 
                                               
770 Kant, 44 (emphasis mine). 
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increase in war power, and the plotting revolutionary upheaval—even while knowing that 
these movements are the true agents of historical progress.”771   
As William Galston observes, this contradiction between Kant’s moral 
philosophy, on the one hand, and his philosophy of history, on the other hand, is a 
contradiction that, despite being aware of it, Kant  leaves “unresolved.”772 He never 
attempts to square his understanding of human freedom with the idea that history is 
“determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event”—and for 
good reason: from a purely philosophical standpoint, reconciling an incompatibilist 
understanding of human freedom with necessity is impossible. 
 As we saw in Chapter 4, in a letter dated November 17, 1853, Tocqueville takes 
issue with the fact that Gobineau’s doctrine is “rather a sort of fatalism, of predestination 
if you wish but, at any rate, very different from that of St. Augustine, from the Jansenists, 
and from the Calvinists (the very last are closest to your doctrines), since you tie 
predestination and matter closely together.”773 Why? Because Tocqueville recognizes that 
despite its scientific pretense, there nevertheless exists a kinship between Gobineau’s 
historical system, on the one hand, and what Montesquieu, as we have seen, calls the 
“dogma of the necessity of human actions” on the other. In other words, he recognizes 
that by designing an absolute historical system of the kind that not only shows how facts 
happened, but also, how they could not have happened otherwise, Gobineau has without 
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realizing it immanentized a fundamentally religious concept which also “vastly limits if 
not abolishes human freedom.” 
 Important to recognize, however, is that insofar as Tocqueville argues that 
chance—as much as it affects everything that takes place on the world stage—is but a 
“skein of secondary causes,” his own theory of history is in a way reminding of the 
theological concept of predestination, as well. Like Kant, Tocqueville presents himself as 
an incompatibilist.774 His invocation of “free will” at the very end of his analysis of 
historians in democratic centuries, along with his insistence that the moral qualities of 
human beings play an important role in shaping the destines of nations, makes it seem as 
though human freedom is incompatible with the principle of causality--just as Rousseau 
argues in The Second Discourse.775 Moreover and, as alluded to above, in an editorial 
footnote at the end Democracy in America, he insists that his “system,” unlike that of 
“Mignet and company” is “perfectly compatible with human liberty.”776 But just as 
Augustine’s conception of predestination assumes that “our wills are themselves included 
in the order of causes which is certain to God and contained within His foreknowledge,” 
so Tocqueville’s theory of history, his own historical “system,” collapses our wills into a 
“skein of secondary causes that we call chance because we cannot untangle them.”777  
                                               
774 Marinus Richard Ringo Ossewaarde, Tocqueville’s Moral and Political Thought: New Liberalism 
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776 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1284 (emphasis mine). 
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Tocqueville, it would therefore seem, reconciles free will with the principle of 
causality, after all. For like Augustine, he simply collapses it into an order of causality 
that human reason, given its limits, cannot penetrate.778 According to Augustine, this 
order of causality remains impenetrable because, in accordance with the doctrine of 
Providence, God’s mind remains unknown to us. But as we have seen, for Tocqueville it 
is not “necessary for God himself to speak in order for us to discover sure signs of his 
will; it is enough to examine the regular march of nature and the continuous tendency of 
events.” Consequently, rather than collapse free will into an order of causality governed 
by the mysterious will of God, Tocqueville—following Montesquieu—collapses it into 
an unintelligible “skein of secondary causes” subject to more general ones. It is not that 
men are “blind instruments in the hands of God.”779 It is that men like Frederick the Great 
are the “agents” of a continuous tendency of events, beyond their control.780 
 In this way, then, Tocqueville’s theory of history is also deterministic because 
while does not overtly affirm that necessity as opposed to fortune governs the world, it 
does preclude the possibility that history is simply absurd: that the historical process is 
nothing more or less than “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying 
                                               
778 For an excellent analysis of Augustine’s conception of free will and how it relates to the belief that God 
or Providence governs the world, see Katherin Rogers, “Augustine’s Compatiblism,” Religious Studies, 
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779 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 10. 
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not only drops any reference to the notion that providence governs history, but also, makes an off-hand 
remark concerning the all too common rhetorical use of the words “Providence” and “providential” by his 
contemporaries. As he writes,  
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nothing.”781  No wonder he leaves his theory of history implicit and scattered; no wonder 
he “reproaches” himself “for seeming to fall in to the mania of the century.” By reducing 
chance to a skein of secondary causes subject to more general ones, does he not also 
vastly limit, if not completely abolish, human freedom? 
TOCQUEVILLE’S “PROFOUNDLY AMBIGUOUS” THEORY OF HISTORY 
While the answer to this question is far from self-evident, for our purposes it is 
important simply to recognize the following: that insofar Tocqueville’s theory of history, 
rather like Augustine’s understanding of causality in the world, carves out a space for that 
which given the limits of human reason, remains unintelligible, when compared to 
theories of history that in no uncertain terms do abolish human freedom, it at the very 
least remains open to the possibility that free will exists (even though it very well may 
not) and thus open to the possibility that human beings are in fact morally responsible for 
their actions (even if they very well may not be). Immediately prior to revealing what he 
“believes,” in the Recollections, about causality in history, Tocqueville tells us that he 
“hates absolute systems that see all historical events as dependent on grand first causes 
linked together in ineluctable sequence, thus banishing individual human beings from the 
history of the human race.”782 In order to separate his own theory of history from these 
absolute systems, therefore, he insists that chance plays a major part in everything that 
takes places on the world stage and, in so doing, brings to our attention the essential 
                                               
781 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. by A.R.B. Braunmuller (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 229. 
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difference between the “philosophy of history,” on the one hand, and “historical 
philosophy,” on the other. 783  
 According to Tocqueville, Montesquieu’s history on the “grandeur and 
decadence of the Romans” is the “inimitable model in this genre” because it perfectly 
mixes “history in the narrow sense” with “historical philosophy,” particular facts with 
general causes, chance occurrences with causal necessities.784 It makes it so events like 
the altogether unexpected appearance of a man like Trajan in the history or Rome can 
occur, even in the midst of her otherwise inevitable decline.785 As a result, unlike Marx’s 
philosophy of history which, as we saw in Chapter 4, conflates the emergence of great 
men in history with the occurrence of any other natural event (whether it be a sunset or a 
flood), Montesquieu’s historical philosophy never goes so far as to render human beings 
the product exclusively of their environment—and neither does Tocqueville’s. For 
Tocqueville, man is more than just “Time” or history. As we saw in Chapter 3, he is a 
combination of Time and Space, history and nature. However malleable the human 
species may in fact be, then, for Tocqueville there is a permanency to human nature 
                                               
783 Robert Gannett Jr. “Tocqueville Unveiled: A Historian and His Sources in L’Ancien Regime et la 
Revolution Volume One,” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 64. As Gannett Jr. 
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which it was “blessing to be born”—was a rare and, for all intents and purposes, an accidental exception to 
the general trend of events leading to Rome’s otherwise inevitable decline.  
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which makes it so, however conditioned by their social, political, and physical, 
environment human beings no doubt are, it would be too reductionistic to argue that by 
making their own history, they are doing nothing more or less than “performing the task 
of their times.” Thus, just as Montesquieu never goes so far as to argue that in the 
absence of a Trajan, another “Trajan” would have taken his place, so Tocqueville never 
goes so far as to argue that in the absence of Napoleon, another “Napoleon” would 
“invariably turn up.”786 To do so would be to make the same methodological error that 
not only Marx, but also, Thiers apparently made while writing his History. It would be to 
inadequately appreciate “the causes, intrinsic and extrinsic, which united to form 
Napoleon.” 
 While historical philosophy is therefore much more scientific than narrative 
history, it is not so scientific as to render the historical process a tale told by a prophet, 
either. To be sure, it is tempting to regard Tocqueville, if not Montesquieu, as a kind of 
prophet—as a historian for whom like the Restoration liberals before him, the future can 
be predicted by conducting a scientific analysis of the past. Methodological statements 
like the one he makes at the beginning of his chapter on the “point of departure” of the 
Americans in Democracy in America appear to suggest just this. In keeping with 
Gobineau, he too is convinced that by going “back to the beginning,” one can explain the 
“destiny of certain peoples who seem to be dragged by an unknown force toward an end 
unknown even to themselves.”787 Moreover, in a letter to Mme de Circourt in 1850, he 
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admits to at times posing as a prophet.788 But as discussed in the previous chapter, with 
the exception of America’s beginning, Tocqueville recognizes that the beginnings of 
other nations (let alone the beginning of human history as a whole), are lost in the mists 
of time. In effect, for him the idea of the “philosophy of history” is essentially a non-
starter. “With difficulty,” he writes, “the human mind manages in a way to draw a great 
circle around the future; but within this circle chance, which escapes all efforts, is in 
constant motion. In the portrait of the future, chance always forms the obscure point 
where the sight of intelligence cannot penetrate.”789 Insofar as history is in part a 
labyrinth of chance, “science, in such a labyrinth, provides only incomplete conclusions 
and vague hypotheses.”790 At most, Tocqueville is a “probabilist:” a historian for whom, 
given the often “radical unpredictability” of social and political phenomena, there can be 
no “ultimate determination of any social aspect by another.”791 
Consequently, despite also being a historical determinist, Tocqueville’s theory of 
history is, in keeping with Montesquieu’s, much less “sociological,” much more 
“political,” and therefore much more “profoundly ambiguous” than those of the 
democratic historians he criticizes. If we recall, according to Tocqueville, whereas 
aristocratic historians prioritize the influence of individuals in determining the course of 
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history (and thus implicitly grant a kind of unfettered freedom from necessity to human 
beings) democratic historians prioritize the influence of general causes in determining 
even the smallest of “particular facts” (and thus implicitly deny that human freedom 
understood as something separate from necessity exists).792 Put another way, whereas 
aristocratic historians commit the methodological error of exaggerating the undoubtedly 
important role that human beings play in determining their own political fate, democratic 
historians commit the methodological error of denying that role in its entirety. From the 
perspective of Tocqueville, however, just as democratic historians are wrong to deny that 
human freedom understood as something separate from necessity exists, so aristocratic 
historians are wrong to grant an unfettered freedom from necessity to human beings. For 
him, 
…there is no period when one part of the events of this world must not be attributed to 
very general facts, and another to very particular influences. These two causes are always 
found; only their relationship differs. General facts explain more things in democratic 
centuries than in aristocratic centuries, and particular influences fewer. In times of 
aristocracy, it is the opposite; particular influences are stronger, and general causes are 
weaker, as long as you do not consider as a general cause the very fact of inequality of 
conditions, which allows a few individuals to thwart the natural tendencies of all the 
others.793  
 
So it follows that if Tocqueville’s theory of history is also more democratic than 
aristocratic—more hostile to human freedom than it is friendly—that is only because his 
living in a democratic century demands it. Just as relying on general ideas is necessary 
for theorizing in general, so identifying general causes is necessary for theorizing about 
history in particular. But just as a good theorist must learn the art of weighing the 
generality of an idea against the number of particular cases that escape it, so a good 
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historian must learn how to weigh the influence of general causes against the influence of 
all of the “fortuitous and secondary causes” that are “infinitely more varied, more hidden, 
more complicated, less powerful, and consequently more difficult to disentangle and to 
trace in times of equality…”794 This is an intellectual exercise that, whether out of 
intellectual sloth or vanity or both, the democratic historians Tocqueville criticizes fail to 
do. Gobineau, as we have seen, is case in point. But insofar as Tocqueville insists that 
“chance—or, rather, that skein of secondary causes that we call chance because we 
cannot untangle them—plays a major part in everything that takes places on the world 
stage,” it is an exercise that Tocqueville understood (and increasingly so) as imperative 
for painting a portrait that was at once “strictly accurate” and “educational,” which was 
his goal in writing both Democracy in America and The Ancien Regime to begin with.795 
According to Tocqueville, historians who design systems like Gobineau’s 
“consider a nation that has reached a certain place in its history and assert that it has been 
forced to follow the road that led it there.” Tocqueville’s aim in writing history, however, 
is to show “what it could have done to take a better route.”796 While he therefore strives, 
like any other historian, to make history intelligible, he nevertheless stops short of 
advancing, let alone systematically elaborating, a theory of historical change that 
attempts to make history predictable. As a historian for whom history is neither “a tale 
told by an idiot” (the product entirely of chance) nor a tale told by a prophet (the product 
entirely of necessity), his theory of history remains, like Montesquieu’s before him, an 
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unsystematic and thus “profoundly ambiguous” one; for while it clearly limits human 
freedom by collapsing chance, and there with it, human agency into an unintelligible 
“skein of secondary causes,” it never goes so far as to outright deny that human freedom 
exists and thus reduce human beings, however circumscribed their freedom may well be, 
to cogs in a historical machine. 
On the whole, therefore, his theory of history remains much safer for democracy 
than those of his contemporaries for whom showing how facts happened is simply “not 
enough.” These other theories of history, Tocqueville tells us, are both “false and 
cowardly.” That they claim to be theoretically infallible, that they are “absolute,” makes 
them not only “probably quite false,” but also, undermining of the preservation of liberty 
and human dignity in a democratic age. But because Tocqueville always cultivates theory 
with a view to practice, because he always keeps his imagination tethered to the 
irreducibly complex nature of social and political reality, he never goes so far as to do the 
same. Their theories of history turn everything unexpected into the inevitable. Their 
theories of history transform disasters into epics, tragedy into farce, and teach a doctrine 
of fatality as a result.797 However, insofar as Tocqueville’s theory of history never goes 
so far as to convert the terror of the unforeseen into an altogether coherent drama of the 
past, it not only remains truer, but also, more ennobling. 
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